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[The following are translations of selected articles from the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL published in Moscow. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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## MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 6, June 1989

### They Stood Til the Death

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pp 8-15

[Article, published under the heading "Security Classification Lifted," by Col Gen L.M. Sandalov: "They Stood Til the Death"; taken from the book by L.M. Sandalov "Boevyye deystviya voysk 4-y armii Zapadnogo fronta v nachalnyy period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Combat of 4th Army of the Western Front in the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961. Continuation, for previous issues see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 10, 11, 12 for 1988 and No 2 for 1989]

[Text]

### Combat Operations of 4th Army on 23 June

The order from the commander of the XIV Mechanized Corps on the conduct of a counterstrike just by the tank divisions without the 205th Motorized Division continued to depress the army commander. He felt that having been persuaded by the workers of the army staff and the corps commander, he had acted capriciously as he had deviated from the instructions of the front staff "to be guided in actions by the Red Packet." For this reason during the night of 23 June, without having any particular arguments from the military council member and the chief of staff of the army, he insisted on the execution of his first decision for the participation of the 205th Motorized Division in the army counterstrike. The latter [the motorized division], upon orders of the corps commander assigned a large portion of the available motor transport and established two improvised motorized battalions which were sent to participate in the counterstrike: one to the 30th Tank Division and the other together with a tank regiment from the division (around 40 tanks) to the XXVIII Rifle Corps to the area of Khvedkovichi.

Cooperation between the XIV Mechanized and XXVIII Rifle Corps in the forthcoming counterstrike had been organized by the army staff. This came down merely to summoning to the army command post the commanders and chiefs of staffs from the corps and the assigning of tasks to them. In turn, the corps commanders and their staffs also limited themselves to giving tasks to the divisions.

By the start of the counterstrike, the army commander with a group of officers traveled to the command post of the XXVIII Rifle Corps in the Zhabinka area but did not find the post as it had been moved to Kobrin. Having visited a number of subunits from the 28th Tank and 6th Rifle Divisions, Gen A.A. Korobkov stopped at the staff of the 459th Rifle Regiment to the east of Khvedkovichi.

From the stories of the officers escorting the army commander in their visit to the units and staffs he found virtually all the personnel asleep. Here one felt the strong nervous confusion from the enemy surprise attack and the unusual combat tension of the first day of the war. Moreover, due to the unavailability of food, the soldiers and commanders had not received a meal in almost 24 hours. Here also the habits of peacetime made themselves felt: the strictly regulated order of the day, the absence of drills in the multiday continuous exercises away from permanent dispositions and brief rest. Moreover, a majority of the soldiers and officers who had been tempered under the severe conditions of the war in Finland had already been demobilized and the difficult testings of the initial period of the war fell on the shoulders of insufficiently trained Red Army men and young officers who had just emerged from the military schools.

At 0600 hours on 23 July, units from the XIV Mechanized and XXVIII Rifle Corps and the 75th Rifle Division began counterattacks against units from the XLVII and XXIV Motorized and XII Army German Corps. Our troops achieved only insignificant successes in the area of Zhabinka and in the zone of the 75th Rifle Division. Here they pushed the enemy to the west. However, on other sectors the enemy supported by concentrated artillery fire and aviation went over to the offensive and with its panzer divisions began to advance rapidly on the axis of Kobrin and Pruzhany.

The 30th Tank Division by the start of the attack had 120-130 operational tanks. In the course of the fighting in the morning of 23 June, the division suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks from artillery fire, particularly the antitank weapons, and from enemy dive-bombers and the fire of medium tanks. Then, being outflanked from the north from the area of Kamenets by the 17th German Panzer Division, the division began to move rapidly back to Pruzhany.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet troop grouping fighting in the area of Zhabinka, Khvedkovichi also suffered heavy losses from enemy artillery and aviation. Under thrusts by the German 3d Panzer, 31st and 34th Infantry Divisions advancing along the Warsaw Highway, this grouping began to pull back to the Kobrin area. Moreover, on this axis a threat was created for an attack in the flank and rear of our troops from the enemy 4th Panzer Division. This division had outflanked units of the 75th Rifle Division to the north and through Pozhelin had reached the Malorita, Kobrin Highway. Without encountering organized resistance from our troops, it rapidly advanced to Kobrin and on its southwestern outskirts engaged a detachment of Lt Col Manevich.

The 22d Tank Division which prior to the start of the attack had about 100 tanks in the fighting around Zhabinka suffered heavy losses and under the threat of encirclement began to pull back also to Kobrin.

On the army right flank, units from the 49th Rifle Division which had advanced to the north of Semyatichye, without making contact with any units and not obtaining any tasks from anywhere, by a decision of the divisional commander were pulled back by the morning of 23 June to the area of Zhurobitsa, Muzhets, Mileychitsy, where they entered battle against units of the 252d German Infantry Division. Also turning up here was the 772d Regiment from the 113th Rifle Division which had lost contact with the divisional staff.<sup>2</sup>

After 0730 hours, the 30th Tank Division which had pulled back to the Pruzhany area on the approaches to this point entered into battle against the German 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions.

This combat was characteristic for the tank engagements of the first day of the war. At that time, one could not even imagine that tank troops could conduct defensive battles on a certain line. Only tank attacks were considered valid. Such attacks against the advancing enemy tank units turned into tank meeting engagements which were more advantageous to the enemy. The fighting turned into a duel of the tank crews under very unequal conditions. Participating on our side were only light tanks with weak armor and comparatively light weapons (armor of 15 mm and weapons included one 45-mm cannon and two 7.62-mm machine guns), while on the German side there were medium tanks fighting (armor of 30-40 mm and armament of one 37- or 75-mm cannon and two 7.92-mm machine guns) and here the enemy tanks were supported by artillery and aviation. Naturally, our tanks suffered incomparably higher losses than the enemy.

The German tanks advanced against Pruzhany in groups from different directions. They were able to hit our tanks from brief halts at a greater range than our tanks could do. In addition, the enemy constantly launched air strikes against our tanks. The 30th Tank Division suffered at least as many losses from enemy divebombers as it did from tanks and artillery.

The results of the tank battles were also influenced by the fact that in the spring of 1941, a majority of the trained tank commanders and senior drivers had been promoted to the newly deployed subunits of the tank divisions. The tank crews were being replaced. The young soldiers who took the seats of the experienced tank troops in the battle crews had not been able to be fully trained. Artillery support for the tank battles remained weak. The artillery regiments of these divisions were armed solely with howitzers having an extremely limited supply of shells. There were also not enough means of traction for the guns.

Naturally, under such unequal conditions it was ill-advised to engage in meeting engagements with the enemy tanks. But at that time there was no experience in using tanks on the defensive; this experience was to come significantly later.

In the course of the fighting between our 30th and the 18th German Tank Divisions, the main forces of the enemy 17th Panzer Division outflanked Pruzhany to the north, struck our troops in the rear and broke into the village. After brief but fierce fighting in the town, the enemy pushed the units of the 30th Tank Division to the eastern outskirts.

The army commander and the commander of the XIV Mechanized Corps were unable to influence the course of the fighting in the Pruzhany area, as they had no reserves.

In analyzing the course and outcome of the morning fighting of 23 June, it may be felt that the main reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the army counterstrike were: the inequality of forces with quantitative enemy superiority on the axis of the main thrust and its qualitative supremacy in tank equipment; the absence of the necessary artillery and air support for the troops launching the counterstrikes; the poor cooperation of the units and formations; the absence of proper troop command on all levels and poor logistic support for the troops.

After the morning fighting the units of the XIV Mechanized and XXVIII Rifle Corps became even more mixed up and lost their battleworthiness.

By 0930 hours on 23 June, the following situation had arisen: the 30th Tank Division with a motorized rifle regiment from the 205th Motorized Division after fighting against the enemy 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions in the area of Pruzhany retreated to the line of Kuklin, Linevo; the division in the morning battles of 23 June had lost 60 tanks.

The 22d Tank Division by this time after fighting enemy infantry and tanks was concentrated in the area of Gutski, Polyatichi, Andronovo (an area to the northwest of Kobrin).

The XXVIII Rifle Corps (42d and 6th Rifle Divisions) with tank and motorized rifle regiments of the 205th Motorized Division had retreated toward Kobrin to the line of Shipoviche, Mazichi, Kobrin, and the units of the 42d and 6th Rifle Divisions had become entangled and could only be slightly controlled by the corps commander and divisional commanders. The units of the corps in the fighting on the morning of 23 June again lost a large amount of personnel and equipment.

The 72d Rifle Division continued to cover the Pinsk sector. By that time the army staff did not have any data on the situation of the 49th Rifle Division.

At 0930 hours on 23 June, the army commander reported to the front commander: "Poorly controllable units confused by the attacks of low-flying enemy aircraft are retreating in disorder and are not a force capable of holding the enemy. Popov<sup>3</sup> and Oborin<sup>4</sup> have shown instability and have prematurely pulled back the units and particularly the staffs." At the same time, he

stated his decision to have the army go over to the defensive on the line of the Yaselda River, Drogichin, Kublik in the aim of bringing the units into order and urgently requested that the front commander:

"a) Intensify our air operations in combating the enemy aviation; have the aviation check the advance of the tanks on the Pruzhany and Bereza (Bereza-Kartuzskaya sector) sectors;

"b) Assign to the army motor transport since the artillery dump in Bronna Gura had been blown up by the enemy, the units had little ammunition remaining and there was not sufficient transport for the move out of Pinsk."

The report rather precisely described the state of the army troops and gave an objective assessment of the actions of the command and the staffs of the formations and for the first time reported an independent decision which did not derive from the cover plan to go over to the defensive. It merely lacked self-criticism of the actions of the army command and staff in controlling the troops, that is, the reasons for the poor command of the divisions were not disclosed.

On the basis of the adopted decision, at 1000 hours on 3 June, an operational order No. 03 was issued in which the following tasks were assigned to the army troops:

"The XIV Mechanized Corps is to support the Pruzhany sector and not allow the enemy to the east of the Mukhavets River (Mukhavets Canal).

"The XXVIII Rifle Corps is to occupy and stubbornly defend a line of the Mukhavets River from Lushchiki to Mukhovloki (the mouth of the Mukhavets Canal).

"In the event of an offensive by clearly superior enemy forces to retreat by lines; farthest line of retreat the Yaselda River.

"Ammunition is to be obtained from the artillery dump in Bronna Gura and fuel from Oranichitsy and subsequently Baranovichi."

At the same time, at the moment of the issuing of the order to the troops and the setting of new tasks for them to repulse the enemy offensive, along the entire front of the army, intense fighting was continuing and the results of this were not in our favor.

After abandoning Pruzhany, units from the 30th Tank Division repeatedly went over to counterattacks in the aim of driving units of the German XLVII Motorized Corps out of the town. They were unable to carry out this task but captured the area of Chakhets.

The commander of the XIV Mechanized Corps, having received the Order No. 03 to the Army Troops, began to concentrate the entire corps in the Pruzhany area. The remnants of the 205th Motorized Division began to move up to Pruzhany from the Kobrin area but it was impossible for the 22d Tank Division to disengage. The problem was that the enemy had moved up the main

forces of the 3d and 4th Panzer Divisions and the 34th and 31st Infantry Divisions and had undertaken several attacks on the Kobrin axis. The 22d Tank Division, together with a detachment from the 6th Rifle Division under the command of Col Ostashenko were heavily engaged with the 3d German Panzer Division on the line of Andronovo, Polytichi (5 km to the southwest of Andronovo) and suffered significant losses, particularly from the enemy aviation. Before the division's retreat from Zhabirka, it had only 67 tanks with incomplete crews. Little ammunition remained but the vehicles were able to refuel at the Kobrin fuel and lubricants dump.

The commander of the XXVIII Rifle Corps in carrying out Order No. 03, for occupying the defenses along the Mukhavets Canal moved up to the line of Lushchiki, Mukhovloki several subunits organized from servicemen retreating from Brest to the east. The remnants of the 42d and 6th Rifle Divisions and the 22d Tank Division were at that time tied down in fighting on the approaches to Kobrin. Here remnants of the 42d Rifle Division were defending the line of Lastovki, Shchipoviche some 5-10 km to the northwest of Kobrin, while the 6th Rifle Division with the 459th Regiment of the 42d Rifle Division and the detachment of Lt Col Manevich were defending Kobrin.

The 75th Rifle Division at 1600 hours conducted counterattacks in the Malorita area against advancing units of the enemy 255th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions while the 49th Rifle Division, as it was to be learned, was fighting to the south of Botski on the line of the Murchik River, Statsya-Nuzhets against units of the IX German Army Corps.

The command post of the army staff was located in Smolyarka (5 km to the northeast of Bereza-Kartuzskaya) and had periodic contact with the front staff by telegraph and with the corps staffs only by liaison officers. All the radios and a significant portion of the motor vehicles of the army staff had been destroyed by German aviation in moving this command post.

At 1600 hours, after a brief but heavy artillery shelling and air raid, the enemy XXIV Motorized and XII Army Corps in the Kobrin area resumed the offensive. Units of the XXVIII Rifle Corps and the 22d Tank Division began to retreat to the east to the Mukhavets Canal. The 42d Rifle Division retreated through Strygovo for taking up the defensive along the Mukhavets Canal to the north of the Warsaw Highway. The 22d Tank Division and the detachment of Col Ostachenko retreated to the north of Kobrin through Imenin. In the fighting for the Imenin Airfield, the division again suffered heavy losses. Here enemy aviation burned up a large portion of its tanks. Not more than 40 tanks remained in the division. Here also the commander of the 22d Tank Division, Maj Gen Tank Trps V.P. Puganov was killed. The deputy commander, Col I.V. Konnov, assumed command of the division.

The enemy 3d Panzer Division captured a bridge across the Mukhavets River in Kobrin. A portion of its tanks broke through along the Warsaw Highway and was stopped only at the Mukhavets Canal. The 6th Rifle Division in the Kobrin area had been split into two parts. Several subunits with a battalion from the 204th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the division (the Battalion was horse-drawn) headed by the division's commander and chief of staff retreated along the highway to Pinsk, picking up groups of soldiers and individual men from various units and facilities retreating to the east. The deputy divisional commander for political affairs, Reg Commissar M.N. Butin with a portion of the divisional staff was leading the remnants of the artillery, special units and rear subunits from the division as well as the remaining subunits of the 84th and 333d Rifle Regiments to the northeast along the Warsaw Highway. The staff of the XXVIII Rifle Corps was moved into the woods to the east of the Mukhavets Canal along the Warsaw Highway. The fuel dump in Kobrin was blown up under orders of Lt Col Manevich.

At 1700 hours, remnants from units of the corps and individual improvised detachments took up the defenses along the Mukhavets Canal covering both sides of the Warsaw Highway and for a certain time held up the enemy.

By this time, the liaison officer returned and was sent to clarify the situation on the Pinsk sector and he reported to the army commander that in Gorodets, Antopol, Drogichin and other points along the Pinsk Highway there was a build-up of very many various subunits and individual soldiers who had been separated from their units and were retreating to the east. He also reported that the commander of a motorcycle regiment in the Antopol area had been unable to stop and organize from the retreating personnel any sort of viable composite unit and requested that a special group of commanders be sent out with representatives from the special section and procurator's office.

For ordering the cover of the Pinsk sector as well as for organizing a point for assembling all the subunits and individual personnel retreating to Pinsk, the commander, the military council member and the chief of staff of the army traveled to Drogichin with a group of officers. In Drogichin they set up a blocking detachment which was ordered to create detachments from the retreating personnel and send them on passing motor vehicles to the area of Bereza-Kartuzskaya; all the apprehended artillery pieces were also to be sent here.

In Drogichin at 1800 hours, the commander issued a particular operational order No. 04 to the 75th Rifle Division and the motorcycle regiment, making them responsible for support of the Pinsk sector. The order stated that the maximum line of retreat was Zhaber, Symonovichi, Drogichin Station, Sulichevo and this should be effectively organized in defensive terms.

Before the arrival of the 75th Rifle Division, the line was to be held by the motorcycle regiment from the XIV Mechanized Corps.

Two copies of the order at 1840 hours were turned over to the deputy commander of the motorcycle regiment, Maj Chepurnov, to be presented to the commander of the regiment and forwarded by liaison officer to the 75th Rifle Division.

By this time the military commissar of the Pinsk Oblast Military Commissariat who had been summoned to Drogichin had arrived and he informed them that he had begun to carry out a general mobilization. Through him it became learned that two storage facilities remained undestroyed in the district artillery dump and that upon orders from the army artillery commander, a portion of the ammunition had been dispatched to Bereza-Kartuzskaya on motor vehicles from the 455th Corps Artillery Regiment. The oblast military commissar stated that the Pinsk Naval Flotilla had been dispersed along the main waterways to the east and west of Pinsk but there was no contact with it.

The army commander pointed to the necessity of rapidly mobilizing the personnel, transport and horses and sending the mobilized resources to the east. In addition, the oblast military commissar was ordered to establish in Pinsk a detachment for apprehending personnel, equipment and motor transport retreating to the east and organize from those apprehended detachments the forces of which would organize the defense of Pinsk.

From the deputy chief of staff of the 10th Air Division who had been summoned from Pinsk, the army command learned that the Pinsk Airfield had come under repeated bombing, the runway had been destroyed, the dump with aviation bombs had been blown up and that for this reason with the surviving aircraft the division would be unable to participate in the fighting on 24 June.

In the meanwhile, at around 1800 hours, the enemy resumed its attacks in the Pruzhany area and along the Warsaw Highway.

Weak and having lost battleworthiness, the formations of the 4th Army were unable to withstand the thrusts of the enemy panzer divisions. The 30th Tank Division was pushed back from the Pruzhany-Slonim Highway to the east and the units of the German XLVII Motorized Corps were able to advance to Pruzhany. Before the retreat, units of the 30th Tank Division had been able to refuel the vehicles and tanks at the district fuel dump in Oranchitsy and then upon orders of the division's commander, Col Bogdanov, this dump was blown up. At the same time, units of the XXVIII Rifle Corps began to be rolled back from the Mukhavets Canal to Bereza-Kartuzskaya and the forward detachments from the panzer divisions of the enemy XXIV Motorized Corps, in pursuing them along the Warsaw Highway, reached the Yaselda River at 1900 hours.

By the end of 23 June, the 4th Army occupied the following position: divisions of the XIV Mechanized Corps were fighting to the northwest and southeast of Selets, the corps staff had moved into the forest to the north of Selets; remnants of the 42d Rifle Division and a detachment from the 6th Rifle Division had retreated to the eastern bank of the Yaselda River to the north and south of Bereza-Kartuzskaya, while the staff of the XXVIII Rifle Corps had shifted into the forest to the east of this point. Another detachment from the 6th Rifle Division headed by the division's commander was in the Antopol area together with a motorcycle regiment from the XIV Mechanized Corps.

The 75th Rifle Division was continuing to fight stubbornly in the Malorita area. The subunits remaining in the Brest Fortress were continuing its heroic defense. The 16th Machine Gun-Artillery Battalion was fighting encircled in the area of Semyatiche Station and the 17th Battalion in the area of Orel (to the south of Volchin).

The 55th Rifle Division assigned to reinforce the 4th Army was arriving by motor transport on the sector Gorodishche, Sinyavka.

The 121st and 143d Rifle Divisions were continuing to concentrate along the railroad in the area of Lesna, Byten. The headquarters of the XLVII Rifle Corps as before was preparing to move from Bobruysk. The 155th Rifle Division had reached the Shara River and was preparing to move on Volkovysk at dawn of 24 June.

The artillery regiments of the RGK [High Command Reserve] which had been organized in the district artillery camp (to the west of Baranovichi) and which had one tractor per battalion, upon orders received from the VPU [auxiliary command post] of the front staff moved their guns in turn to the area of Slonim.

#### **Results of the Second Day of the War. Reasons for the Defeat of the Army**

The army counterstrike on 23 June was unsuccessful. As a result of the counterstrike it was not possible not only to throw back but even halt the further advance of the German shock groupings. The army troops, in suffering heavy losses in personnel and combat equipment over the 2 days of the fighting, further lost battleworthiness and by the end of the second day had retreated some 100 km back from the frontier. On the Slonim axis, the pancer divisions of the German XLVII Motorized Corps had captured Pruzhany and their forward units had reached Ruzhany, that is, they had advanced 125 km in 2 days.

As a result of the retreat of the army and the capture of Pruzhany and Bereza-Kartuzskaya by the enemy, the path lay open for an offensive by the Nazi troops against Slonim and Baranovichi into the rear of the 10th Army and the front horse-mechanized group under the command of Lt Gen Boldin which was fighting on the Grodno axis.

One of the main reasons for the setbacks of the army, as during the first day of the war, was the lack of protection of our troops against Nazi air strikes. The successes of the Nazi troops in the fighting at Pruzhany and in the Kobrin area were ensured by the constant and dependable support of them by aviation, by the qualitative and quantitative supremacy of the German tanks, by the reliable artillery support for the tank attacks, by the superiority of the German panzer troops in coordination and combat experience as well as by better organization of signals and the logistic service.

Suffice it to say that the 2d German Panzer Group had its own reconnaissance, fighter and bomber air groups, its own antiaircraft, artillery and antitank units, including battalions of assault guns. The group was assigned many engineer, road and motor transport units, signal units, rear units and facilities as well as special artillery and engineer staffs for organizing cooperation.

Conversely, the XIV Mechanized Corps participated in the counterstrike, in essence, or with individual tanks with several improvised motorized subunits and half of the tanks of one of the corps divisions had been destroyed the day before. In the tank units of fire, there was an extremely limited amount of armor-piercing shells. The involvement of the rifle troops in the counterstrike came down merely to futile attempts to go over to the offensive on individual sectors.

Poor command and poor organization of the counterstrike by the army command and the command of the corps and the weak control of the troops during the entire day to a significant degree increased our failures. In the unsatisfactory command of the troops on all levels a major role was played by the poor quality of our means of communications. Moreover, our command personnel did not know how to employ radio equipment for command and there was little of the equipment available. The presence of the command headquarters and the staff of the XXVIII Rifle Corps in the army was a superfluous level of command and with the insignificant number of rifle divisions in the army this not only did not help troop command but, conversely, created significant difficulties.

The army did not have intelligence bodies and for this reason data on the enemy were determined in the course of the fighting by the units.

In our setbacks, a major role was also played by the poor contact between the army command and staff with the formations and units of the okrug level and which were in the zone of the army. These troops, with the exception of the XIV Mechanized Corps, regardless of operational subordination to the army, were guided solely by the instructions of their front superiors. During the first 2 days of the war, they retreated into the rear via Pinsk or through the Belovezhskaya Forest and received new tasks from the front staff. The remnants of the Brest Border Detachment immediately after the start of the

war were shifted to the old state frontier. The commander of the 62d Fortified Area, Maj Gen M.I. Puzyrev, with a portion of the subunits from the machine gun-artillery battalions which had retreated to him in Vysokoye during the very first day of the war pulled back to Belsk and then further east. The commander of the Kobrin Brigade Air Defense Area together with the subordinate 218th Air Defense Battalion and the remaining units on 23 June moved from Bereza-Kartuzskaya to Pinsk and later into the rear. The commander of the 10th Composite Air Division with the staff and remnants of the air regiments, as was already pointed out above, with permission from the front staff on 22 June had moved to Pinsk, on 24 June to the Gomel area. The 33d Engineer Regiment which the staff of the Western Front had transferred on 24 June to the 4th Army with instructions that "the location of the regiment is unknown," was located only on 6 July in the Luninets area. The army commander also did not have contact with the Pinsk Naval Flotilla and did not know where it was and what missions it was carrying out.

The absence of an organized army and front rear services was also one of the reasons for our failures. With the destruction of the front artillery dumps and fuel dumps, the army did not have an opportunity on a regular and planned basis to replenish the ammunition and fuel for the troops. The orders from the front staff to the rear services to deliver ammunition, fuel and food for the 4th Army to the regulating station of Luninets remained unfulfilled. Even if the front had done this, the supply of the army troops would not have improved, as the army was unable to deliver this materiel to the troops. There was no motor transport either in the rifle divisions or army rear services and the motor vehicles which they had prior to the war had been burned up by German aviation. The absence of the necessary amount of motor transport prevented the organizing of normal evacuation of sick and wounded. The severely wounded had to be evacuated through the civilian hospitals or left for care with local inhabitants.

The personnel of the 4th Army in the fighting of the first days of the war, although showing amazing tenacity and wholehearted courage, were unable to oppose the superior forces of the experienced enemy.

#### Footnotes

1. From the memoirs of Mar Tank Trps S.I. Bogdanov.
2. From the memoirs of Maj S.I. Gurov.
3. Commander of the XXVIII Rifle Corps.
4. Commander of the XIV Mechanized Corps.

(Conclusion follows)

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#### Baltic Military District: On the History of Its Founding

*18011001b VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL*  
in Russian No 6, Jun 89 (signed to press 16 Jun 89)  
pp 16-21

[Archival documents prepared by L.V. Dvoynikh, deputy director of the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army: "The Baltic Military District: On the History of Its Founding"]

[Text] [Introduction by L.V. Dvoynikh, deputy director of the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army]

In mid-1940, Soviet power was proclaimed in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and declarations were adopted with a request to incorporate them in the USSR. The Extraordinary 7th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet granted these requests.

The military-political situation in the Baltic during this period was extremely complex: the commenced World War II and the growing threat of aggression by Nazi Germany against the USSR and the Baltic republics impelled their peoples to strengthen unity and join forces (including military) in the interests of defending freedom and independence.

The creation under such conditions in the Baltic of an independent military district of the Soviet Armed Forces was dictated by the necessity of defending the north-western land and sea frontiers of the USSR and ensuring the security of the young Soviet Baltic republics.

Formed upon orders of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense, the Baltic Special Military District had important strategic significance, as its troops covered the sea frontiers and most important land approach from East Prussia into the Soviet Baltic republics and further to Leningrad and Moscow. Conditions were created for close cooperation between the district troops and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

The Baltic Military District in August 1940 included the 8th and 11th Armies of the Soviet Armed Forces. Also stationed during this period on the district territory were the People's Armies of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In August-September 1940 these were transformed into national rifle corps (XXII Estonian, XXIV Latvian and XXIX Lithuanian) and incorporated in the district troops. During the same period local and republic military commissariats were set up in the republic and these played an important role in registering those liable for military service and resolving questions concerning compulsory military service by citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The military schools which existed on the territory of the Soviet Baltic republics were transformed into normal infantry schools of the Red Army and within the system of these there functioned special battalions for training the command personnel of the nationality units.

At the request of readers we are presently publishing the directive of the USSR people's commissar of defense of 17 August 1940 and the order to the troops of the Baltic Special Military District of 27 August 1940 concerning the transformation of the People's Armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into rifle territorial corps and their incorporation in the district troops.

In the units and formations, exercises were conducted regularly in combat, operational and political training and military discipline was strengthened. At the beginning of the summer of 1941, when the international situation had been sharply intensified and intelligence had discovered the concentration of Nazi troops along the USSR frontiers in East Prussia, the district military council on 14 June 1941 approved a plan for redeploying a number of divisions and separate units into the border zone and on 18 June issued a directive to introduce increased military preparedness in the district units and formations. [End of Introduction]

USSR People's Commissar of Defense

Top Secret

17 August 1940

Copy No 1

No 0/2/105022

#### TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE BALTIC MILITARY DISTRICT

Copies: To USSR Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank, Comrade Mekhlis

—To the USSR deputy people's commissar of defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank, Comrade Shchadenko

—To the chiefs of the central directorates of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] (by special list)

On the basis of the decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars, I order:

To give the following names to the corps:

- a) XXII Rifle Corps to the Estonian Corps;
- b) XXIV Rifle Corps to the Latvian Corps;
- c) XXIX Rifle Corps to the Lithuanian Corps.

2. Within each corps according to the current TOE of the Red Army there are to be:

Corps headquarters—53 men

Corps artillery regiment—1,594 men

Corps antiaircraft artillery battalion—350 men

Corps signals battalion—358 men

Corps combat engineer battalion—579 men

Corps air squadron—208 men

Total—3,142 men

Two rifle divisions in each corps. A division will consist of the following:

Division headquarters—69 men

Three rifle divisions each with—1,410 men

One light artillery regiment—436 men

One howitzer artillery regiment—673 men

One intelligence battalion—95 men

One signals battalion—130 men

One combat engineer battalion—148 men

One antitank battalion—92 men

One antiaircraft artillery battalion—94 men

Cadres of motor transport company and cadres of medical battalion—33 men

Total in division—6,000 men

In two divisions—12,000 men

Total with corps units in each corps—15,142 men

In three rifle corps—45,426 men

In the Latvian and Lithuanian corps, in addition to the above-indicated units, there was to be one cavalry regiment of 1,175 men in each.

3. In constituting the corps they are to draw on all the troop units and facilities comprising the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armies with all weapons, transport and military supplies. Surplus military supplies after the transforming of the army are to be turned over in working order under registration to the army dumps.

4. For strengthening the cadres of the command and political personnel, the NKO is to be obliged to assign command and political personnel of the Red Army from the corresponding nationalities and Russians partially to command and political positions.

5. The programs and regulations of the Red Army are to be introduced into the transformed corps, having obliged the NKO to translate them into the appropriate national languages.

6. The transformed corps are to be incorporated as part of the Red Army and subordinate as follows: the Estonian XXII Rifle Corps, the Latvian XXIV Rifle Corps and the Lithuanian XXIX Rifle Corps to the commander of the Baltic Military District.

7. The XXII, XXIV and XXIX Rifle Corps are to keep the existing uniforms with the removal of the shoulder straps and the introduction of the insignias for the leadership of the Red Army.

8. Within a period of 2 months from the transforming of the corps, in accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of

the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 January 1939 on the procedure for taking the military oath, all the personnel of the designated corps is to take the military oath.

9. For registering persons liable for military service and resolving questions of undergoing compulsory military service by Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian citizens, the NKO is to form in Tallinn, Riga and Kaunas republic military commissariats and in the rayons (districts) rayon (district) military commissariats, drawing on the existing local military authorities for forming them.

10. The existing military schools are to be transformed into normal infantry schools of the Red Army and in the system of these schools there is to be one battalion for training command personnel for the nationality units.

11. The army dumps, shops, airfields, camps, ranges, hospitals and other facilities are to be incorporated in the corresponding military districts. The weapons, ammunition and military supplies in the dumps and shops are to be received by the NKO main directorate, having left in them the weapons and supplies essential for fielding the nationality corps while the surplus is to be moved gradually to the central dumps of the NKO.

12. All barracks and housing facilities are to be turned over to the corresponding military districts. The commanders of the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts, with the agreement of the governments of the corresponding Union republics, are to establish the billeting of the rifle corps.

13. The commander of the Baltic Military District, Col Gen Lektionov, is to submit a proposal for reorganizing the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies for review by the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and inform them of the formation of the Baltic Military District on the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

In carrying out the above-stated, I order:

1. The commander of the Baltic Military District, Col Gen Lektionov, is to inform the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian governments of the formation of the Baltic Special Military District for leadership of the troops stationed on Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian territory.

In accord with the adopted decision, you are to submit for approval by the Union republic governments the proposals to transform the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies and immediately report on the results.

2. The military council together with the governments of the designated republics are to draw up a plan for the reorganization of the army and the plan is to indicate the procedure for transforming the armies into rifle corps with precise indication as to what units are to be reorganized and what are to be deconstituted, and this is to be submitted to me for approval.

For registering the weapons, ammunition and all military supplies, commissions are to be founded in each army—Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian.

The following are to be appointed the commission chairmen: the deputy chief of staff of the 8th Army to the Estonian Army, the deputy chief of staff of the district to the Latvian Army and the deputy chief of staff of the 11th Army to the Lithuanian Army.

The chiefs of the main and central directorates are to assign their own representatives for participation in the commissions to accept all supplies, weapons and ammunition in the Estonian and Latvian Armies.

3. The corps are to be constituted drawing on all the troop units and facilities comprising the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies with all weapons, transport and military supplies according to the wartime establishments. Surplus military supplies after the reconstituting of the armies into corps is to be turned over in working order to the army dumps by writ.

4. The commander of the Baltic Special Military District is to provide security for the dumps and housing of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies.

Within the period of a month, the Red Army General Staff is to receive a list of rear facilities to be maintained and deconstituted and here they must indicate under what TOE they must be maintained.

5. Together with the governments of the Union Soviet republics, the personnel of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies is to be inspected and purged of unreliable elements. The personal files concerning the command personnel of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies, both those who may remain in the army as well as the unreliable who are to be discharged from the army are to be forwarded to the Personnel Directorate of the Red Army.

6. The chief of the Personnel Directorate and the chief of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army are to assign partially command and political personnel from the Red Army from among the appropriate nationalities and Russians to the command and political positions for strengthening the command and political personnel of the XXII, XXIV and XXIX Rifle Corps.

7. The existing military schools are to be reorganized into normal Red Army infantry schools, leaving one infantry school in each Union republic while the remaining military schools are to be closed down. The personnel is to be used for manning the schools. Each school will have one battalion for training command personnel for the XXII, XXIV and XXIX Rifle Corps. The schools are to be maintained according to the TOE.

The transformed corps and infantry schools are to be incorporated into the Red Army and are to be under the Military Council of the Baltic Special Military District.

In the rifle corps, training is to be conducted according to the programs and regulations of the Red Army and these are to be translated into the appropriate national languages of the Union republics.

The chief of the Red Army Directorate for Combat Training is to provide the translating of the basic training programs, field manuals and instructions into Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian languages and supply the corps with training materials.

9. The chiefs of the NKO main and central directorates are to account for the weapons, ammunition and military supplies existing at the dumps and shops, leaving only the weapons and supplies necessary for fielding the XXII, XXIV and XXIX Rifle Corps, with the surplus being turned over to the army and central dumps.

10. The Red Army Chief Quartermaster is to register all available housing of the military departments of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Armies.

In the transfer and acceptance, there should be no alienation of the housing of the military departments to civilian organizations or the theft of supplies and equipment.

11. For registering persons liable for military service and for resolving questions of undergoing compulsory military service by citizens of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, republic military commissariats are to be organized in Tallinn, Riga and Kaunas according to the TOE No 3/803-1 category, using reliable personnel from the existing bodies of the local military administration for filling the technical positions.

The Military Council of the Baltic Special Military District on 1 September 1940 is to submit to the Red Army General Staff its ideas on organizing the oblast and rayon (district) local military administrative bodies.

12. Over a period of 2 months after the constituting of the XXII, XXIV and XXIX Rifle Corps, in accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 January 1939 on the Procedure for Taking the Military Oath, all the personnel of the designated corps is to take the military oath.

13. The designated organizational measures are to be completed by 20 September 1940.

The course of carrying out the directives is to be reported to the Red Army General Staff by the 1st, 10th and 20th of each month.

USSR People's Commissar of Defense,  
MSU S. Timoshenko  
Chief of Red Army General Staff,  
MSU B. Shaposhnikov

Top Secret  
Copy No 1

## ORDER TO THE TROOPS OF THE BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT № 0010

27 August 1940

Riga

On the basis of the directive of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense No 0/2/105022 of 17 August 1940,

I order:

1. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian People's Armies by 15 September 1940 are to be transformed each into a single territory rifle corps which is to be maintained in the organization, TOE and dispositions according to the appendix.

The territorial rifle corps are to be incorporated in the Baltic Special Military District with direct subordination to the district military council.

2. By the same time, the following are to be organized:

a) One infantry school each according to the TOE No 19/12 in Tallinn, Riga and Kovno.

One battalion at each school is to train leadership for the nationality units;

b) The republic, city and district military commissariats in the number and at the points according to the appendix.

3. Direct leadership over the transformation of the people's armies into rifle corps and the organizing of the schools and the local military authorities is to be entrusted to the following:

a) For Latvia—to the chief of staff of the district;

b) For Estonia—to the military council of the 8th Army;

c) For Lithuania—to the military council of the 11th Army.

The district chief of staff and the commanders of the 8th and 11th Armies are to be involved in the work of organizing the chiefs of the combat arms and services of the district and the armies.

4. The following are to be permitted to carry out duties:

Commander of the XXIV Rifle Corps, Gen Klyavish  
Commissar of the XXIV Rifle Corps, Brig Commissar S.N. Smirnov  
Corps Chief of Staff, Gen Ieske Commander of the XXII Rifle Corps, Gen\* [\* indicates unfilled position]  
Commissar of the XXII Rifle Corps, Sr Btl Commissar N.S. Orlov  
Corps Chief of Staff, Gen\* Commander of the XXIX Rifle Corps\* Commissar of the XXIX Rifle Corps, Brig Commissar A.V. Tsarev  
Corps Chief of Staff, Gen Zhemaytis

Pro tem performance of duties of republic military commissar: Estonia\* Latvia—Maj. Comrade V.A. Malakhovskiy Lithuania\*

Lists of the leadership for the remaining formations and units of the corps will be announced supplementarily.

5. The corps are to be constituted by drawing on all the troop units and facilities comprising the People's Armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with all weapons, transport and military supplies according to the supply plan.

Surplus military supplies after the equipping of the rifle corps, military schools and military commissariats are to be turned over in working order to the army dumps by signature.

6. The supply of the corps, schools and military commissariats with personnel and all types of logistic supplies are to be carried out on time according to a calendar plan.

The transfer of the personnel in the manning is to be carried out predominantly on the march, in an organized manner, with precise observance of the requirements of the Order of the USSR NKO No 0231-39.

Requests for the required rolling stock for transporting supplies are to be submitted by 5 September of the current year to the district chief of staff.

7. In providing the corps with personnel from the units of the People's Armies, persons worthy of service in the Red Army are to be chosen. A study of the army leadership is to be carried out by commissions appointed by the district military council following the coded telegram of 21 August 1940 No 927, 928, 931. The study of the rank-and-file and NCO personnel is to be carried out in the process of manning by commissions specially appointed in each division and approved by the district chief of staff and the military councils of the armies.

8. Commissions are to be organized in each army to account for the weapons, ammunition and all supplies.

A list is to be set for the rear facilities to be maintained or disbanded and instructions are to be given according to which TOE and where the remainder is to be kept.

The list is to be submitted for approval on 12 September 1940.

9. The army dumps, shops, camps, ranges, hospitals and other facilities with all weapons, ammunition and military supplies are to be taken over by the above-indicated commissions, having incorporated them in the district, and for each of these facilities the district staff is to receive a detailed statement for determining their further employment. The statements are to be submitted on 15 September 1940.

All barracks and housing and plots of land are to be incorporated in the district and accepted by commissions organized by the district KEO [quartering and utility detachment] at the location of these facilities.

By orders of the district chief of staff for Latvia and the commanders of the 8th and 11th Armies for Estonia and Lithuania, all major dumps and housing are to be put under guard.

10. The personnel of the territorial rifle corps are to keep their uniforms existing in the People's Armies, having removed the shoulder straps and introducing the insignias for the Red Army command personnel.

The district chief of staff and the district chief of the political propaganda directorate are to issue instructions on administering the military oath to the corps units within a period of 2 months after constituting in accord with the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 3 January 1939.

11. For ensuring even manning and supply and for achieving combat readiness in the corps units, it is permissible to shift junior command and rank-and-file personnel of scarce specialties from one division to another, carrying out this measure after the basic manning of the divisions and ascertaining the shortage of specialists.

For all personnel, rank-and-file and command, which are surplus after the organizing of the rifle corps, schools and military commissariats as well as the rank-and-file which has served the established time in accord with the Law on Universal Military Service, information is to be submitted to the district staff by 20 September for resolving the question of their utilization.

12. Military and political training in the rifle corps, military schools and military commissariats is to be organized according to the Red Army programs and life and routine according to the Red Army manuals.

Regular exercises are to be commenced immediately. Particular attention is to be paid to organizing firm internal order and discipline.

13. The units of the rifle corps and the military commissariats until special instructions are to be supported with pay, food and uniform supplies from the 1940 budget funds provided for maintaining the People's Armies in each republic.

14. The course of carrying out this order is to be reported to the district staff on 30 August, 4, 9, and 15 September.

District Commander, Col Cen  
Loktionov

District Military Council  
Member, Corps Commissar  
Susaykov

District Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Klenov

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### First Days of the War in Documents

18011001c VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL  
in Russian No 6, Jun 89 (signed to press 16 Jun 89)  
pp 22-35

[Documents, published under the heading "From the Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense," and prepared by Col V.P. Zhuravlev, Capt A.S. Anufriev and N.M. Yemelyanova: "The First Days of the War in Documents"; continuation, for the beginning see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1989]

[Text]

#### ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE TO THE MILITARY COUNCILS OF THE NORTHWESTERN, WESTERN, SOUTHWESTERN AND SOUTHERN FRONTS No 3

22 June 1941, 2207 hours

1. The enemy, in launching its main thrusts from the Suvalki salient against Olita and from the area of Zamostye on a front of Vladimir-Volynskiy, Radzehov, and auxiliary thrusts on the axes of Tilsit, Shaulay and Sedlets, Volkovysk, during the period of 22 June, in suffering heavy losses, has achieved small successes on the designated sectors.

On the remaining sectors of the state frontier with Germany and along the entire state frontier with Romania, the enemy attacks have been driven off with heavy losses for it.

2. I set the immediate task for the troops for 23-24 June as follows:

a) By concentric concentrated attacks by the Northwestern and Western Fronts, to encircle and destroy the Suvalki enemy grouping and by the end of 24 June capture the area of Suvalki;

b) By powerful concentric strikes of the mechanized corps, all aviation of the Southwestern Front and the other troops of the 5th and 6th Armies, to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the axis of Vladimir-Volynskiy, Brody.

By the end of 24 June, the area of Lublin is to be captured.

3. I order the following:

a) The armies of the Northern Front are to continue the strong cover of the state frontier with the boundary to the left as before;

b) The armies of the Northwestern Front, in firmly holding the Baltic Seacoast, are to launch a powerful counterstrike from the Kaunas area into the flank and rear of the enemy Suvalki grouping, to destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and by the end of 24 June, take the area of Suvalki and the frontier to the left as before;

c) The armies of the Western Front, in holding the enemy on the Warsaw Sector, are to launch a powerful counterstrike with the forces of at least two mechanized corps and the front aviation in the flank and rear of the enemy Suvalki grouping, to destroy it together with the Northwestern Front and by the end of 24 June, capture the area of Suvalki, with the boundary to the left as before.

d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, in firmly holding the state frontier with Hungary, with concentric thrusts on the general axis of Lublin with the forces of the 5th and 6th Armies, at least five mechanized corps and all the aviation of the front, are to surround and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the front of Vladimir-Volynskiy, Krystynopol, and by the end of 24 June, are to capture the Lublin area and strongly support themselves on the Krakow sector;

e) The armies of the Southern Front are to prevent an enemy invasion of our territory: with the enemy's attempt to launch an attack on the Chernovtsy sector or cross the Prut and Danube Rivers, by powerful flanking thrusts of the ground troops in cooperation with the aviation, the enemy is to be destroyed; with two mechanized corps during the night of 23 June, to concentrate in the Kishinev area and the forests to the northwest of Kishinev.

4. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the state frontier with Hungary, I permit crossing of the state frontier and operations without considering the frontier.

5. The aviation of the High Command:

a) Is to support the Northwestern Front with a single sortie of the I Long-Range Air Corps and the Western Front with a single sortie by the III Long-Range Air Corps during the period that they carry out the task of defeating the enemy Suvalki grouping;

b) To incorporate in the Southwestern Front the 18th Long-Range Air Division and support the Southwestern Front with a single sortie by the II Long-Range Air Corps during the period that they are carrying out the task of defeating the enemy Lublin grouping;

c) The IV Long-Range Air Corps is to remain at my disposal ready to assist the main grouping of the Southwestern Front and with a portion of the forces the Black Sea Fleet.

USSR People's Commissar of Defense, M.S.U. Timoshenko  
Member of Main Military Council, Malenkov  
Chief of Red Army General Staff, Army Gen Zhukov

TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 208, inv. 2513, file 9, sheet 444

#### FROM THE COMBAT LOG OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT

22 June 1941

...Our clandestine intelligence and defectors have pointed out that in the near future we must expect an armed action by Germany against us. The time for the start of the offensive was given almost precisely: 20-22 June 1941.

Thus, war has become a fact and events have required the adopting of immediate measures on both sides, and primarily in the area of the operational deployment of the troop formations of all combat arms and the concentration of them according to the mobilization plan for conducting operations.

The command of the Northwestern Front during the last days prior to the war was given an opportunity to immediately shift a number of units closer to the frontier. However, the pace of concentration and deployment...has been picked up extremely slowly. It is essential to consider the low capacity of the Baltic railroads, the scattering of the troops over a large territory and their remoteness from the state frontier.

At the same time, there was a complete opportunity, under the guise of pulling back the troops into camps, to carry out a covert concentration of the main forces along the state frontier, to occupy and improve the field defensive structures under the condition of a correct assessment and anticipation of the approaching events on the Northwestern Front. At the same time, only the 90th, 188th and 5th Rifle Divisions were pulled back but a majority of these was engaged in equipping the camps and less in combat training.

Thus, directly along the state frontier running from the Baltic Coast to Augustogallen were: the X Rifle Corps with the 10th, 90th and 125th Rifle Divisions of the XI Rifle Corps; from the Neman River to Koptsiovo—the XVI Rifle Corps with the 5th, 33d and 188th Rifle Divisions and the 128th Rifle Division.

These units were basically located in camps, having a cover of from a company to a battalion directly along the state frontier, in essence, having reinforced the border service....

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1351, file 202, sheet 1. Original.

#### **OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM THE STAFF OF THE 27TH ARMY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT**

22 June 1941, 0705 hours

According to data at 0600 hours on 22 June 1941, Palanga came under fire, it is burning and contact lost. The German units went over to the offensive and our units are fighting. There were several raids with incendiary bombs dropped on Libau. It is quiet on the Vindau coast and island.

Data are being verified and adjusted.

**Commander of 27th Army, Maj Gen Berzarin  
Military Council Member Batrakov  
Chief of Staff Boloznev**

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1394, file 2, sheet 154. Original.

#### **TELEGRAM OF DEPUTY AIR FORCES COMMANDER OF THE BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO SUPPLY AND REPAIR CHIEF OF THE RED ARMY MAIN AIR FORCES DIRECTORATE**

22 June 1941, 0710 hours

In my telegram of 20 June 1941, I requested a reply to when the ammunition would be delivered. Military operations have commenced on the district's territory. Again I urgently request information when ammunition will be delivered.

Deputy Air Forces Commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Maj Gen Avn Andreyev

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1394, file 22, sheet 389. Original.

#### **ORDER OF STAFF OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO COMMANDERS OF 8TH AND 11TH ARMIES**

22 June 1941, 1130-1200 hours

The enemy has occupied Kretinga with tank and motorcycle units; enemy tanks and motorized infantry have broken into Taurogen. The enemy attempted to encircle units of the 8th Army.

I order:

The XII Mechanized Corps is to eliminate the enemy 23d Panzer Division in Kretinga, the main forces of the corps are to deploy on a front of Telshay, Poventis for attacking the flank and rear of the enemy which has broken through to Taurogen. The III Mechanized Corps, having left the 5th Tank Division at the disposal of the commander of the 11th Army, the 2d Tank Division and the 84th Mechanized Division during the night of 23 June are to get a head start to the area of Rossiyeny for attacking the enemy in cooperation with the XII Mechanized Corps with the 9th Antitank Artillery Brigade.

The commander of the 8th Army is to make extensive use of the obstacles preventing the enemy from coming out in the rear of the XI Rifle Corps and join up forces with the III and XII Mechanized Corps.

The commander of the 11th Army is to secure the retreat of the 28th Rifle Division, prevent its encirclement and prepare positions along the eastern bank of the Neman River to the left frontier of the front. The troops are to cooperate with the 3d Army.

The air forces commander is to strike the Tilsit and Kalvariya enemy groupings with heavy raids.

The commanders of the 8th and 11th Armies are to report their plans.

Commander of Baltic Special  
Military District, Col Gen  
Kuznetsov

Military Council Member, Corps  
Commissar Dibrova

Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Klenov

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 1, sheet 64. Original.

#### OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 27TH ARMY FROM SOUTHWESTERN FRONT

22 June 1941, 1145 hours

1. During the period between 0400 and 0600 hours on 22 June, enemy aviation made a raid and bombed Vindau and Libau.

Simultaneously, on the front of the 8th Army at 0400 hours, the enemy crossed the state frontier and by 0900 hours had captured Palanga and had advanced 4 km. By 1045 hours to the north of Palanga, the enemy had captured Taurogen, Shaki, Kalvariya.

2. The 27th Army is carrying out the set task.

3. The 3d Rifle Brigade, according to the orders, has taken up the defensive on the islands....

4. The 67th Rifle Division has taken up the defenses according to the plan. Contact has been maintained with the 114th Rifle Regiment (Vindau) and contact has been broken since 0400 hours with the staff of the 67th Division.

5. New information has not been received from the XXIV and LXV Rifle Corps.

Chief of Operations Department of Staff of 27th Army.  
Maj Stepanov

TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4597, file 1, sheets 54-61. Original.

#### INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF STAFF OF BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT No 03

22 June 1941, 1200 hours

After artillery softening up, the enemy Air Force violated the state frontier and, beginning at 0415 hours on 22 June 1941, raided and bombed a number of objectives on our territory.

As of 0525 hours, enemy infantry and tanks went over to the offensive.

The air raids and bombing were carried out against the following objectives: at 0442 hours on 22 June 1941, up to 45 aircraft bombed Shaulyay. An air battle occurred over Shaulyay; at 0415 hours, a group of aircraft operated over Vindau; at 0418 hours, 5 aircraft strafed Vishtynets and these same aircraft operated over Kalvariya; at 0425 hours, bombs were dropped on Yurburg; at 0420 hours, up to a regiment of aviation bombed Kaunas, Kalvariya; at 0455 hours, 5 aircraft bombed the Panevezhis Airfield.

During the same period of time, bombings occurred against Keydany, Simno, Alitus. During the period from 0908 to 0912 hours, 12 Ju-88 flew out against Shaulyay and 9 bombers from the direction of Rossiyen also operated against Shaulyay. At 0820 hours from an altitude of 3,000 m, Orany was bombed and at 0925 hours, Shaulyay Airfield was bombed.

#### First. The Shaulyay Sector.

a) After artillery softening up, the enemy went over to the offensive, launching the main thrust on the axis of Kretinga, Kartena and a more powerful one on the sector of Taurogen, Yurburg.

At 0600 hours on 22 June 1941, a motorcycle battalion with tanks occupied Kretinga and at 0900 hours up to a regiment of infantry occupied Kartena.

In the region of Vezhaychey up to a battalion of tanks broke through to Retavas. At 0630 hours, up to a battalion of tanks crossed the frontier on the Taurogen axis; at 0730-0900, up to a battalion of infantry and a motorized unit approached Taurogen; at 0730 hours, an enemy tank battalion occupied Gavry.

To the south of Yurburg, up to an infantry battalion is advancing, enveloping the left flank of the 8th Rifle Division.

b) In the region of Tilsit, a major accumulation of infantry and tanks. The region of Tilsit, Ragnit, Zhilien is covered by strong air defense.

#### Second. The Kaunas-Vilno Sector.

a) On the sector Yurburg, Vishtynets, by 0900 hours, the enemy had reached the front: on the Shaki axis up to an infantry regiment was advancing; Naumiystis, Kibarty, Virbalis were occupied by up to two infantry regiments; in the Vishtynets area infantry of unestablished strength was advancing.

b) On the front Vishtynets, Koptsevo the enemy was developing its main thrust on the general axis of Alitus and by 0900 hours, in the sector held the following position: Virgele and the region were occupied by up to an infantry regiment with tanks, in the Lyubovo region up to a cavalry regiment was advancing on Kalvariya; up to 500 tanks had broken through in the Lozdzee area, continuing the drive to Alitus; Koptsevo had been occupied by infantry.

c) Avgustov was occupied by enemy infantry.

d) At 0730 hours in the Vodzhgiry area, the enemy dropped an airborne force but by 1000 hours the strength of the assault force had not been established.

#### Conclusions:

1. After artillery softening up and bombing, the enemy Air Force, infantry and tanks had gone over to the offensive, launching the main thrust against Kaunas, Vilno.

2. The enemy still has not committed significant Air Forces, limiting itself to the actions of individual groups and individual aircraft.

Chief of Staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lt Gen Klenov

Deputy Chief of Intelligence Department of Staff of Baltic Special Military District, Col Kashnikov

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1362, file 5, sheets 25-26. Original.

**FROM THE COMBAT LOG OF THE 27TH ARMY OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT**

22 June 1941

At 0400 hours, seven enemy aircraft bombed the airfield in Libau, four aircraft were destroyed on the ground and three Red Armymen were wounded.

One enemy aircraft made a forced landing in the forest (the Libau area) and six aircraft turned back.

Units of the 67th Rifle Division according to the operational order occupying battle positions.

According to inaccurate data in the forest to the south of Libau (the precise region has not been established, a paratrooper force has been landed. Verification is required.

1600 hours. The enemy shows great activeness on the front. The enemy has bombed Libau five times. At 1200 hours, the enemy occupied Rutsava, having an absolute superiority over our troops which on this sector, without having any tanks, could not stop the enemy.

The 10th Rifle Division quickly retreated to the north and northwest.

In the Eltvilki area, an assault force was landed. The 67th Rifle Division was given the assignment at whatever the cost to hold Libau. For halting the spread of the enemy to the north, to Rutsava Station (up to two infantry battalions), two rifle battalions were sent with artillery, one battalion by train and the second on motor vehicles.

The concentration of units from the LXV and XXIV Rifle Corps is going on slowly and they are being moved under district plans and orders.

TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4570, file 36, sheets 1-1 verso. Original.

**OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM STAFF OF BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT No 2**

22 June 1941, 1430 hours

First. The enemy went over to the offensive along the entire front at 0630 hours. The offensive was preceded by the bombing of airfields and troops in Vindau, Taurogen, Shaulay, Keydany, Kaunas, Kalvariya and Panevezhis.

Second. On the front of the 8th Army, motorcycle units with tanks occupied Kretinga, Kartena. By a counterattack at 1230 hours, Kartena was recovered by units of the 10th Rifle Division.

The enemy breached the front to the northwest and southwest of Kuley and has surrounded units of the 10th Rifle Division operating in this area. On the Taurogen axis, the 125th Rifle Division, in suffering heavy losses, has been fighting for the Yura River. Fighting against the division are up to two motorized divisions with tanks enveloping the division's flanks.

The 48th Rifle Division which came under enemy air attack on the approach to Vodzhgiri, has been fighting retreating to the northeast.

In the area of Rossiyen, Vidukla, at 1252 hours, an assault force was landed of unestablished size. The enemy, having occupied Yurburg, has spread out along the Neman to the east and northeast.

Third. On the front of the 11th Army, the enemy is advancing having the basic grouping of up to 500 tanks on the axis of Kalvariya and Alitus.

The 5th Rifle Division is counterattacking the enemy which has broken through to Shaki and Skordubyany.

The 33d Rifle Division is holding the front of Kardniski, Volkovysk; the 1st Rifle Regiment has reached the area of Mariampol; the 188th Rifle Division is approaching the line of Volkovysk, Budentse.

The 126th Rifle Division is on the move from Preny to Lake Zhuvinty.

The 23d Rifle Division with its forward units is approaching Kaunas and is moving to the Revyasha River.

The 128th Rifle Division is heavily engaged in the area of Lake Dus and its flanks are being turned by tank units.

In Alitus there is an enemy airborne force and enemy tanks.

Fourth. Aviation is fighting in the air and operating against the troops. Losses are 56 aircraft.

Chief of Staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lt Gen N. Klenov

Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj Gen F. Trukhin

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1351, file 57, sheets 16-17. Original.

**OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM COMMANDER OF 67TH RIFLE DIVISION**

22 June 1941, 1520 hours

Units of the 10th Rifle Division are retreating, according to the report, quickly. They are approaching Rutsava; it will be difficult to hold Libau without strong help. We request support. Libau is defended by a construction

battalion and 13 raids have been made against Libau. Antiaircraft artillery does not hold [the enemy aircraft].

Commander of 67th Rifle Division, Maj Gen N.A. Dedayev

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1394, file 2, sheet 194. Original.

**OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM STAFF OF 8TH ARMY TO CHIEF OF STAFF OF BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT**

22 June 1941, 1530 hours

Upon the report of the commander of the XI Rifle Corps, the 125th Rifle Division is being enveloped on both flanks from the region of Pagramantis, Gavry. The division has suffered heavy losses, there are few shells and the units are gradually retreating. Ahead of it are up to three infantry divisions and up to two tank regiments.

The 48th Rifle Division is retreating.

The corps commander has been ordered to stop the enemy by a stubborn defense in the forests to the east of Taurogen.

The commander of the 125th Rifle Division is changing the location of the command post to the region of the forest to the southwest of Skaudvile.

At 1500 hours, the corps commander did not have contact with the command post of the 125th and 48th Rifle Divisions.

Chief of Staff of 8th Army, Maj Gen Larionov

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 10, sheet 69. Original.

**OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF 67TH RIFLE DIVISION TO CHIEF OF STAFF OF 27TH ARMY OF BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT 22**

June 1941, 2000 hours

1. The 67th Rifle Division (minus the 114th Rifle Regiment) has gone out for exercises to the area: Pavilosta, Libau, Barta, for the subject: defending the coast and combating enemy airborne forces.

2. The 56th Rifle Regiment with the 94th Artillery Regiment were conducting exercises in the region: Pavilosta, Libau, Grobinya....

4. The 114th Rifle Regiment in winter quarters in Vindau was leaving for exercises for its own forces on 22 June 1941....

Chief of Staff of the 67th Rifle Division, Col Bobovich  
TsAMO, folio 325, inv. 4579, file 1a, sheet 58. Original.

**OPERATIONS SUMMARY OF STAFF OF NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO CHIEF OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF**

22 June 1941, 2200 hours

1. Units of the SZF [Northwestern Front] continued to hold the enemy which has endeavored to envelop the Taurogen grouping (90th, 125th and 48th Rifle Divisions) on the flanks, while simultaneously opposing the exploitation of the enemy offensive on the Kaunas and Alitus axes.

2. The 27th Army: units were alerted and occupied: the 3d Separate Rifle Brigade with one battalion, Dago Islands and with the remaining forces the coastal fortifications of Lake Ezel;

The 67th Rifle Divisions with the 114th Rifle Regiment and an artillery battalion the coast of Kolkas-Ragaz, Vindau, the 156th Rifle Regiment in the area of Libau and Pavilosta, the 281st Rifle Regiment in the mobile reserves. The enemy has not attempted to land on the island. According to unverified data an insignificant amphibious landing has been made at Pavilosta.

Libau has been bombed 13 times.

3. The 8th Army with the X Rifle Corps, staff in Varnyay. The front of the divisions has been breached on the Kretinga axis with tanks and motorcycle units and on the Kuley axis by infantry.

Units of the 10th Rifle Division have retreated to Plunga, the 204th Rifle Regiment with artillery has escaped from encirclement in the Kuley area. The Retavas area is held by units of the 10th Rifle Division and losses are being ascertained.

The 90th Rifle Division is fighting stubbornly for Shilale against superior enemy forces. The enemy has attacked the boundary of the 10th and 125th Rifle Divisions in the Payuris area. The XI Rifle Corps with the 125th Rifle Division has suffered heavy losses, lost contact and, in being enveloped on both flanks, is fighting in the forests between Taurogen and Skaudaile.

The 48th Rifle Division retreated in the second half of the day from Erzhvilki to the northeast.

The XII Mechanized Corps is concentrated as follows: the 23d Tank Division to the north of Telshay, the 28th Tank Division to the north of Shaulay, the 202d Mechanized Division in Kelme.

The 11th Rifle Division continues unloading in the area of Radvilishkis, Beysagola, Sheduva.

The 9th Antitank Battalion is on the line Varnyay, Kelme.

The III Mechanized Corps (corps staff, forest to the north of Keydany).

The 84th Mechanized Division has moved up to the Nevyazhis River to the south of Labunovo.

The 2d Tank Division is in the forests in the Gayzhyuyay area.

The 5th Tank Division has been left in the 11th Army, and is defending the crossings at Alitus. The corps is ready for the offensive, taking up the forming-up place during the night in the Rossiyeny area.

As a consequence of bombing, wire communications with the 8th Army has been lacking since 1400 hours. Losses are being ascertained.

4. 11th Army—army staff is moving to Kayshyadoris. Communication disrupted by enemy aviation is still not operating. Communication is maintained solely by radio.

Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the formations are retreating as follows: the 5th and 33d Rifle Divisions from the XVI Rifle Corps have been pushed back into the Kozlovarudskiy Forests.

The 188th Rifle Division is fighting in the forests to the southeast of Prey.

The 126th Rifle Division is fighting at Alitus.

The 128th Rifle Division has suffered heavy losses; army staff does not have contact with it.

5. During the day the enemy aviation bombed the communications centers, population points, dumps, air-fields and caused serious damage to Shaulay and Kauñas.

The Air Forces, in carrying out missions, combated the enemy aviation and bombed accumulations of tanks and tank columns in the Tilsit area and on the Alitus sector.

Losses: 56 aircraft were destroyed; 32 damaged at air-fields.

Downed aviation—19 enemy aircraft and 8 aircraft downed by 3d Army. These figures are being clarified.

Chief of Staff of Northwestern Front, Lt Gen Klenov  
Deputy Chief of Staff of Northwestern Front, Maj Gen Trukhin

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5554, file 32, sheet 11. Original.

#### ORDER OF MILITARY COUNCIL OF BALTIC SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT No 05

22 June 1941

Due to the military operations initiated by Germany, I declare the territory of Lithuania and Latvia to be under martial law.

1. All land forces on the territory of the Baltic Special Military District are to be subordinate to myself.
2. The NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] Troops are to be subordinate to the garrison chiefs for combating enemy paratroopers and saboteurs.
3. In all the population points, lights are not to be lit and travel through the streets in the towns and population

points is prohibited for the local population from 2000 hours to 0500 hours in the morning. All persons guilty of violating the established order are to be remanded to the court under martial law.

4. In the towns and in all other population points, the maintaining of revolutionary order and discipline is entrusted to the worker-peasant militia bodies.

District Commander, Col Gen F. Kuznetsov      District Military Council Member, Corps Commissar Dibrova  
District Chief of Staff, Lt Gen P. Klenov

TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 1362, file 5, sheet 2. Original.

#### ORDER OF COMMANDER OF 8TH ARMY OF THE NORTHWESTERN FRONT TO COMMANDERS OF X AND XI RIFLE CORPS

22 June 1941

I order using all forces available to you the immediate evacuation of the families of the command personnel from Palanga, Kretinga, Kartena, Alunge, Taurogen. The evacuation is to be made by the X Rifle Corps to Telshyay and the 11th Rifle Corps to Shaulay.

The chief of the UNS [directorate of supply chief] 85 is to make available to the commander of the X Rifle Corps the necessary number of vehicles, at the request of the corps commander.

The chiefs of the OPP [political propaganda department] are to make available one political worker per garrison for settling in the families of the command personnel.

In executing this work I demand the observance of complete order and the prevention of any panic.

Commander of 8th Army, Maj Gen Sobennikov      Military Council Member, Div Commissar Shabalov

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 10, sheet 56. Original.

#### OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM STAFF OF WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEF OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF No 001/OP

22 June 1941, 0420 hours

First: 3d Army—up to 60 German aircraft have bombed Grodno. Our aviation initiated air combat.

Second: 10th Army—a group of saboteurs crossed the frontier, with two being killed, two wounded, three captured, and one fled.

Third: 4th Army—at 0420 hours, the bombing of Brest commenced. Number of aircraft not ascertained.

Fourth: along the entire frontier according to the data of the air alert posts, artillery crossfire.

Fifth: the alerting of the troops has been ordered and they are to act in a combat manner.

Chief of Staff of Western Special Military District, Maj Gen Klimovskikh

TsAMO, folio 344, inv. 5564, file 10, sheet 56. Original.

**OPERATIONAL ORDER FROM COMMANDER OF WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO COMMANDER OF 4TH ARMY**

22 June 1941<sup>1</sup>

The commander of the Western Special Military District has ordered: the bands which have broken and are breaking through are to be decisively destroyed, and for this they are to employ primarily the Oborin<sup>2</sup> corps. In terms of operations be guided by the Red Packet. Use aviation for joint attacks with the mechanized units. I draw exceptional attention to the maintaining of contact between the air alert posts, and the liaison officers are to be sent by aircraft directly to the district staff or to the nearest voice frequency telegraph and telephone exchange. Provide information every 2 hours. I place responsibility for this on you. Up to now, I have not been in contact with Comrade Golubev.<sup>3</sup> Establish it through a liaison officer and inform him that he should report on the situation on the front with all available means. For guidance I transfer to you an excerpt from NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] Order No 2.

Commander of Western Special Military District, Army Gen Pavlov      Military Council Member, Corps Commissar Fominykh

Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Klimovskikh

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheet 1. Original.

**OPERATIONAL REPORT OF STAFF OF WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEF OF RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF № 002/OP**

22 June 1941, 0700 hours

First: 3d Army—at 0516 hours, the Germans made a second bombing of Grodno. Between 0500-0525 hours, Lida was bombed by three groups of three aircraft, two aircraft and three aircraft. Ross was bombed at 0430 hours. At 0636 hours, Lida again came under bombing. On the Lida—Gavya Station line, a raid was made against a passenger train with two bombs being dropped. The train was fired on. Some 10 persons were wounded and the train set afire. At 0540 hours, a train was fired on at Bastuna Station.

Second: 10th Army—Belostok and Belsk were subjected to bombing. The air raid warning station in Belsk was destroyed. The Borisovshchizna Airfield was bombed. There were casualties.

Third: along the entire frontier small arms and machine gun artillery fire.

Fourth: from information from the KOVO [Kiev Special Military District], Lutsk, Dubno and Beleisk were subjected to bombing. The Germans crossed the state frontier on the territory of the KOVO.

Fifth: we do not have wire communications with the armies.

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District, Maj Gen Semenov

TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2513, file 71, sheets 85, 86. Original.

**OPERATIONAL REPORT FROM STAFF OF 4TH ARMY OF WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT № 05**

22 June 1941, 1155 hours

1. By 1000 hours on 22 June, army units continued to move out to the defensive areas (49th and 75th Rifle Divisions), and the garrison of the Brest Fortress—the 42d Rifle Division—suffered heavy losses from enemy aviation and artillery, as a result...the 6th Rifle Division was forced to 0700 hours on 22 June to surrender Brest with a fight, while scattered units from the 42d Rifle Division were assembling on the line of Kurnetshcha Velke, Cherne (the 459th Rifle Regiment with the 472d Artillery Regiment in the area of Zhabinka, Karolin, Khvedkovizh) and were putting themselves in order. Thus, the 42d Rifle Division only at about 1200 hours will move out to occupy its area to the north, on the level of its section.

The enemy is superior in the air; our air regiments have suffered heavy (30-40 percent of the personnel) casualties. The army staff (in Kobrin). The corps staffs: the XXVIII Rifle Corps in Zhabinka also at 1215 hours on 22 June was bombed; the corps staff of the XIV Mechanized Corps is in Tevli.

2. I have issued the following orders:

a) The XXVIII Rifle Corps is to prevent the further advance of the enemy against Zhabinka, Kobrin;

b) The XIV Mechanized Corps consisting of the 22d and 30th Tank Divisions concentrated in the area of Vidomlyya, Zhabinka, is to attack the enemy on the Brest axis and destroy it together with the XXVIII Rifle Corps and the 10th Composite Air Division and restore the situation.

3. The army staff is to move from Bukhoviche to Zapрудny.

4. I request the advance of the enemy be stopped on the Brest axis by aviation.

5. There is communication with the staff of the XXVIII Rifle Corps and periodically with the staff of the XIV Mechanized Corps.

6. The 205th Motorized Rifle Division has remained in place, sending one rifle regiment to the Mukhovets River.

Commander of 4th Army, Maj . . . Military Council Member, Div  
Gen Korobkov Commissar Shlykov  
Chief of Staff, Col Sandalov

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheets 28-29.  
Original.

**OPERATIONAL ORDER FROM COMMANDER  
OF 4TH ARMY OF WESTERN SPECIAL  
MILITARY DISTRICT No 02**

22 June 1941, 1830 hours

1. The enemy has made a treacherous attack on the Soviet cities and has forced our units back from the frontier to the east.
2. Troops of the 4th Army, in continuing during the night to firmly defend the held lines, on the morning of 23 June went over to an offensive enveloping Brest Litovsk and to the north with the mission of destroying the enemy which had crossed the Western Bug River.

The assault is being launched: by the XIV Mechanized Corps with the XXVIII Rifle Corps and a high-speed bomber regiment from the 10th Composite Air Division.

The 75th and 49th Rifle Divisions are continuing to hold the occupied lines.

3. The XIV Mechanized Corps (22d and 30th Tank Divisions and the 205th Motorized Rifle Division) from the morning of 23 June are to launch a strike from the line of Kryvlyany, Pelishche, Khmelevo on the general axis of Vysoke-Litovsk with the task by the end of the day of destroying the enemy to the east of the Western Bug River.

On the right wheeling flank there is also to be a company for exploiting the success and covering the right flank of the 205th Motorized Infantry Division.

The tank assault is to be supported by a high-speed bomber regiment from the 10th Composite Air Division.

4. The XXVIII Rifle Corps is to launch an attack with its right flank: the 6th, 42d Rifle Divisions and a battalion of tanks from the 205th Motorized Rifle Division on the general axis of Brest having the task of occupying Brest by the end of the day.

5. The assault is to be commenced at 0500 hours on 23 June after a 15-minute artillery shelling.

6. The frontier is not to be crossed until a special order is issued.

7. Command post in Zaprudy.

8. Reports are to be sent every 2 hours.

9. Unit commanders are to take decisive measures to supply the units during the night with ammunition (Bronna Gura and Pinsk) and with fuel (Kobrin, Oran-chitsy).

Commander of 4th Army, Maj . . . Military Council Member, Div  
Gen Korobkov Commissar Shlykov  
Chief of Staff, Col Sandalov

TsAMO, folio 318, inv. 4631, file 6, sheets 7-7 verso.  
Original.

**OPERATIONAL SUMMARY FROM STAFF OF I  
RIFLE CORPS OF 10TH ARMY OF WESTERN  
FRONT**

22 June 1941, 1900 hours

1. The enemy with an estimated force of up to two infantry divisions supported by artillery and aviation at 0500 hours on 22 June 1941 violated the state frontier, crushed the border units and exploited the success to the east and southeast.
2. Alerted units of the 8th Rifle Division which anticipated the enemy in capturing the forward position of UR [fortified area] took up the defensive on the line: Shchuchyn, Grabovo, Kolno, Vorkovo, Konty. Stubborn holding actions were conducted during the day and by 1900 hours on 22 June 1941 were at the lines;
3. The 229th Rifle Division—Shchuchyn, Mentusevo, in being opposed by up to one infantry regiment, losses are being clarified.
4. The 151st Rifle Regiment is holding up the drive of up to two or three infantry battalions on the line of Marki, Lebki-Duzhe, Golyanki.
5. The 310th Rifle Regiment is conducting holding operations on the line of the nameless elevation to the east of Kolno, Vorkovo (its eastern extremity), Konty—Maly, Plotsk occupied by the enemy at 1200-1400 hours was cleared of the enemy which retreated to the northwest of Konty.
6. The 57th Separate Rifle Battalion in the Popki area prior to 1200 hours checked the enemy thrust of unknown force and by 1900 hours had retreated to the Rogenitse Veliki Forest. During the night of 23 June, a combat engineer battalion was pulled back to Vizna for covering and restoring the crossings.
7. As a result of a double air bombing raid, Vizna was set afire. The bridge while sustaining insignificant damage remains standing.
8. To the left on the Luby axis and further to the south the units of the 6th Cavalry Division are operating.
9. Units of the 2d Rifle Division are conducting holding operations in the Ruda area. The enemy with a force of up to one infantry regiment. Grayevo was taken by the enemy.

10. A reserve of the KSK [?rifle corps] has been established consisting of one rifle battalion from the 261st Rifle Regiment.

11. There has been no contact with the staff of the 10th Army during the day either by radio or telegraph. There is telephone contact with the divisions with frequent interruptions. Losses in the units are being clarified.

Chief of Staff of the 1 Rifle Corps, Col Sokolov

Chief of Operations Department, Maj Stavrovskiy

TsAMO, folio 353, inv. 5908, file 2, sheet 2. Original.

**OPERATIONAL ORDER OF STAFF OF KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO COMMANDERS OF XXIV MECHANIZED CORPS AND 45TH TANK DIVISION**

22 June 1941

At dawn of 22 June, the Germans commenced an offensive. Fighting is underway on the frontier.

Begin to execute the 1941 cover plan.

Commander of Kiev Special Military District, Col Gen Kirponos

Military Council Member of Kiev Special Military District, Corps Commissar Vashugin

Chief of Staff of Kiev Special Military District, Lt Gen Purkayev

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 164, file 50, sheet 3. Original.

**ORDER OF CHIEF OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEFS OF POLITICAL BODIES OF DISTRICT FORMATIONS**

22 June 1941

I propose verifying the placement of the party-Komsomol forces and the political support for combat operations of the units during the night of 23 June 1941, having paid particular attention to the coordination, cooperation and communication between the subunits, units and formations.

Continuous intelligence, a knowledge of the situation, the issuing of the battle task to the men and constant vigilance are essential conditions for preventing confusion and panic which are particularly dangerous at night.

The elimination of the small groups of paratroopers, saboteurs who are dressed in Red Army uniforms will ensure calm in the rear.

Popularize instances of heroism and unstinting work by the individual Red Armymen, the command personnel, subunits and units.

Ensure precise work of the rear services, evacuation of wounded, uninterrupted food supply for the personnel, the delivery of newspapers and listening to the radio.

Each day by 0800 hours and 2000 hours to report by telegraph and a day later submit detailed written reports.

Chief of Political Propaganda Directorate of Kiev Special Military District, Brig Commissar Mikhaylov

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 213, file 1, sheet 3. Original.

**POLITICAL REPORT FROM POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEF OF MAIN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF RED ARMY**

22 June 1941, 1300 hours

On 22 June 1941 at 0400 hours, German aviation without any grounds launched raids against a number of our airfields and towns along the Western frontier and bombed them. The most bombed were the airfields of Chernovtsy (a hangar was burned up and 22 aircraft were destroyed and 8 enemy aircraft were downed) and Stanislav (36 of our aircraft were destroyed).

Simultaneously, in various areas the German troops opened artillery fire and crossed the frontier. In the area of Lyuboml, Vladimir-Volynsk, the enemy crossed the Bug River. Artillery fire was opened against Peremyshl. Lutsk also came under air bombing repeatedly.

In Karchezi the frontier was crossed by Romanians and our forward units halted them. In the Guta area, a cavalry regiment was preparing to cross. Operating in the Ustilug area were enemy saboteur groups dressed in our uniform. The dumps are being set afire in this area.

The district troops opened the packets and set off for the locations designated by the mobilization plans.

The staff and the UPP [Political Propaganda Directorate] of the KOVO by 0500 hours on 22 June were concentrated in the town of Tarnopol and began operational work.

District troop morale is high. The personnel is full of terrible hate for German Naziism which brazenly violated the peace treaty with the USSR. All the district forces have descended on the enemy and are destroying it where it crossed the frontier.

Instructions have been given to the political propaganda departments [OPP] of the armies and formations to completely explain to the troops the order of the people's commissar and organize an explanation of the radio statement by Comrade Molotov.

The OPP of the formations are to organize continuous party political work in the units and rear and correctly assign the party forces. It has also been proposed that the party system be turned over to the KOVO UPP (Kiev).

Chief of Political Propaganda Directorate of the Kiev Special Military District, Brig Commissar Mikhaylov

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 213, file 12, sheets 7, 8. Original.

**POLITICAL REPORT FROM POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE KIEV SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA DIRECTORATE OF THE RED ARMY**

22 June 1941, 2205 hours

On all sections where the enemy has crossed the border, our units are fighting hard, checking the numerically superior enemy forces in a number of places.

Particularly heavy fighting is occurring in the Peremyshl area where units of the 99th Rifle Division and the 8th Fortified Area are operating.

The 69th Rifle Regiment of the 97th Rifle Division in the Lyubachev area has checked the enemy advance with a force of up to two regiments.

The personnel of the 4th UR surrounded in individual structures is fiercely repelling the enemy assaults. All the strongpoints of the 6th UR are firing intensely. On this sector the enemy has pulled back and dropped three small airborne assault groups. For combating these groups the worker construction battalions have been armed.

All the units of the KOVO which have come into contact with the enemy have defended each inch of the Soviet land unstintingly, showing examples of courage and heroism herein.

The Red Armyman from the 244th Rifle Regiment, Comrade Romanov, in crawling up to an enemy motorcycle scout, destroyed him.

The company commander of the same regiment, Jr Lt Mezuyev, being wounded three times, did not leave the battlefield in continuing to fight.

The driver from the construction battalion of the VI Rifle Corps apprehended four pilots who had parachuted from a downed aircraft and had endeavored to hide.

In the Zholkov area, enemy aircraft dropped anti-Soviet leaflets which were gathered up and destroyed.

The radio speech of Comrade Molotov and the order of the people's commissar of defense have been issued to the soldiers and commanders. The personnel completely approve the measures of the Soviet government and are burning with a desire to defeat the invading enemy.

The military council has issued a directive for strengthening the combat zeal of the troops and their actions at night.

Operational workers from the Political Propaganda Directorate of the KOVO have been provided with instructions and sent into the armies and formations. All the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the political propaganda departments of the corps and divisions have been selected.

All the deputy regimental commanders have also been selected (with the exception of three vacant positions).

The district party aktiv courses (250 persons) the Kiev Military Political School (200 persons) and the district courses for the deputy political instructors with 200 persons were graduated ahead of time.

Some 18 ambulance trains are being organized. On 23 June 1941, one or two ambulance trains went into service at Kiev Station and three ambulance trains at Taras Shevchenko Station.

Contact and information have been established with the Tarnopol Obkom of the KP(b)U [Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik)]. The party aktiv of the civilian organizations has been mobilized and armed to combat enemy paratroopers and for maintaining order in the city.

Leaflets have been prepared for printing in German and Romanian. The first issue of a newspaper in German has been prepared. Radio interception of foreign radios has been organized.

A front expedition has been set up consisting of 13 men and equipped with 15 motor vehicles. A request has been made for the delivery of newspapers by aircraft.

Two mobile vehicle-mounted shops have been organized for repairing political and educational equipment.

A district film projector set-up and a printing train have been dispatched from Kiev. Instructions have been issued to the political propaganda departments of the armies on organizing the motion picture facilities. The NZ film library has been moved closer to the front.

Chief of Political Propaganda Directorate of Kiev Special Military District, Brig Commissar Mikhaylov

TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 213, file 12, sheets 19-21. Original.

**Footnotes**

1. Delivered by the front liaison officer at 1800 hours on 22 June 1941.
2. Meaning the XIV Mechanized Corps, corps commander, Maj Gen Stepan Ilich Oborin.
3. Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev, commander of the 10th Army.
4. The file was captured by the Germans.

**WEHRMACHT DOCUMENTS**

Army Group Center

Translated from German,  
Headquarters

Morning Report

22 June 1941, 0800 hours

**The 4th Army:**

1) The offensive is developing successfully. The enemy is putting up basically weak resistance. The impression is created that it was caught by surprise.

**The bridges across the Bug River:** they have captured the bridge at Kodon, the rail bridge at Brest and the bridge of Fronolov.

By 0600 hours, the forward advancing units had basically advanced to a depth from 4 to 5 km to the east of the Bug River. Drogizhin has been occupied. In Brest, primarily in the fortress, resistance has stiffened. All the corps are aiming at the bridges.

2) Surprise is utilized by strengthening the thrust.

3) Enemy air operations are still weak. One of our reconnaissance aircraft has been downed.

**The 9th Army:**

1) The offensive started according to plan and is developing successfully along the entire front. The 800th Regiment Osnas [Special Assignment] committed to battle before the start of the offensive against Avgustov has been repulsed.

2) General impression of the enemy:

Along the entire enemy front resistance is still weak and in places light artillery is firing. In zone of VIII Army Corps, one heavy battery has been detected.

3) By 0530 hours, we have achieved the following:

**The XLII AK [Army Corps]:** Kupnin and the edge of the forest to the west of Chervone. In Vincheta the enemy continues to put up weak resistance. The population point of Grayevo has been occupied. The bunkers in front of Grayevo were not occupied by the enemy.

**The XX AK:** the 162d Infantry Division has captured Avgustov with the northern defile. The crossings were not damaged. The 256th Infantry Division reached the Avgustov—Grodno Highway to the south of Krasnoye, and with the left flank is approaching Kuryanka.

**The VIII AK:** the 8th Infantry Division, having overcome comparatively stubborn resistance in the hills to the west of Bokhatery, Lezne, reached the Kuryanka—Sopotskin Highway near Kholynka. Fighting is still underway at Markovtse. The 28th Infantry Division is halfway from the frontier to Sopotskin and the 161st Infantry Division is at elev. 118 and 3 km to the west of Zhabani and near Motovichay.

**The 3d Panzer Group:** by 0530 hours, the line was reached—5 km to the southwest of Kaptiamistis—Lazdnyay—Asava (9 km to the southwest of Kalvariya)—Grauzinyay (12 km to the east of the southern extremity of Lake Vistyter).

**The XXXIX AK:** with units of both panzer divisions at 0445 hours, it set out on the axis of the line of Krisna. At 0615 hours it had reached Murgininkay (5 km to the southwest of Kalvariya).

4) The bridges at Savantey, across the Neman River at Merikina and Olita have not yet been destroyed.

5) A portion of the population is fleeing.

Army Group Center

Secret

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 547, sheets 2, 3, 4

Telegram to Army Group Center

22 June 1941

1. The 3d Panzer Group is fighting for the road junction of Vilna for continuing the offensive with the northern flank against Mikhalishki.

2. The enemy's situation: the enemy is retreating to the east. In the Vilna area, concentrations have been spotted.

3. The LVII Army Corps at 0900 hours was advancing from Vareny to Oshmiana, covering the southern flank.

4. The XXXIX AK is beginning to advance from Olita to Vilna and, having pushed the enemy back to the north, is continuing to advance against Mikhalishki.

5. The question of the subordination of the units to the staff of the 9th Army will be settled not sooner than noon on 23 June.

6. In the evening of 22 June, the 7th Panzer Division had the largest tank battle over the period of this war to the east of Olita against the 5th Tank Division. Some 70 enemy tanks and 20 aircraft (at airfields) were destroyed. We lost 11 tanks, including 4 heavy ones.

7. Particular attention should be paid to the march capability of the 56th Reinforced Infantry Regiment on 22 June in the direction of the Neman River.

Staff of 3d Panzer Group

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 118, sheet 2.

Report to Army Group Center

22 June 1941, 2030 hours

Army Group Center, Secret

Staff Headquarters

The staff of the 9th Army:

1) The surprise in crossing the frontier was completely successful. From approximately 0900 hours, enemy resistance began to partially strengthen. On individual sectors as before, only scattered resistance from poorly commanded enemy.

2. 9th Army is advancing forward along the entire front and at Zhabany, Merkine and Olita has crossed the Neman River.

**XLII AK:** the 87th Infantry Division (southern group) has advanced to the hills along both sides of Katy. There are plans to continue the offensive to the northeast. The northern group, beginning at 1500 hours, has attacked from the staging area of Kolno to the northeast.

**102d Infantry Division:** successful close reconnaissance by patrols and assault groups. The 129th Infantry Division by 1415 hours with an assault group of the 87th Infantry Division reached an area to the southwest of Okol (10 km to the west of Grayevo). The left flank is advancing against Ruda along the road to Osovets. Enemy is weak.  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the 900th Brigade Osnaz has reached the area of Orelburg. The staff of Reichsführer SS is in Grabnik. The 1st Brigade (as yet only certain units have arrived) is to the east of Lake Arys.

**The 2d Brigade (the main forces have arrived)** is in an area of Zeysen (to the north of Lutsk) at the disposition of the XLII AK. The arrival of the cavalry regiment SS will be announced additionally.

**XX AK:** the advancing groups of both divisions are making headway. The offensive is being exploited with particular success by the 256th Infantry Division and the 162d Infantry Division: fighting for Avgustov. Capture of northern defile. The 256th Infantry Division: at 1315 hours one regiment captured Novyy Dvor. Another regiment near marker 196 2 km to the south of Lipsk.

**VIII AK:** After stubborn fighting breached the border positions of the Russians at Bokhatery, Lezne and Sopotskin and is advancing to the Neman River. By 1400 hours reached the line of Konyukhi—elev. 214 (9 km to the south of Sopotskin)—Vasilyevichi. On the northern flank the 161st Infantry Division, beginning at 0800 hours, with two regiments has crossed the Neman along both sides of Zhabany and from 1600 hours one regiment was advancing on Yazerki.

**In front of the 3d Panzer Group** weak enemy troops retreating to the east. To the east of the Neman River, significant enemy movements not observed.

By 1600 hours, the line was reached: the southern extremity of Lake Metelio—Pryga (8 km to the west of Zimnas)—Olita—Mariampole.

**Plan for 23 June:** to continue offensive across Neman River on axis of Verenov—Vilno.

**General Impression:** on this side of the Neman River, units of eight divisions were established and these were not completely ready for the defensive and were literally bowled over by our offensive. Enemy plans not yet established.

**Our plans without changes.**

**4th Army:**

**1) Surprise offensive across Bug River and across land frontier completely successful. Border fortifications breached on sectors of all corps.**

**Enemy defending (Brest Fortress) and Drokizhin.**

**General Impression:** Enemy did not expect our offensive and this made it possible to breach border positions. Artillery and air operations weak. Larger enemy forces have not yet appeared.

By 1600 hours the following were reached:

**2d Panzer Group:** forward detachment of 255th Infantry Division—Oltush, main division forces Pushcha, Wlodawa....

**18th Panzer Division:** in region of Pilishche (15 km to the northwest of Tsabinka) and to the north repelled strong Russian tank attack.

**2) Air situation:**

There were no strong raids. Our aviation in all regards surpasses the Russian. Operational and tactical air reconnaissance did not encounter substantial obstacles anywhere.

As yet, it cannot be said with certainty whether the Russians will fight to the end close to the frontier or will retreat in order to accept battle on the rear positions. In any event, it is clear that on the tactical level they were caught by surprise. Arguing against the fact of a deliberate planned retreat is the content of numerous intercepted radiograms, evidence of prisoners, uncertain air operations and the fact that all the bridges fell into our hands undestroyed. Also arguing in favor of this is the small amount of artillery, the still insignificant number of prisoners and information from inhabitants that the Russian infantry formations retreated to the east literally yesterday.

The army group intends to continue the offensive with the former groupings, having accelerated the advance of the motorized formations on the main axes.

TsAMO, inv. 12462, file 547, sheets 11, 12, 13, 14, 15

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### **The Riddle of 22 June 1941**

*18011001d VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL*  
in Russian No 6, Jun 89 (signed to press 16 Jun 89  
pp 36-42

[Article, published under the heading "Debates and Discussions," by V.I. Chukreyev, member of the USSR Writers' Union: "The Riddle of 22 June 1941"]

[Text] On the pages of this journal there has been a discussion of the initial period of the war. Articles by military historians have widely taken up the questions of the preparations for the war by the nation and the Soviet

Army, and they have described the enormous organizational activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in the prewar years.

For many years I have been working on a novel "Den i chas" [Day and Hour] and the main aim of this was the task of figuring out the riddle of 22 June 1941. It seems to me that up to now there have been no persuasive explanations of the conduct of our supreme leadership, or to put it more simply, of I.V. Stalin, during the last days before the war. When one raises the issue of that titanic work which was carried out in the nation and the army to prepare to repel aggression, everything is comprehensible and the conduct of the head of government, I.V. Stalin, seems absolutely logical, persuasive in each specific instance. But when one begins to describe the very eve of the war and those last prewar hours, the impression is gained that I.V. Stalin abandoned a feeling of elementary logic. He supposedly endeavored to put off the military clash and for this reason did not give approval to bring the troops to alert. But one would have to be an ostrich which sees a danger and puts its head in the sand. I.V. Stalin, regardless of all of the negative that was in his nature and which has been properly assessed, could never be styled an ostrich when it came to politics. Something else determined his conduct during these days and hours.

In writing in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof V.A. Anfilov, has proposed a version according to which Stalin assumed that "Hitler would not act against us until military operations against England were over...secondly, Stalin felt that Germany would need oil for a major war against the Soviet Union." Here he referred to G.K. Zhukov to whom Stalin supposedly on a globe "pointed out the nations of the Near and Middle East as the territory of the subsequent German offensive in the Balkans."<sup>1</sup>

This is an unexpected and extremely unreliable story. To know that Hitler had brought his military machine on our frontiers to full readiness and to think that he would go into the Near East for oil is to be supernaive in political matters. Stalin certainly was not this.

So much has been said about 22 June and the days, months and years which preceded it that seemingly there would be nothing more to say here. However, many explanations may be given, and there have been such, the most important facts are not made any clearer by this. For example, the TASS announcement of 14 June 1941. Many most unflattering words have been voiced over the question of this document. Sufficient bewildering questions have been asked about the reasons for its publishing. Now it has evidently been established that this was a political trial balloon undertaken in the aim of establishing Hitler's intentions. Seemingly, this idea was first proposed by the English journalist A. Werth.<sup>2</sup> At present, in the literature dealing with World War II, the notion voiced by him is considered rather canonical. However, if one agrees with it, the question arises of why the Soviet government and I.V. Stalin who undertook

this trial balloon and did not achieve outstanding results (the Germans did not reply and this more than clearly showed their intentions) did not lead the Soviet Army and the nation into readiness to repel the aggression already, for example, on 17 or 18 June? No, the English version does not explain the reasons for the appearance of this political document and does not help understand all the complexities of the situation in which it appeared.

Another fact: the directive alerting the troops in the Western military districts was issued during the night of 22 June. No matter how this is interpreted at present, it cannot be likened to those simple, clear commands such as "To Arms," "To Battle" which turn the serviceman and the reservist into a soldier or to a clear signal "The Nation In Mobilizational Readiness!" which raises the entire people to fight. So much is not clear in it. There is so much confusion. And at the same time, when information had been received from various sources on the precise date of the enemy offensive.

At present, it is no secret to anyone that our intelligence knew about the concentration of the Nazi troops along the frontiers of the Soviet Union. To know about Hitler's intentions and until the last hour, the last minute not to determine one's every action and step by an awareness of the great danger. Why? What else could determine I.V. Stalin's behavior?

We feel that the crucial issue is the following. For the Soviet Union, which at that time was the world's only socialist state, there existed one other, truly fatal danger, possibly, even a more terrible one than a Nazi invasion and this was the danger of entering a general military coalition of the leading capitalist states. Everyone knows about this but it is seen as a danger which existed on a purely theoretical level. The Nazi invasion and the development of historical events after 22 June 1941 and which assumed a certain direction for all of us seemingly obscured for us and played down much which had occurred on the eve of the war and could have turned the course of the historical process in a different direction. The events and facts which were of crucial, determining significance for history seemingly ceased to exist for us and became completely insignificant. However, since history had taken precisely that path, we pretended and persuaded ourselves that this was nothing and would not even permit ourselves the notion of any other different development of events. We did not even make any suppositions, we did not propose hypotheses, this was merely necessary.

Really, are there not grounds to wonder about the actions of the military leaders and assess their psychology, for example, the measures initiated by the Naval Command during the night of 22 June? There is the opinion that they were irreproachable and this determined the fact that the sailors encountered the enemy in a worthy manner. Let me give the facts. Here is how the events of the night of 22 June were described by Adm

N.G. Kuznetsov: "At around 1100 hours in the evening, the telephone rang. I heard the voice of Mar S.K. Timoshenko:

"There is very important information. Come to see me..."

"Semen Konstantinovich [Timoshenko]...said that a German attack on our country was considered possible.

"Zhukov...showed us a telegram which he was preparing for the border districts.... Reading through the text of the telegram, I asked:

"In the event of an attack is permission given to use weapons?"

"It is."

"I turned to Rear Adm Alafuzov:

"Rush to the staff and immediately issue instructions to the fleets on a full actual alert, that is, an alert No 1."<sup>3</sup>

"At the people's commissariat," N.G. Kuznetsov went on to write, "they reported to me that an urgent order had already been given. It was very brief—a signal by which on the spot they would know what to do. But still it would take a certain amount of time for the telegram to arrive and time was precious. I reached for the telephone."<sup>4</sup> The Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, the Pinsk and Danube Flotillas were put on combat alert.

What happened then? Adm V.F. Tributs who was then in command of the Baltic Fleet has written: "After the order from the people's commissar on putting the fleet in full combat alert, we received an announcement after midnight of 22 June: "During 23 June (certainly this is not an error, not a slip by the memoirist in quoting such documents they do not err.—V.Ch.) a surprise German attack is possible. It can commence with provocative actions capable of causing major complications. Simultaneously be in full combat alert and encounter a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies. I order: move to Alert No 1 and carefully camouflage the increase in alert status. I categorically forbid the conducting of reconnaissance in foreign territorial waters. No other measures are to be carried out without special permission."<sup>5</sup>

The document with its ambiguousness, in terms of the intention contained in it could confuse or mislead anyone who reads it but it surpasses the directive to the ground troops. In the first instance, the possibility of provocations is mentioned on 22-23 June. But here it is during 23 June! Here one feels that the accusation (units of the USSR Narkomvoenmorflot [People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs], without having instructions, fired on German aircraft violating the frontier of the USSR.—V.Ch.) and which in March the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] had made against the Navy Command had not been forgotten. The fear of this is seen in the document. And it was well and good that the first to reach the fleets and

flotillas was not the document but rather a simple telegram stating: "The Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Pinsk Flotilla and Danube Flotilla. Operational alert No 1 immediately. Kuznetsov."<sup>6</sup>

There can be no science without hypotheses and suppositions based on a firm foundation of facts. But then you read military memoirs or journal articles and the question arises as to why the mechanized corps stationed on the Western frontiers did not come under the crushing blows of the Germans, particularly their aviation, during the first hours of the war? Most likely because all of them or the main portion at least were away from their permanent dispositions. L.M. Sandalov (chief of staff of the 4th Army.—V.Ch.) has written about this in his memoirs. And possibly someone with L.P. Beriya gripping their throat, like the Navy Command, the border troops and many others, still managed under these conditions to do everything possible to bring the troops to combat readiness? A broad field for supposition, hypotheses and a scientific search.

The main thing, in my view, is to be seen in the fact that during May-June 1941, the danger of action by the coalition of leading capitalist states against the Soviet Union became particularly real. The objective course of events due to the irreconcilability of the contradictions between the groupings of capitalist states, the historically determined clash between the world of socialism and capitalism and the desire of the imperialist aggressors caught up in a fatal clash to use the military might of the Soviet Union each in its own interests as well as a result of the political intrigues which during these months reached the point of absurd, in essence, got out of control of realistic policy. The Western politicians which had lost their sense of reason, regardless of to what camp they belonged, by their irrationality and the loss of any guidelines whatsoever in policy brought the world and its future, the entire fate of mankind to the brink of disaster. In the political chaos of May-June 1941, the formation of an united front of the leading capitalist states against the Soviet nation became almost a reality.

Hess was in England. It might be said that a situation unprecedented in history had come into being. Two warring states were committing adultery on diplomatic grounds. No one could say what would come of this. However, I.V. Stalin had every reason to assume that the most unpleasant news could come at any moment from England.

Hess, although his situation was ambiguous with the English, it can be said, had them by the throat. He terrorized the English government with the simple but in its way inspired idea: either you agree to an alliance with us or we will conclude a military alliance with Russia and then continue the war against you.

Such a posing of the question forced the English bourgeoisie and Churchill himself to lose their heads. During the days of May and June, common sense abandoned the "wise" English politicians. How in our research

describing the situation on the eve of the war can we overlook the fact that "on 12 June (1941—V.Ch.) the Joint Chiefs of Staff (English—V.Ch.) decided to adopt measures which would permit without any delay attacks launched from Mosul with medium bombers against the Baku oil refineries?"<sup>7</sup> Certainly the English air strike against the Soviet Transcaucasus would mean war but now between the USSR and England. Not only would the Axis states of Rome, Berlin and Tokyo be at war against the Soviet Union but also Great Britain and America standing behind it, in other words, a coalition of all the leading capitalist states would be acting against us. And everything was ready for such a war! Only one thing was lacking: the English should feel that the Russians were to sit down at the negotiating table with Hitler. As J. Butler has written: "At the end of May the opinion arose in London that, having created a threat to the Caucasus oil, it would be possible to best apply pressure to Russia so that it would not concede to the German demands."<sup>8</sup>

Let us again trace the chronology of events. On 12 June, a decision was taken in London which actually commenced war against the USSR. One could be certain that it would immediately become known to Moscow. At present, we are well aware of the efficiently operating Soviet intelligence. The book of Kim Philby states unambiguously about this and about the strikes against the Transcaucasus which the English generals were preparing. One can be certain that there was the closest observation of both the intentions of the English ruling circles and the intentions of Hitler.

On 14 June, Moscow published the TASS statement which endeavored to cut through the knot of intrigues aimed against the Soviet Union. It stated clearly and unambiguously that the Soviet Union would not follow the path of anyone's policy. The Soviet leaders did not intend to sit down at the negotiating table with Hitler. But also the intrigues of the German politicians were perfectly clear to the Soviet leadership.

This statement, it is to be greatly regretted, did not bring anyone in the Western world to his senses. We do not know at what pace squadrons of English bombers were being concentrated in the Mosul area. We merely know that the targets in the Transcaucasus and in the oil fields of the Northern Caucasus had been well reconnoitered and precisely determined. The attack could cause maximum damage. The Soviet Union still did not have another Baku.

Here is another noteworthy historical fact. In Halder's diary on 20 June, there was the entry: "Mr. Molotov wanted to speak with the Führer on 18 June."<sup>9</sup> Another well known fact shows that on 21 June through the German embassy in Moscow and our embassy in Berlin, the Soviet Union proposed a discussion of the state of Soviet-German relations.

What do these facts show? That the Soviet government, in endeavoring at any price to thwart Hitler's action planned for 22 June, had resorted to extreme measures:

it had abandoned the position set out in the TASS statement of 14 June; it proposed to the German government that some sort of talks get underway, although precisely such a situation would lead to a united military alliance of the entire capitalist world forming against the USSR. This diplomatic game, as they say, was worth playing. To thwart the aggressive plans of 22 June, to confuse Hitler, to deprive him of the summer months of 1941! It was worth fighting for this, but this fight and the diplomatic game, in our view, gave Hitler an opportunity to determine the further course of events. He could choose: either create a situation whereby the Soviet Union was in a state of war against England and this would mean with the entire capitalist world, or himself commence a war against the USSR. Here, we feel, lies the key to an understanding of I.V. Stalin's behavior and an explanation of that mistake of his which cost the Soviet Army and the Soviet people generally so dearly. Stalin felt that he was dealing with a politician who of course knew how to calculate and think in any categories but rather he was confronted with an ordinary adventurer who, in using the terminology of chess, could not plan two moves ahead. Stalin was afraid that Hitler would create a situation which would allow Nazi Germany to lead a crusade of the entire capitalist world against the Soviet Union while Hitler went straight to his own death.

Having correctly guessed the scale of the dangers, I.V. Stalin was unable to determine which of them would be realized first and gain its factual, material embodiment. Unable to keep on top of the situation, he during those days and hours acted like a politically bankrupt person whose activities confronted the Soviet state and the Soviet people with disaster. Being a prisoner of his own error, I.V. Stalin forced the others to be more afraid not of an attack but rather provocations by which, in his understanding, Hitler would intimidate the Soviet government and force it to be compliant with talks and then announce that Germany and the USSR had agreed to a general military alliance.

Stalin slept peacefully during that tragic night of 22 June. He was certain that war would not break out.

To recognize this error of Stalin's, in my view, is to draw a very important conclusion from the last war. And this is: the Soviet state should have its arms at the ready not only against refined, in their way wise enemies, but also against any senseless adventurism.

#### Footnotes

1. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 17 June 1987.
2. A. Werth, "Rossiya v voynie 1941-1945" [Russia at War 1941-1945], Moscow, Progress, 1967, pp 78, 79.
3. N.G. Kuznetsov, "Nakanune" [On the Eve], Moscow, Vayenizdat, 1969, pp 355, 356.
4. Ibid., p 357.

5. V.F. Tributs, "Baltiitzy srazhayutsya" [The Baltic Sailors Fight], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, p 12.
6. N.G. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p 361.
7. J. Butler, "Bolshaya strategiya. Sentyabr 1939—iyun 1941" [Grand Strategy. September 1939-June 1941], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostr. Lit-ry, 1959, p 497.
8. Ibid.
9. F. Halder, "Voyennyy dnevnik" [Military Diary], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1969, p 579.

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### A Soldier's Duty

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[Article, published under the heading "Cuts, Omissions and Withdrawals," by MSU K.K. Rokossovskiy: "A Soldier's Duty"; continuation of series. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 4, 5 for 1989]

[Text] Everyone remembers the actions of the Russian troops under the command of such leaders as Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov in the War of 1912. Certainly either also could have given orders to the troops to "Stand to the Death" (this has been particularly instilled in us and certain military leaders have begun to boast of this!). But they did not do this and not because they doubted the steadfastness of the troops assigned to them. No, that was not the reason. They were confident of their men. The entire question was that they wisely considered the inequality of the sides and realized that they may have to die but they should do this intelligently. The most important thing was to equalize the forces and create a better situation. For this reason, without becoming involved in a decisive engagement, they pulled the troops into the interior of the country.

The battle given by Kutuzov at Borodino was a testing: wasn't it time to deal a decisive blow to the enemy? But, having been convinced that the enemy was still strong and that his own forces available by this time were still not sufficient for a victorious engagement, Kutuzov took the decision to retreat and abandon even Moscow.

During the first days of the Great Patriotic War, it was determined that the border engagement had been lost by us. It was possible to stop the enemy only somewhere in the interior, having concentrated the necessary forces for this by pulling back the formations which had maintained their battleworthiness or had not yet participated in the fighting as well as those being moved up from the interior under the deployment plan.

The troops which engaged the besieging enemy in battle had to carry out the task: in employing a mobile defense, to retreat under enemy pressure from line to line, thereby slowing down the enemy advance. Such a decision would

have corresponded to the situation on the front. And if this had been adopted by the General Staff and the front commanders, then the war would have occurred in a completely different manner and we would have avoided those enormous losses, human and material, which we suffered in the initial period of Nazi aggression.

Having arrived in Moscow, I was assigned to the commander of the Western Front, MSU S.K. Timoshenko, and his command post was being moved from around Smolensk to Kasnya. I left for there.

Both on the southwestern sector and on the western, neither the General Staff nor the commander of the Western Special Military District (ZOVO; prior to 1940, the Belorussian Special Military District) had taken any fundamental decisions dictated by the situation on the first day of the war for improving the extremely disadvantageous situation in which our troops found themselves. But since by the start of the war there were fewer troops in the ZOVO than there were in the KOVO [Kiev Special Military District], the enemy succeeded in immediately advancing to a greater depth than on the Southwestern Front.

I was assigned the task of covering the Smolensk sector and preventing the enemy advance toward Viazma.

To my question of what troops and from whence they would be assigned to carry out this task, I received the reply that for now the troops would be those which I had to catch and put under my command starting along the road from Moscow to Yartsevo.

I was to receive more specific instructions from the front commander.

The General Staff had put at my disposal a group of officers with motor vehicles, a radio and two vehicles with quadruple machine guns and personnel.

By evening, our small group had arrived at the front command post and I introduced myself to the commander, S.K. Timoshenko, whom I had known previously. In 1930-1931, he had been the commander of the III Cavalry Corps in which I commanded the 7th Samara English Proletariat Division. Our meeting was warm and heartfelt. I did not feel the difference in the held position. Semen Konstantinovich [Timoshenko] showed no condescension and had maintained a simplicity in manner and a comradely accessibility just as during those times when he was a corps commander. I should say that among all of us, the cavalrymen, he had won not only our respect but our affection.

Having become acquainted with the situation from the data available at that time at the front's staff, I was convinced that here no one could say with confidence that these data corresponded to reality. Contact had been broken with certain armies, in particular the 19th and 22d, and their situation remained unclear. For example, there was unverified information on the landing of a large airborne assault force in the area of Yartsevo, but if

this was confirmed, it remained unclear whether anyone was covering the Yartsevo sector. Fragmentary and unclear information was also received on the appearance of certain large enemy tank units in the Yelnya area.

Having received additional instructions from the front commander to apprehend everyone who under any pretext was retreating to the east and assume command of any units and formations which might be on the Yartsevo sector as well as organize a defense of this line, I during the very same night left for Yartsevo. And along the way we picked up everyone who could be used for organizing resistance to the enemy.

Thus, from this very moment in the Yartsevo area there began the formation of a field force which was officially named the group of Gen Rokossovskiy. It was also added to by soldiers who had accumulated at the assembly point and who had been separated from their units or had broken out of encirclement. Unfortunately, the latter, more accurately a majority of them, were without weapons and it was with great difficulty that we succeeded in arming them. And this had to be done during fighting which went on both night and day. The men got to know one another, it can be said, in the very thick of things.

During those days personnel turnover was enormous.

In the continuous fighting against the ever-strengthening enemy on the Yartsevo sector, there were numerous examples of heroism shown both by individuals (Red Armymen, officers) as well as by subunits and units.

To my great shame, and this I do not have the right to overlook, there were also numerous instances where the servicemen showed cowardice, panicking, desertion and self-inflicted injuries in the aim of avoiding combat.

Initially, there appeared the so-called "lefties" who had shot themselves in the palm of the left hand or had shot off a finger or several fingers. When attention was drawn to this, then we began to find "right handers" who did the same thing but with the right hand.

There were instances of self-inflicted injury by collusion: two men would shoot each other through the hand.

Soon thereafter a law was issued which provided for the employment of the strongest measure (execution) for dissension, avoidance of battle, "shooting yourself," or disobedience of a superior in a combat situation. The interests of the motherland were higher than everything and for their sake we had to apply the severest measures and any concession for the shirkers was not only superfluous but also harmful.

Soon thereafter our group merged with the 16th Army, taking on its name. I was appointed commander, Col M.S. Malinin was chief of staff, Maj Gen V.I. Kazakov was the artillery chief and Maj Gen A.A. Lobachev the military council member. My predecessor, Gen M.F. Lukin, had taken over the 20th Army in the place of Gen P.A. Kurochkin who had been called back to Moscow.

In the second half of September, we carefully worked out a plan of actions for the 16th Army and, along with measures to prevent the breaching of our defenses by the enemy, also made provision for other things, for the event of a retreat.

But the commander of the Western Front at that time, I.S. Konev, approved only the first part of the plan, while the second which envisaged the procedure for a forced retreat was rejected. I feel that this decision was not completely thought out and ran contrary to the existing situation. The enemy was still stronger and more maneuverable than we were and as before held the initiative in its hands. For this reason it was extremely essential to provide for the organization of a forced retreat by the defending troops under the pressure of a superior enemy.

It must be pointed out that neither the Supreme High Command nor many of the front commanders had considered this circumstance and this was a major error. The troops continued to receive loud, sharp directives which did not consider the feasibility of their execution. They served as the grounds for unjustified losses as well as the reason that the fronts were being rolled back on one or another sector.

The general situation which existed by 14 October on the Western Front was extremely severe. In launching an attack with its large tank and motorized groups against our flanks, the enemy had breached the front on both sectors both to the north and in the south, advancing quickly in depth and, having closed the ring, surrounded the troops of several armies left on the former lines to the west of Vyazma. While in the Battle of Smolensk in July 1941, the German Command had not succeeded in such a maneuver, now it was completely carried out. Our surrounded troops, without receiving help from outside and fighting courageously, perished in the enemy ring. There was almost a void on the Moscow sector. It took titanic efforts by the party, the government and the VGK [Supreme High Command] to eliminate the threat hanging over the motherland's capital.

Having located our command post in Volokolamsk, we immediately sent out groups of officers from the staff and the political department in all directions to seek out and establish contact with troops which were already in this area or were arriving from the rear or for intercepting units, groups and individuals who had broken out of encirclement.

The fighting still on the distant approaches to the capital and which preceded the engagement on the Volokolamsk axis brought together the army personnel and the inhabitants of Moscow. The enormous concern shown by the muskovites for the men of the army raised the spirit of the fighters and inspired them to fight and to victory.

At the same time the enemy, having encircled the troops of several armies of the Western and Reserve Fronts to the west of Vyazma, continued the offensive to the east

with its mobile panzer and motorized formations and on 16 October in the morning attacked the left flank of our 16th Army.

Having encountered well-organized resistance, the Nazis retreated and resumed the assaults.

Suffering heavy losses in personnel and equipment, the enemy was forced to commit constantly new forces to battle.

Soon thereafter the engagement heated up along the entire defensive front of the army.

During the fighting from 16 through 27 October, everyone, from the private to the army commander, did everything possible to prevent the enemy from breaching our defenses. And regardless of this, a special commission assigned by the front commander, G.K. Zhukov, arrived at our staff to investigate and hold responsible those guilty of permitting the enemy capture of Volokolamsk.

The gesture of mistrust for subordinates by such a major chief and in such a situation evoked my indignation to the depth of my soul. We viewed this gesture as an attempt to have handy a document in any event to justify oneself, for the front commander could not help but know in what a situation and under what conditions the enemy had taken Volokolamsk. The commission drew a justifying conclusion but the military council member and I had to sign the document drawn up by it.

Having exhausted its forces in the fighting which had occurred around Volokolamsk and to the north of it, the enemy broke off the offensive.

In benefiting from the temporary lull, the army troops conducted small battles, continuing to strengthen the defensive positions. At that moment, I was summoned to Zvenigorod by the front commander who had arrived there and was proposed to head a horse army which I was to organize from four cavalry divisions which had arrived from Central Asia and the corps of L.M. Dovator. This army, in the opinion of G.K. Zhukov, was to breach the enemy front to the south of the Volga Reservoir and launch a thrust into the flank and rear of the enemy which was concentrated in the area of Volokolamsk. I had a very difficult time showing the inadvisability of the plan which could merely lead to the useless loss of many men and horses. Assembled together, the cavalry formations could easily be wiped out by aviation and tanks. I do not know whether I persuaded Zhukov or whether the devolving situation on the front influenced him, but, having obliged me to think over his proposal, he did not come back to this question.

Having carried out a regrouping and having moved up new units and replenished the formations which had already been involved in the fighting, the Nazi troops of Army Group Center headed by von Bock went over to the offensive on 16 November.

By this time, the 16th Army had received reinforcements, including three cavalry divisions which had arrived from Central Asia. We had some trouble with them. The horses had not been shod for the winter and this was at a time when in the Greater Moscow Area the ground had frozen and ice formed on wet and swampy areas. They were constantly slipping and falling, impeding general movement. In addition, the personnel was unskilled in operating on rugged and wooded-swampy terrain and this reduced the fighting qualities of the formations.

On the other hand, the 78th Rifle Division had reached us from Siberia and it was up to full strength in personnel as well as weapons and supplies stipulated by the wartime establishment. It was headed by the remarkable fighting general A.P. Beloborodov and consisted predominantly of Siberians and this greatly pleased us. Also incorporated in the army were two tank brigades with a small number of tanks and a so-called tank division virtually without any. Our artillery was somewhat reinforced.

Just before the very beginning of the enemy offensive, we suddenly received an order from the front commander G.K. Zhukov to launch an attack from the area to the north of Volokolamsk against the Volokolamsk enemy grouping. What impelled the front commander who knew the situation to issue such an order is even now incomprehensible to me. Certainly we had extremely limited forces and the preparation time was set at one night. My arguments to defer this offensive or to extend at least the preparation time for it remained disregarded.

Initially our units, in benefiting from the surprise, succeeded in advancing up to 3 km into the enemy positions, but then was scarcely able to free themselves from this incursion. The horse group of L.M. Dovator which participated in the offensive was repelling attacks launched by the enemy from all sides. Using mobility and boldness, it was able to break free and avoid complete encirclement. Almost simultaneously with this so-called offensive of ours, the enemy was moving along the entire sector occupied by the army.

The crucial moment had come. In truth, the enemy offensive was not a surprise for us and we were prepared for it. Of course, this was all within the limits of those capabilities which we possessed by that time, and these were very limited.

By the start of the enemy offensive we had assembled approximately accurate data on its grouping. This had been repeatedly reported to the front staff. But from a comment made to me by the front commander in speaking with him over the high-frequency telephone that supposedly we were "panicking" and had greatly exaggerated the enemy forces, one could conclude that our report had not been believed.

At the same time, the prisoners taken in combat in the area of Skirmanovo and to the northwest of Volokolamsk had confirmed the information we had. We, of

course, realized that the front commander wanted the enemy forces to be smaller. Certainly we would not argue against this, only the facts had to be considered and we had to be ready to deal with the worst. We did not have the right to be complacent let alone let ourselves or the troops relax.

In the 3 days of fighting, in encountering a strong defense by our troops, the enemy was persuaded that it would not succeed in breaching the defenses on the Volokolamsk sector. In continuing to constantly launch attack after attack on this sector, and in slowly pushing back our troops 2 or 3 km a day, it began to prepare an assault to the south of the Volga Reservoir on the Klin axis.

By this time the fighting was going on in the center and on the left wing of the army some 10-12 km from the Istra Reservoir. This reservoir, the Istra River and the terrain itself adjacent to it were an excellent line and in occupying it ahead of time it would be possible to organize a strong defense with small forces.

Having carefully thought out everything and having thoroughly discussed the developing plan with my assistants, I acquainted the front commander with it. I requested that he permit us to pull back the troops to a strong line without waiting until the enemy by force upset the defending troops and on the wings crossed both the river and the reservoir.

The commander did not consider the advisability of my request but ordered us to stand to the death without retreating one step back. This expression, incidentally, had become fashionable at that time. And it was pronounced most often by those individuals who were far away from events and did not see and did not know how they were developing or where one or another engagement was occurring and under what conditions. One must stand to the death and die intelligently only when this achieves a major goal and only in the event that this, the death of a few which prevents the loss of the majority, ensures overall success. But in the given instance no such necessity existed and the front commander, Army Gen G.K. Zhukov, was not right.

Let me quote literally the content of a brief but tough coded message from Zhukov: "I am in command of the front's troops! I am canceling the order to pull the troops back to the Istra Reservoir. I am ordering the defenses be held on the occupied lines and not to retreat a step back."

This was like Zhukov. In this order of his you could feel: I am Zhukov. And his personal ego very frequently prevailed over general interests.

I cannot help but mention how both at the outset of the war and in the Battle of Moscow, the superior levels often considered neither the time nor the forces to which they were issuing orders and instructions. Quite often such orders and instructions did not correspond to the situation existing on the front at the moment they were

received by the troops and often they stated a desire which could not be backed up by the capabilities of the troops.

This was like a desire to protect oneself (who issued such an order) against possible unpleasantnesses from above. In this instance you could not blame the troops which had been unable to supposedly carry out the order and a "strong-willed" document remained for justification for the chief and his staff. How much grief these "strong-willed" orders caused the troops and how many unjustified losses this brought!

The troops removed from the Istra positions had been given an army order to occupy the defenses near Solnechnogorsk in order to retard the enemy advance toward Moscow were moved to the designated area by forced march. But even along the way upon the orders of the front commander, their task was changed: instead of a defensive they were ordered to advance and drive the enemy out of Solnechnogorsk. This episode was a clear example of the discrepancy between desire and capability.

No time was provided to organize the offensive. It commenced hurriedly since the front was urgently demanding an immediate offensive. Initially our troops had a partial success and made some forward progress. But then they were halted and thrown back to the initial position. The enemy was able to bring up sufficient forces to repel all our attempts to drive it out of the town. In truth, the enemy also was unable to exploit the success toward Moscow.

The troops of the 16th Army were living through difficult days. They were at the limit of their forces trying to prevent a further enemy advance. All of us, from the soldier to the general, felt that the crucial days had arrived and we had to hold out whatever the cost. Each man burned with this desire and endeavored to do everything as well as possible. In vain certain superiors who held high positions thought that only they could handle matters effectively and only they desired success and shouts and intimidation had to be employed against all the rest in order to bring them up to the chief's wishes. I would also put our front commander among such individuals. It reached such a point that the army chief of staff Malinin repeatedly asked me to designate a command post away from the roads, desiring to be rid of the high-frequency telephone over which he more often had to listen to a dressing down by Zhukov. This also happened to me but I was more often in the troops and experienced this pleasure more rarely.

I recall one instance when after a conversation over the high-frequency telephone with Zhukov I was forced to state to him that if he did not alter his tone I would break off the conversation with him. The vulgarity released by him at that moment surpassed all limits. At the same time, I had not noticed that in the adjacent room were two representatives from the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Evidently they, upon returning to

Moscow, informed the Central Committee about what had occurred. This, of course, is my assumption but, whatever the case, the next day, having summoned me to the high-frequency phone, Zhukov stated that he had been set upon by Stalin. Then he asked whether I had complained to Stalin about yesterday's conversation. I replied that it was not my habit to complain generally, and particularly in the given instance.

I could understand the certain nervousness and heatedness which could occur in such a difficult situation under which the Western Front found itself. But certainly the merit of a military leader in any situation is his restraint, calmness and respect for his subordinates. No self-respecting commander has the right to insult subordinates in any form whatsoever, or belittle their dignity. Unfortunately, G.K. Zhukov did not have enough of this feeling and he frequently exploded and most often unjustly, as they say, in the heat of the moment. For example, I could never accept the fact when after linking up with the 1st Assault Army of Gen F.D. Zakharov, he initiated measures to hold the latter responsible for the giving up of Klin. And this was regardless of the fact that Zakharov had skillfully directed the actions of the troops which had been able to check the enemy advance. To the honor of the procurator who arrived at Zhukov's orders, he objectively and justly examined the charges leveled against Zakharov and halted proceedings.

Against the background of the described events, I would like to recall one episode.

Once during the period of heavy fighting, when on one of the sectors of the Istra axis, the enemy had succeeded in squeezing the 18th Division, the front commander, G.K. Zhukov, arrived at the command post and brought with him the commander of the 5th Army, L.A. Govorov, our adjacent unit to the left. Having spotted the commander, I was preparing for the very worst. Having reported the situation on the sector of the army, I waited to see what would happen.

Turning to me in the presence of Govorov and my closest assistants, Zhukov stated: "Well, again the Germans are pushing you? You have more than enough forces but you don't know how to use them. You don't know how to command!... Here Govorov has more of an enemy than you do, he is holding it and not letting the enemy through. I brought him along here so that he could teach you how to fight."

Of course, in speaking about the enemy forces, Zhukov was not correct, because all the German tank divisions were operating opposite the 16th Army and against the 5th only infantry ones. Having heard this statement, I with the most serious appearance thanked the front commander for having given me and my assistants an opportunity to learn, having added that it did not hurt anyone to learn.

We all would have been happy if his arrival had been limited to just this "lesson."

Leaving Govorov and myself alone, Zhukov went into another room. We began to exchange views on enemy actions and discuss the opinions of how best to oppose it.

Suddenly, Zhukov rushed into the room, banging the door. He looked mad and very excited. Turning to Govorov, he shouted in a cutting voice: "What do you think you are doing? Whom did you come here to teach? Rokossovskiy? He has been repelling the attacks of all the German tank divisions and is beating them. And opposite you there has been one lousy motorized division and has driven you back scores of kilometers. Get back to your job! And if you do not rectify the situation...." and so forth, and so forth.

Poor Govorov could not get a word in edgewise. Turning white, he quickly retreated from the angry attacks.

In actuality, on that day in the morning, the enemy, having brought up a fresh motorized division to add to those which already were there, went over to an offensive on the sector of the 5th Army and advanced up to 15 km. All of this had happened during the time when the front commander and the commander of the 5th Army were on their way to us. And here, at our command post, Zhukov had received the unpleasant statement from the front staff.

After the stormy discussion with Govorov, the front commander's steam somewhat abated. In leaving, he mildly, in comparison with his usual tones, rebuked us and said that he was on his way to put things in order with Govorov.

This also was one of his methods of leadership and influence, that is, to set one commander against the other and play on the self-esteem of individuals.

(To be continued)

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#### Nikolay Nikolayevich Voronov

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pp 62-63

[Service autobiography, published under the heading "The Age in Autobiographies," by Nikolay Nikolayevich Voronov]

[Text] [Introduction] Nikolay Nikolayevich Voronov (1899-1968), was the chief artillery marshal (1944) and Hero of the Soviet Union (1965). He was a member of the CPSU since 1919. He joined the Soviet Army in 1918. A participant of the Civil War. In 1924, he completed the Higher Artillery School for Command Personnel and the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1930).

In 1937-1940, he was the artillery chief of the Soviet Army and participated in the Soviet-Finnish War. In 1940-1941, he was the deputy chief of the Main Artillery

Directorate. At the start of the Great Patriotic War, he was the chief of the Main National Air Defense Directorate and then from July 1941, the Soviet Army artillery chief and USSR deputy people's commissar of defense. From March 1943 he was the Soviet Army artillery commander and the national air defense commander. He was repeatedly the representative of Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] on the fronts. He provided overall leadership over the operation to eliminate the Nazi grouping surrounded at Stalingrad. He was one of the initiators of working out the questions of an artillery offensive, combating tanks, creating large artillery formations and developing the artillery of the Supreme High Command Reserve. From 1946, he was the artillery commander of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1950-1953, he was the president of the Academy of Artillery Sciences. In 1953-1958, he was the chief of the Military Artillery Command Academy. He was a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1946-1950. He was awarded six Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, three Orders of Suvorov 1st Degree, the Order of the Red Star. An urn with his ashes is in the Kremlin Wall. [End of Introduction]

I was born in the city of Leningrad on 5 May 1899 in the family of an office worker. My father, Nikolay Terentyevich Voronov, prior to the October Revolution, worked as an accountant in a savings bank, in the Tula Land Bank and was at one time a stage artist.

My mother, Valentina Andreyevna, was a housewife. She died in 1908. At the given time, my father is working as a rural teacher in Leningrad Oblast, Cholovo Station, the Krasnyy Bor Kolkhoz and in 1937, he received the title of People's Teacher. My wife Lyubov Mikhaylovna Shadurskaya was born in Riga and since childhood has lived with all her family in the city of Pskov; she derives from a worker family. Her father died in the city of Pskov in 1919 and her mother died in 1921 in the same city. The brother of my wife Petr Mikhaylovich Shadurskiy, while serving in the ranks of the army, died in 1921, from typhus, and another brother, Boris Mikhaylovich, after serving as a rank-and-file Red Armyman and participating in the Civil War is working as a tractor mechanic at one of the kolkhozes around Leningrad. My only sister, Varvara Nikolayevna Voronova, before the October Revolution was a student and after it worked as a saleswoman in Leningrad Oblast and in the city of Leningrad. At the given time, she has married a member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] since 1919 Ivan Yefimovich Zverev (food supply chief for the coastal defense artillery, Russkiy Island).

My wife and I have not had nor do we have relatives abroad.

I began my independent life and career at the age of 17. From 1916 up to the October Revolution, I worked as a clerk for a private barrister on Basseynaya Street in the

city of Leningrad and at the same time continued my studies at general education courses in the city of Leningrad.

My general education: four grades of real school, and in 1916 as an external student I took the exams for the Petrograd Education District for six grades of the gymnasium and in 1917, passed the exams also there for eight grades for all subjects with the exception of Latin.

Military education: in 1918 on 18 September, I completed the second Soviet Petrograd Artillery Courses (now the First Leningrad Red Banner Artillery School), in 1924, I completed the year's course of the AKKUKS [Artillery Courses for the Advanced Training of Command Personnel], and from 1927 I studied and completed the Academy imeni Frunze in 1930 in the first category.

I participated in the February Revolution of 1917, and in Leningrad with workers from the Vyborg side plundered the arsenal, destroyed police units and their stations and so forth. From the February Revolution to the October Revolution, I continued working for a private barrister Firsov on Basseynaya Street in Leningrad while studying on general education courses for adults. At the beginning of October 1917, I was dismissed and remained unemployed, searching for work, I fell ill with a cold and developed an inflammation of the lungs. The October Revolution found me sick in bed and, as a result, I did not participate in it. Upon recuperation, I went to work at the State Bank taking the place of saboteur officials.

I was admitted to membership in the VKP(b) on 15 April 1919 at the front near Pskov in the party organization of the 2d Howitzer Battalion of the 10th Rifle Division. My party card is No 0471724. I was not a member of any other parties, nor have I ever been a member of any antiparty, counterrevolutionary organizations. I did not participate in the antiparty Belorussian Tolmachev Grouping. Over the 19.5 years of membership in the ranks of the VKP(b), I have one party reprimand and this was a reprimand for lessened class vigilance (with a warning I was unable to discover the enemy of the people Andriashov) and prior to this I did not have even any comments. During all the work in the ranks of the VKP(b), I always fought for the party general line and was repeatedly elected secretary of the inferior party organizations, party buro member, as well as a member of the raykoms for the VKP(b) in the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. I have never been in any anti-Soviet, conspiratorial, espionage, fascist, nationalistic or counterrevolutionary organizations. I have always worked and am working honestly and conscientiously. I have been, am and always will be loyal to the cause of Lenin and Stalin.

I did not serve in the Old Army nor have I served in the White Army, the army of the interventionists and other anti-Soviet armies. I volunteered for the Red Army on 1 March 1918 (officer candidate of the 2d Artillery Soviet Command Courses, March-September 1918); I was a

platoon commander and an assistant battery commander up to 1920 in the 10th Rifle Division on the fronts of the Civil War; battery commander of the 10th Rifle and 27th Rifle Divisions 1920-1924; commander of a line battalion and then a training artillery battalion in 1924-1927, in the 27th Rifle Division; student at the Academy imeni Frunze from 1927 through 1930; commander-commissar of an artillery regiment in the Moscow Proletarian Division from 1930 through 1933; chief and commissar of the First Leningrad Red Banner School from 1934 through 1937, from 21 June 1937, artillery chief of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army]. I participated actively in the fighting on the Petrograd and Western Fronts. For participation in the fighting I was twice put up for the Order of the Red Banner, in 1919-1922 I was awarded the revolver No 40572 and binoculars. In 1927, by the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary-Military Council] I was awarded a name firearm and certificate. In 1936, for successes in military and political training I was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1937, the party and government awarded me the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of Lenin. For particular services to the motherland, I was awarded the rank of corps commander.

In 1920, while serving as the commander of the 1st Battery of the 10th Rifle Division, I was taken prisoner by the White Poles, where I spent around 9 months. During the retreat to Warsaw and the attempts to break out of complete encirclement, the 83d Rifle Regiment with the battery entrusted to me engaged the White Poles who surrounded us near the village of Yuzerfov in the area of Novo-Minsk. The small regiment supported by the artillery fire of the battery after certain successes became scattered in space, leaving the battery undefended. The battery was surrounded by the enemy and in driving them off "with grape shot" at point-blank range, caused major damage to the enemy and coming under fire, suffered losses in men and horses and was seized by the enemy. During this fighting, in being last to leave the weapons (I made them unusable for immediate combat use), I suffered a severe concussion close to an exploding shell and was taken prisoner with paralysis of both legs and partially my speech. For around 9 months, I endured difficult captivity, for 7 and 1/2 months I did not get up from the hospital beds in Warsaw and Tuchola and while lying there suffered from typhus, inflammation of the lungs, erysipelas on the face and severe exhaustion. Upon recovering I spent about a month in a prisoner-of-war camp in the town of Tuchola, I was then judged unfit for service in the army and in April 1921 I was exchanged at Negoreloye Station in one of the first batches of disabled veterans.

During all the time as a prisoner, I was considered a rank-and-file Red Armyman. I was not brought before the court or investigated.

Artillery Chief of RKKA,  
Corps Commander Voronov  
25 October 1938

## Moscow

From the Editors: In one of the near issues we plan to publish excerpts from a book on Ch Mar Art N.N. Voronov "Ryadom s ottsom" [Near to Father] which is being prepared for publishing by Politizdat. Its author is the son of the marshal, a colonel, candidate of military sciences and participant in the Great Patriotic War.

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## Do We Need Bastion Fortresses, Forts and Permanent Emplacements?

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[Article, published under the heading "Viewpoints, Judgments, Versions," by V.F. Abramovich, technical school teacher of history and social sciences from Orsha: "Do We Need Bastion Fortresses, Forts and Permanent Emplacements?"; on the preservation and use of the monuments of fortification]

[Text] In our nation you will scarcely find any adult who has heard nothing about the walls and towers of the Moscow Kremlin, the fortress in Smolensk, the fortifications of the Solovetskiy Monastery, the castles of Khotin, Vyborg and Narva which are all priceless military monuments of the past, and all of which have become part of our cultural treasure. In scientific and artistic literature and in the documentary films there has been a good treatment of the history of the development and use of medieval defensive structures. Yet virtually nothing is known about the fortresses of modern and recent times, with the exception of Peter and Paul, Kronshtadt and Brest.

At the beginning of the 18th Century, the bastion system of fortresses instituted by Peter I had taken hold fully in Russia. The Russian military engineers, having brought together the passivity of the Western bastion fortresses and the activeness of domestic ones, obtained simple but highly defensible fortifications. They employed the new system in building the fortifications of Yamburg, St. Petersburg and Kronshtadt. The high level of Russian military engineer art was clearly demonstrated in the Battle of Poltava (1709). Nor was engineer work on strengthening the frontiers halted later. Among the most interesting of these we can put Kronverk (Vyborg), Northern Dvina (Arkhangelsk) and Orenburg (Fortresses). They were built in the first half of the 18th Century. In the second half of this same century, they continued building a system of border lines which covered the southern and southeastern frontiers of Russia including Tsaritsyn, Samara, Orenburg and others. Under the leadership of A.V. Suvorov who had an expert knowledge of military engineering, they strengthened Kinburn, Tiraspol, Priozersk (Keksgolm). The Russian fortresses and fortifications played an important role in the fight against the Napoleonic troops (Bobruysk and Dvina Fortresses as well as the redoubts and fleches of the Borodino Field).

The Brest, Kiev, Sevastopol, Novogeorgiyev, Ivanograd and Warsaw Fortresses were built in the first half of the 19th Century and at the same time the Kronstadt and Sveaborg Fortresses were rebuilt and the Khotin and Proskurovo were designed. Significant fortification construction at that time was carried out in the Caucasus. Fortification theory developed simultaneously with practice. In the second half of the 19th Century, the Russian fortification school became generally recognized among the European countries as a scientific center for developing new fortress forms. There was an ubiquitous transition from the bastion fortress to the fort with intermediate strongpoints and batteries. Following the designs of Russian military engineers N.A. Buynitskiy and G.G. Nevskiy, forts were erected in Vladivostok, Batumi, Sevastopol, Libau and Vyborg. The heroic defense of Port Arthur was largely ensured by the forts and shore batteries built during this period from the plans of the Russian military engineer, K.I. Velichko.

The Russian fortification school underwent even severer testing during the years of World War I. Then began a new stage in its development with a transition to fortified areas (UR) and a characteristic trait of these was the close tie to the rear services. In 1928-1937, along the old Western state frontier they erected 13 URs the basis of which was reinforced concrete gun emplacements. In 1938-1939, work began on erecting 8 URs according to a new system: the weapon emplacements were combined into strongpoints with mutual fire support. In 1940, construction was started on the URs along the new state frontier but the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on our country impeded the completing of the planned. However, what had been built was very useful in the course of the initial period of the war. The permanent emplacements and double caponiers of the Brest, Rava-Russkaya, Tiraspol, Kingisepp and Kiev URs, the Odessa and Sevastopol defensive areas held up for a long time the advance of the Nazi troops while the Karelian UR was completely insurmountable for the enemies during the entire war.

And in what state are these structures now? Let us say directly, in a lamentable one. I am standing on the edge of Fort No 2 of the former Kovno Fortress (Kaunas). The fort which was erected at the end of the 19th Century looks like an enormous mythical monster which has grown into the ground. On the surface, virtually nothing remains, only the broad fortress moat now overgrown with grass and brush. Under a multimeter layer of earth and stone are the barracks, the powder magazines with lifts for the shells, the command posts, and the underground communications tunnels (galleries). At present, the fort is empty and abandoned. Only rarely do gangs of little boys appear near it and residents from nearby houses who throw garbage in the moat. But certainly this structure recalls a great deal—both the heroic defense of the Russian soldiers during the years of World War I and how bourgeois nationalists tortured patriots in its casemates. Even more could be told about the past by Fort No 1 which lies 2 km away and was one of the first to

receive the German attack in 1915. During the years of the bourgeois republic, here they built a gas chamber in which they executed patriots long before the invention of the "execution chambers" of the SS member Rauf. The history of the other forts of the former Kovno Fortress preserves much else, including the world famous Fort No 9 which now is a part of the memorial to the victims of Naziism.

At the same time, many fortification monuments which are now abandoned have not fallen into any of the systems of historical and cultural monuments. The author of these lines has inspected over 100 "orphan" or almost "orphan" military monuments from the bastion fortifications of the 17th and beginning of the 18th Centuries to powerful permanent emplacements and double caponiers of the former fortified areas. And often it is not a matter of small fortification structures, but rather entire military engineer ensembles which have grown up over the centuries, for example, the Sevastopol and Kiev Fortresses. Of equal size are the fortified areas which put up heroic resistance to the Nazi troops. Many of them are amazing in their enormous size, the scope of construction work carried out and are a visible proof of the advanced nature of military-technical thought of their times. The gigantic earth ramparts of the Perekop and Arabat fortifications in the Crimea would scarcely leave anyone unmoved. Their history began even in prehistoric times while during the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet soldiers built machine gun nests there. One would long remember the great fortress moats cut into the rock and the underground mining galleries at the fortresses of Narva, Vyborg, Kerch, the monumental double caponiers ("mushrooms") of the Bobruysk and Kiev Fortresses and the now water-flooded mysterious underground forts in the former fortresses of Kaliningrad, Grodno, Brest, Liyepaya, the mighty shore batteries of Kronstadt (Krasnaya Gorka, Seraya Loshad, Ino) and Sevastopol, the strong reinforced concrete emplacements and single caponiers of the former Karelian, Pskov, Minsk, Korosten and Novgorod-Volynskiy URs.

Unfortunately, all these glorious monuments of our military glory, having lost their military importance and having not gotten onto preservation lists, are gradually being lost and destroyed. The bastion fortifications of the Dvina (Daugavpils), Bobruysk and Bendery Fortresses are perishing as well as the Brest Forts. The external forts and intermediate batteries in Kaliningrad are being destroyed and each stone of these is covered with the blood of our soldiers who stormed these fortifications. Only recently (but for long?) have they halted the barbarous destruction of the nation's only outpost fort from the end of the 19th Century "Dubno" (Rovno Oblast). The stones from the sacred ruins of the rubble-stone concrete emplacements of the Krasnogvardeyskiy UR in Russko-Vysotskiy (Leningrad Oblast) are being carted off for building material and here the garrisons had blown themselves up in the structures, not wanting to surrender to the Nazis. It is sad and painful to look at

the permanent emplacements which have collapsed as a result of the removal of sand in the former Minsk fortified area near Zaslavl, the grandiose single caponiers of the Kingisepp (Koshkino), Korosten (Belokorovichi) and Kamanets-Podolskiy (Zhvanets) fortified areas or the burned out permanent emplacements in the Karelian UR (Beloostrov). There can be no doubt that these monuments will disappear if serious measures are not undertaken to preserve them, just as at one time Kitaygorod and Bely Gorod disappeared in Moscow, the kremlins of Mozhaysk, Kolomna and Serpukhov, the monumental fortifications of Kafy (Feodosiya), the fortifications of Kinburn, Izmail and Ochakov which are wreathed in Suvorov glory and many others.

It cannot be said that we have not taken steps to preserve the fortresses. The fortresses of Bendery and Bobruysk have been declared monuments (unfortunately, this has been all); protective plaques have been put up on the walls of Kronverk (Vyborg), the fortress of Yenikale (Crimea), the citadel of the Brest Fortress as well as on certain interior forts in Kaliningrad. However, these measures are not sufficient. Even if a protective plaque has been put up on the facade of a monument, in the rear methodical destruction or cluttering up has continued. Such an unpleasant picture can be seen in the Dvina Fortress (Daugavpils) and Narva (here the fortress ditches by the bastions of honor and glory have been turned into drainage pits for the municipal sewage system while the eastern part of the city fortifications have been reforested). In essence, the ensemble of the Bobruysk Fortress has been destroyed. The facts which show the blasphemous indifference to our sacred memory of the last war can be immediately detected in visiting the former Kovno Fortress. Regardless of the obelisk put up here in the memory of the death of 8,000 Soviet citizens in Fort No 7 by the hands of Nazi butchers, this structure is being greatly destroyed and the fortress ditches which became a grave for thousands of our compatriots have been turned into the city dump.

In addition, it is important to point out that according to the classification adopted in our country, fortress structures are to be protected either as historical monuments (world historical) or as archeological monuments or as architectural monuments. At the same time, it is understood that history is interested only in events related to the given monument while the subject of study of archeology is basically the earthwork structures and for architecture the stone ones. For this reason one will frequently note that integrated restoration is not being carried out as in focusing, for example, on a monument of architecture, they deal negligently with the earthworks. Thus, in restoration the fortress ditches in Smolensk and Koporye (Leningrad Oblast) have been filled with construction rubble. Quite recently in work on landscaping the park in Kingisepp (Leningrad Oblast), a significant portion of the fortress ditch of the Yamburg Fortress was filled in. A major error was made by the restorers in reconstruction work on the Belgorod-Dniester Fortress of the 15th-18th Centuries (Odessa Oblast). In endeavoring to

return the initial appearance to its structures, they removed the earthen additions from the interior side of the fortress walls, thereby destroying a rare monument in our nation of a bastion fortification. The situation is made even worse when the forts from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries made from concrete and earth (Fort No 9 of Kovno Fortress, the land forts of Sevastopol) or even the permanent emplacements of the prewar and wartime fortified areas are declared to be "architectural monuments."

The time has come to put in wider scholarly use the term "monument of fortification" or "monument of military engineer art." This would make it possible not only to eliminate the presently existing artificial dividing of the defensive structures into three types but would also provide an opportunity to work out unified measures for their protection. The author of these lines has traveled along the entire line of permanent emplacements and double caponiers of the former fortified areas following the old Western state frontier (from the Karelian to the Tiraspol) and partially along the new one (the Brest and Vladimir-Volynskiy URs) and has observed a rather joyless picture. Not all the fortified areas are being protected by the state. Commemorative plaques have been put up only on individual permanent emplacements of 1941. The lists of the multivolume publication "Svoda pamyatnikov istorii i kultury Belorussii" [Compendium of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Belorussia] does not include a single permanent emplacement or double caponier from the Brest, Grodno, Polotsk, Minsk or Mozyr URs the garrisons of which put up courageous resistance to the Nazi troops. Nor will they appear in the "Svod pamyatnikov" [Compendium of Monuments] which is now being created in the Ukraine, although on the territory of this republic some 12 URs were erected along the old Western state frontier just in the 1920s and 1930s. Such an attitude toward the fortification monuments developed to a significant degree because they are viewed solely as monuments of architecture or art. They are primarily monuments of military glory, of military technical thought and construction art.

In the aims of preserving the military monuments even now before it is too late, it is essential to raise the question of declaring the territory of the former fortresses such as the Bendery, Dvina, Bobruysk, Kiev, Kovno and others as reserves with historical development. Behind the fortress walls, the ramparts and ditches, it is possible to locate various cultural services or build park recreational zones or a zone of glory or develop interesting tourist routes, for example, along the line of the permanent emplacements of the former Sevastopol Defensive Area, along the line of permanent emplacements of the former Kiev UR, along the line of the Karelian UR (only in the area of Beloostrov Station have they maintained two unique machine gun emplacements, one artillery single caponier and the antitank trenches).

We do have experience in this regard, although slight. A portion of the Krasnaya Gorka Fort, for example, has been opened for viewing. The shore batteries and the powerful artillery rail transports displayed there are magnificent examples of Russian and Soviet military equipment from the end of the 19th and the middle of the 20th Centuries. Certain shore batteries in Odessa (Battery No 411) and Sevastopol have also been put in order and opened for viewing. Fort No 5 has been turned into a memorial monument to the heroes of the storming of the Konigsberg Fortress and in one of the interior forts, they have set up an amber museum. In the former Fort Kopgalis (Klajpeda) they now have a marine aquarium-museum. The redoubts and fleches of Poltava and Borodino Field have been put in order. Restoration is being carried out on the bastions and curtains of Kronwerk (Vyborg) and Khotin Fortress. The question has been constantly raised (its solution, unfortunately, has been delayed) of employing the Kronshtadt Forts for sports and cultural purposes. Certain permanent emplacements of the Izhora defensive line (Leningrad) and the Borodino Field have become monuments; steps have been taken to create a Glory Zone for the heroic defenders of Liyepaya. But this is not enough. We do not have enough uniform, nationwide measures to register, preserve and use the fortification monuments for various purposes.

The experience of using fortress structures in the aim of military patriotic education of the youth should be more widely developed. The youth is fond of visiting the restored individual sectors of the former defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa and Sevastopol, as these places vividly recall the heroic past. The forward edge of the defense of Stalingrad has been marked with 17 tank turrets on pedestals. On Lysaya Gora in Krasnoye Selo (Leningrad Oblast) they have rebuilt the permanent emplacement the firing slit of which Hero of the Soviet Union A.F. Tipanov blocked with his body. Numerous tourists can be encountered among the destroyed bunkers of the former Hitler Headquarters Werewolf at Vinnitsa.

What could become a scientific center for registering, preserving, restoring and adapting the fortification monuments? In our view, this would be the Central Military Engineer History Museum as it was rebuilt in its initial form. The reduced interest in the history of military engineer art has been caused largely by the combining of the institute in 1963 with the Artillery Museum (now the Military History Museum of Artillery, Engineer Troops and Signal Troops in Leningrad). The holdings and exhibits of the engineer museum have literally been lost in the bowels and halls of the Artillery Museum. The exhibit set up in two small rooms not only does not provide a notion of the development of domestic fortification but, as a whole, all military engineer art. The main portion of the former exhibit was not even set up. The Engineer Museum restored to its original form and returned to its original cradle, the Engineer Castle (Leningrad) would not only recover the wrongly forgotten

glory of Russian and Soviet military engineer art but could also become, let me reemphasize this, that essential scientific center for us to study and preserve fortification monuments. The fortresses, forts and permanent emplacements from the 18th through the middle of the 20th Centuries should be placed on the same level as the monuments of art, architecture, science and technology, having thus taken their legitimate place in the cultural heritage of our country.

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### A Train a Quarter of a Century Long

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[Article, published under the heading "Investigating Court Materials," by Capt Just N.L. Anisimov, Capt 1st Rank V.G. Oppokov: "A Train a Quarter of a Century Long"]

[Text]

#### 1. Legends and Fables

Pvt Fedor Yakovlevich Radchenko carried out his soldier's duty of honor with honor: he did not hide in fighting for comrades and did not run from the enemy. At the end of the war, he received a severe wound and concussion. He returned home disabled. But when his arms and legs were mended and nature had been generous with strength and endurance, why should he be disabled? However, it did not take long for the former soldier to show industry on the labor front. After finishing his work on the threshing floor, when certain kolkhoz members began to stuff the just threshed grain into pockets made specially at various points, Fedor Yakovlevich did not hold back. There was not enough grain at home. And he ended up in the defendants' docket. For what he had done he had to work in the north.

Returning from incarceration, Fedor Yakovlevich led an honest labor life. But still the villagers made fun of him:

"Well you, Fedor, are such a fool. Others steal bagfuls and get nothing and you could not get away with a handful."

"That may be, but there is nothing to boast about theft," replied Fedor Yakovlevich. "And it is untrue that you can get away with a major theft. You get a longer sentence for the more you steal. I was given a year and they counted each kilogram of grain. But in the camp they told about a general who made off with an entire train of goods. He got a year for each car. A total of 25."

"Are you lying?" said the listeners in amazement. "A general? That couldn't be!"

"No, I am not lying. The entire nation is buzzing about this story. When I was coming home I heard all sorts of

things. They said different things, but there was one essence: he may swing.... But let me say that an honest life is of course simpler and better. And I am not about to take anyone else's things and will tell my children and grandchildren this."

...The case which Fedor Yakovlevich Radchenko described to his fellow villagers was true. And it gave rise to many at times unbelievable rumors. Most often it was said that the fighting general had not taken anything for himself but had organized a train with valuable freight in order to help the orphans and widows and at each railroad station he handed out goods according to a list of the neediest. In the mouths of others the story about the train became embellished with fabulous details. It turned out that this train did not need either ties or rails but could suddenly appear in a forest, in a steppe or in the mountains. Generally, it assumed the features of the "flying Dutchman," although it did not ply the expanses of the seas. The people passed it on that the widows, orphans and disabled veterans who reached the train were generously provided for and released while the plunderers and thieves disappeared without a trace. The "flying train" was run by a certain brave captain who at the stations reported to the general on what was given out and what was given to whom and who was punished....

Recently, in studying the archives of investigatory and court materials, we became acquainted with a case in which seemingly the same general, the same captain and the same train figured. It seemed to us that this case history, in using the documents, should be related to the readers in order to restore the historical truth about this at-one-time much publicized occurrence.

## 2. Arrest

In the investigatory file on the case of interest to us, a curious document has survived. Let us reproduce it fully.

"28 November 1953"

"To the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Col Gen Comrade S.N. Kruglov"

"In 1948, the bodies of the former USSR MGB [Ministry of State Security] arrested Lt Gen Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, Lt Gen Vladimir Viktorovich Kryukov and his wife Lidiya Andreyevna Kryukova-Ruslanova who subsequently were condemned to various terms of imprisonment in the ITL<sup>1</sup> with the confiscating of their property.

"On 28 July 1953, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court overturned the rulings previously handed down against K.F. Telegin and V.V. Kryukov, the cases against them were stopped and K.F. Telegin and V.V. Kryukov were completely rehabilitated.

"On 3 August 1953, by a Special Session of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the case against L.A. Kryukova-Ruslanova was reviewed and halted and she also was completely rehabilitated.

"In this context I would like you to issue instructions to return to K.F. Telegin, V.V. Kryukov and L.A. Kryukova-Ruslanova the personal property confiscated from them with the exception of property taken from them upon special instructions.

"Deputy Chief Military Procurator,  
Maj Gen Just D. Kitayev"

The grounds for the arrest of the married couple, as the documents were to show, was an inclination for enrichment. From the Kryukovs they confiscated over 700,000 rubles as well as a significant amount of valuables, 123 pictures by famous masters, 2 dachas and many other goods.

But our story is not about Kryukov and his wife, a famous singer. We mention them only because their names were mentioned along with the name of Gen Telegin. Precisely he, Konstantin Fedorovich, is more similar to the role of the hero in the legends which spread in the people after the war.

On 13 March 1954, the Deputy Chief Military Procurator, Col Just D. Terekhov, prepared for the USSR Deputy General Procurator N. Khokhlov a brief on the case of K. Telegin with the following content.

"K.F. Telegin was arrested by the USSR MGB on 24 January 1948....

"In Telegin's property file which is kept with the First Special Department of the USSR MVD, there is a copy of a letter from the former minister of USSR State Security Abakumov of 5 March 1948 to I.V. Stalin.

"In this letter there are the lines: 'In accord with your instructions, the property and valuables taken away from the arrested Lt Gen K.F. Telegin on 4 March 1948 were turned over by writ to the Manager of the USSR Council of Ministers, Comrade Chadayev. Together with the letter, statements and inventories were submitted for the property and valuables confiscated from Telegin and turned over to the manager of the USSR Council of Ministers....'

It is reasonable to point out that if Stalin had issued instructions to the minister of state security about the property and valuables confiscated from the arrested Gen Telegin, it is doubtful that he was not informed for what reason the latter was arrested and for what sins he was being accused. Certainly this name, judging from the investigatory materials, had come to the attention of the leader significantly before. The following instance could have been memorable. In 1947, the military council member of the Group of Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany (GSOVG), Lt Gen K.F. Telegin, had suffered a major mishap: he was accused of violating the proper procedure for awarding orders. By a decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, he was reduced from a party member to

a candidate member and then discharged in retirement with a minimal pension and without the right to wear the uniform.

And then his arrest.

### 3. Husband and Father Missing...

To the Chief Military Procurator of the USSR Armed Forces, Comrade Afanasyev (Personal)

From the wife of the arrested Lt Gen (former member of the military council of the First Belorussian Front) Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, Citizeness Mariya Lvovna Telegina

#### Petition<sup>2</sup>

"About 18 months ago, the MGB bodies arrested my husband and since then over the entire designated integral of time I have been informed that an investigation is underway concerning the case of my husband.

"In realizing that an investigation under no circumstances could last so long, I have been forced to consider that the information submitted to me by workers upon request was completely wrong and misled me about the status of my husband's case...."

We will come back again to this petition, but now let us try to make the situation created at that time clear. Mariya Lvovna was not being deceived. The investigation was drawn out. It lasted almost another year. There had been an extortion of evidence. This was shown in the documents. Here they are.

Approved USSR Minister of State Security, Col Gen (Abakumov)

30 January 1948

Arrest Approved, Chief Military Procurator of the Soviet Army, Lt Gen Just (Afanasyev)

31 January 1948

### DECREE OF ARREST

Moscow

1948, January....<sup>3</sup>

"I, assistant chief of the investigatory unit for particularly important cases of the USSR MGB, Lt Col Sokolov, having examined the materials received on the criminal activities of Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, born 1899, a native of Tatarsk, Novosibirsk Oblast, a Russian by nationality, and who in 1947 was moved from VKP(b) member to candidate member and dismissed from military service in the Soviet Army, as a lieutenant general (retired), have found:

"The materials existing in the USSR MGB establish that Telegin conducted anti-Soviet activities and also that in 1945-1946, while on German territory, he engaged in depredation. In being guided by Articles 145 and 158 of the RSFSR UPK<sup>4</sup>, it is ordered:

"Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin be subject to arrest and search."

Some 2 weeks after the approval of this document, the same Sokolov drew up an order presenting charges against Telegin and here for some reason there is no signature of the accused although the corresponding note does exist. There then passed another 2 and 1/2 years, during which each month a petition and ruling were drawn up to extend the period of investigation. Only the names of the investigators changed: Sokolov, Samarin, again Sokolov, Sedov.... On 12 September 1941, an order was drawn up for resubmitting the charges and 2 weeks later a list of charges.

Let us quote the latter completely:

#### For Investigatory File No 960

Approved, USSR Deputy Minister of State Security, Col Gen (Goglidze)<sup>5</sup>  
26 September 1951

### LIST OF CHARGES\*

Accusing Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin of Crimes Under Articles 58-10 Part II and 193-17 Point "a" of the RSFSR Criminal Code

The USSR MGB on 24 January 1948 has arrested for criminal activities Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, former military council member of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, lieutenant general (retired).

An investigation of the case has established that Telegin, while holding leading political work in the Soviet Army, committed a crime against the VKP(b) and the Soviet state. As was established, Telegin made statements having an anti-Soviet nature.

Thus, in 1943, Telegin in conversation with military leaders in contact with him, in criticizing the tactical training system which existed in the Soviet Army prior to the Patriotic War, called it faulty and slanderously stated that the Soviet Army had supposedly not been sufficiently prepared for war against Germany.

In 1945, also in a conversation with one of the military leaders, Telegin stated:

"We should be ashamed in front of foreigners of our troops stationed in Germany as they look so dirty and shoddy while the Anglo-American troops are smartly dressed."

The investigation materials also established that Telegin, in possessing facts showing a hostile attitude on the part of military leaders close to him to the Supreme High Command and to political work in the Soviet Army, concealed this from the VKP(b) Central Committee and himself in individual instances sided with them.

As was established, Telegin's brother, D.F. Telegin, in 1948, was condemned for conducting anti-Soviet agitation, and he voiced his hostile convictions to the accused Telegin, holding a conversation with him of an anti-Soviet content.

Moreover, the investigation established that Telegin, being stationed on the territory of Poland and Germany in 1944-1946 together with Soviet troops, in benefiting from his official position, was engaged in money-grubbing, buying cheaply and appropriating valuables and property which should have been turned over to state income.

In searching Telegin, a large amount of valuables was confiscated along with over 16 kg of silver articles, 218 cuttings of wool and silk textiles, 21 hunting guns, numerous porcelain and pottery antiques, furs, French and Flemish tapestries by masters of the 17th and 18th Centuries as well as other costly things.

Telegin recognized his guilt. He was proven guilty of a stating of hostile views by evidence of D.F. Telegin and of appropriating property which should have been turned over to state income by evidence of the condemned A.I. Morozova, V.V. Vasyukov and V.N. Borisov, the arrested A.S. Semochkin and L.S. Chernorizh and by the materials of the search.

On the basis of what has been stated, charges are made as follows:

K.F. Telegin...<sup>7</sup> including in talks with acquaintances voiced anti-Soviet views, he deceived the VKP(b) Central Committee, concealing known instances of hostility shown toward the Supreme High Command and the political personnel in the Army by close military leaders and in 1944-1946, used his official position, in being engaged in enrichment, bought and appropriated valuables and property which should have been turned over to state income, that is, crimes provided by Articles 58-10 Part II and 193-17 Point "a" of the RSFSR Criminal Code.

The investigatory file No 960 containing charges against Telegin, in accord with Article 203 of the RSFSR UPK, is to be forwarded for review to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court.

Senior Investigator of the Investigatory Unit for Particularly Important Cases of the USSR MGB, Capt Samarin

Approved:

Acting Chief of Investigatory Unit for Specially Important Cases of the USSR MGB, Lt Col Ryumin

However, Telegin's wife did not know any of these details and for this reason in her petition the start of which is already known to the readers, she wrote:

"It should be pointed out that for more than a year now I have been writing to a whole series of levels and no one tells me anything at all and now I am forced to resort to your intervention.

"In view of what has been stated, I would request that you issue an order for me to receive the most ordinary statement: whether the case of my husband is over, whether he has been condemned and to what punishment and if not, then even tentatively when the investigation would be over and what court body would examine the case?..."

Telegin's son wrote a different statement and this was sent both to the General Procurator and the Main Military Procurator. One is struck by the fact that the wife of the arrested general, in trying to find out where her husband had gone, was more concerned for his fate and was asking for clear information about him, while the son wrote chiefly about the things. We feel that he did this intentionally. In having more accurate information than did the mother about the state of the father's affairs and that the anti-Soviet charge would be difficult to prove and now the investigation would shift the accents in the case of K.F. Telegin, the son made an attempt, as far as he was able, to reduce the scale of the father's guilt. This is why he focused attention of the investigation on the fact that "after the search all articles that were in any way of interest, including things belonging personally to me, were put under seal in one room and then removed." "All my things," stated Telegin Jr., "were described as things of Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, that is, in the name of my father, and I argued uselessly against this.... To my comment that my things had been incorrectly registered in the name of my father, co-workers from the MGB stated that everything would be investigated and anything mine would be returned, and it made no difference in whose names the articles were registered. Was this actually the case? If not, then here one can spot a conscious deception...." At the end of the document he directly and tenaciously demands: "...I request an analysis of my statement from the viewpoint of Soviet laws, an acceleration in the analysis of this case which has gone on too long, and for a start return my things, my mother's card and unseal the room."

At the same time, there still existed the "Flying Dutchman," the general's train about which not only the wife but also the son of Konstantin Fedorovich had not even a suspicion. The time has come to tell about it and about the people escorting it.

#### 4. The Captain of the "Flying Dutchman" and the Passions About the Train

The information about this person is very meager. Only two of his letters have survived addressed to Col Notey-Golenko, commander of the 21st Separate Captured Equipment Brigade. Capt Kalachev, and this is precisely the person we are concerned with, judging from everything had a firm character, he was able to keep his word,

he showed a considerate and respectful attitude toward subordinates, he was totally honest, that is, a man of duty and deed.

Here is one of his letters:

"19 April 1946

"To the commander of the 21st Separate Brigade.

"I report that the team consisting of two men—two officers and three rank-and-file Red Army men—sent to escort transport No 178/4899 with the property of Lt Gen Telegin from Oranienburg Station to Tatarsk Station, Omsk Oblast,<sup>8</sup> at present is located at Oranienburg Station. Just a month has passed. At present, there are three loaded flatcars carrying tractors and excavators, there is a car for guard personnel, the remaining property has not been loaded, while the property indicated on the list as unreceived is approximately up to 25 carloads and we do not know where it is. I request that you accelerate the delivery of this property through the corresponding channels or at least return us to the brigade, having released us from this heavy and forgotten work.

"Deputy Chief of Captured Equipment Department, Capt Kalachev."<sup>9</sup>

Subsequently, events developed as follows:

"1 August 1947

"To the military procurator of the ground troops, Maj Gen Just Comrade A.A. Cheptsov.

"I submit certain documents of a preliminary investigation of data concerning the dispatch of equipment and motor vehicles and carried out, as a number of persons has stated, upon orders of the former military council member of the SOVG, Lt Gen Telegin.

"I judged it essential to seek explanations from Lt Gen Telegin on this question.

"The former chief of the Captured Equipment Directorate of the SOVG, Lt Gen Zhizhin, has confirmed the receipt of such orders from Lt Gen Telegin, however he did not present any written explanations on this question, having left for a new assignment with the Northern Group of Forces. In the documentation of the military council there are no data concerning the dispatch of this freight.

"Lt Gen Zhizhin was questioned by us before the Military Procurator's Office of the Northern Group of Forces so that his written explanation would be submitted by the military procurator of the Northern Group of Forces directly to you.

"I assume that the existing data are sufficient in order, having heard the explanation of Lt Gen Telegin, to form some opinion on the legality of illegality of the direct

dispatch of a large amount of freight to the local party and soviet bodies at the place of residence of Comrade Telegin."<sup>10</sup>

"If one excludes the possibility of permission being provided from the appropriate central bodies, then the actions of Lt Gen Telegin appear as arbitrariness with all the ensuing consequences.

"Appendix of 52 pages.

"Deputy Military Procurator of the SOVG, Maj Gen Just Ogandzhanyan."

In the investigation materials there are explanatory notes from Lt Gens Telegin and Zhizhin dated 12 September and 22 August 1947. The first stated that in response to a request from the Tatarsk Town Soviet and VKP(b) Gorkom to their fellow countrymen to provide help to the town in equipping the power plant and a brick-tile plant, and for motor transport and so forth, an official request had been sent to the party Central Committee and more precisely to G.M. Malenkov on permitting the dispatch of the necessary equipment and property to the designated address. Malenkov had given his approval in a telegram. "Since my request to Comrade Malenkov," clarified K.F. Telegin, "as well as his reply should certainly be in the files of the GSOVG Military Council for...the GSOVG Staff...."<sup>11</sup>

"The property was dispatched under the waybills of the Captured Equipment Directorate, and was received by the Tatarsk Town Soviet. The latter received special permission from the RSFSR Council of Ministers to install this equipment." He also referred to the former assistant of G.M. Malenkov, N.G. Zhukov, who at that time was working in the Military Department of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Zhizhin, in essence, confirmed these facts and supplemented them. "Comrade Zhukov and his personnel," he reported to the military procurator of the northern group of forces, Maj Gen Just Chernov, "certainly knew about the shipment and sanctioned the dispatch otherwise centralized transport could not have been obtained to Tatarsk Station. Only Moscow could provide all the transport for the dispatch of the equipment...."

Both these explanations as well as others clearly so convinced that there were no illegal actions by Gen Telegin that the military procurator of the GSOVG, Maj Gen Just V. Shaver, on 14 November 1947, issued the appropriate ruling. It, in particular, pointed out that the correspondence on the given question arose in July 1946 and the grounds for this was a statement on the legal confiscation in the 2d Guards Mechanized Army of three regular ZIS-5 trucks. Having examined this correspondence as well as considering that the permission to deliver the equipment and supplies to the town of Tatarsk which was not in a zone that had suffered from Nazi occupation had been carried out upon the permission of the directive bodies, Shaver concluded that no crime punishable on criminal grounds had been committed in the actions of the former military council

member of the GSOVG and he ruled that the designated correspondence and further prosecution of the case be halted.

However, not more than 3 months had passed when all the documents concerning the "general's train" were removed from the archives upon orders of the same Shaver and forwarded to the Military Procurator of the Ground Troops Cheptsov with a remarkable commentary: "Possibly this correspondence in line with recent events which involve Telegin will be of certain interest and, in light of the new circumstances, will involve an additional check and could be used by the corresponding investigative bodies." We have already stated what were these "recent events" and "new circumstances."

On 8 March 1948, Cheptsov who by that time was already the deputy main military procurator sent instructions to the procurator of Tatarsk: "I would like you immediately and personally to check and submit for a report to the General Procurator precisely what property was delivered by the train and...how was it used as well as why the town soviet did not answer us...."

To this request came the reply that the property dispatched from Germany to the Tatarsk Town Soviet by Lt Gen Telegin had arrived on 31 June 1946 in accord with a list (on two sheets of paper). "It was used," the reply stated, "in the town utility system." The procurator of Tatarsk was unable to provide an answer and explain why replies had not been sent to the repeated requests of the Main Military Procurator's Office clearly because "the former chairman of the town soviet is not here at the given moment and the entire personnel of the town soviet is completely new...."

Thus, Kalachev, the captain of the "Flying Dutchman" had been able to deliver the freight entrusted to him completely and safely earlier than had been assumed, having clearly shown a good deal of tenacity as well as enviable resourcefulness and boldness.

##### 5. Guilt Not Admitted

Above we, in truth in passing, mentioned that the story of the "general's train" had required an investigation due to the forced reorientation of the charges made against K.F. Telegin. But we have not yet been able to state that the accused himself repudiated the previous testimony given by him in the course of the investigation. And of all places this happened in court! Why? The answer to this question can be gained from an excerpt from a ruling by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Soviet made in the course of a closed court session on 3 November 1951.

"At a court session of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court," it states, "Telegin did not admit guilt on the question of anti-Soviet agitation and pointed out that the conversations which he had with individual military leaders on the question of the degree of the tactical preparation of the Soviet Army and that our troops in Germany were poorly uniformed were not

considered by him either anti-Soviet or antiparty and that these conversations were completely legitimate and natural and did not contain any criticism against the Soviet government or the Supreme Command.

"Telegin did not deny the circumstance that he, in the presence of the chief of staff of the First Belorussian Front, actually said that our troops needed better tactical training. But it was a question of troops which had been encircled by the enemy and which in tactical terms had not been sufficiently trained for fighting in an encirclement.... This question at that period was very pertinent and for this reason had been discussed.

"On the question of Telegin's conversation with one of the military leaders that our troops in Germany looked dirty and shabby, Telegin at the court stated that such a conversation had actually occurred and he said that the clothing of our soldiers due to the particular conditions of combat and field life was partially unusable and dirty and that immediate measures had to be taken to provide new uniforms for our soldiers since they would come into contact with foreign troops dressed in new uniforms and that at that time a decision was taken to petition the Supreme Command about the uniforms and, as is known, the petition was granted."

In addition, the ruling of the Military Collegium pointed out that the charges against K.F. Telegin of anti-Sovietism had been based exclusively on his personal testimony which he had given in a preliminary investigation under coercion "as a result of employing illegal methods of investigation against him."

Incidentally, let us allow K.M. Telegin himself to have his say. After his trial,<sup>12</sup> in a letter dispatched from prison to K.Ye. Voroshilov, he stated<sup>13</sup>:

"Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov]:

"Please forgive me for turning to you with the current letter, but the terrible tragedy of my life forces me to inform you of the cruel injustice which has befallen me.

"I, a former lieutenant general and military council member of the Moscow Military District, the Stalingrad, Central, First Belorussian Fronts and the MVO, Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, have been condemned by the court to 25 years in a ITL and have been deprived of all that I have earned over 30 years of honest, irreproachable service to the motherland and the party in border security and the Soviet Army.

"I have been accused of embezzling socialist property, of theft, robbery and concealment of anti-Soviet agitation by my brother Dmitry Telegin and on the basis of which the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court on 20 March 1952 has condemned me under the Ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 2 April 1932 (clearly here is an error: it should read 7 August.—Author) to 25 years of a ITL and under Article 58-12 to 10 years of the ITL, for a total of 25 years.

"In addition to the petition to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for lifting this unmerited shameful slander against me and submitted simultaneously with this letter, allow me to describe what has happened to me.

"On 24 January 1948, I was arrested by the USSR MGB and placed in an internal prison. On 30 January, charges were made against me under Articles 58-10-11 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and 193-17. On 27 January 1948, I was summoned by the former Minister Abakumov who, from the very beginning of the discussion, dressed me down at the top of his voice, called me an enemy and plunderer and propose that I 'give testimony on my criminal activities against the party and the state.' I demanded from him a specific charge against me and precisely what was my 'hostile activity,' for I had never committed such and did not know what it was all about. Abakumov replied to me that I myself should tell what my guilt was and if I would not speak then 'we will send you to a military prison and rough you up..., and then you will say everything yourself.' This conversation in a way set the tone for the course of the investigation. The unceremoniousness and cynicism of Minister Abakumov added to the severe nervous jolt caused by the punishment of the Central Committee of 22 June 1947<sup>14</sup> and by the very fact of my arrest had such a strong effect on me that I began to lose my common sense and ceased realizing what I was saying and signing.

"Over the period of a month, the investigator for official matters Sokolov and his assistant Samarin, without allowing me to sleep at all during the night or day, brought me to a point of complete desperation. Without securing the desired testimony from me about involvement in the leadership of a military conspiracy consisting of G.K. Zhukov, A.I. Serov and a number of other generals and in blackmailing me by the fact that Zhukov and Serov had already been arrested, they demanded from me evidence 'on the work methods and plans of the conspiracy.'

"After, with complete unambiguity, stated that Zhukov, Serov and the other 'conspirators' had been arrested, in believing them, an organ of our party and state, I tried to recall everything to which I previously had not paid importance and which in the completely new situation could provide a different cast and help the party completely unmask the 'enemy conspirators.'

"A number of facts which I recalled with difficulty I conditioned by saying that at that time I saw nothing criminal in them. The investigation, benefiting from my impotence and perplexity, consciously distorted these facts, giving them a clearly anti-Soviet cast, adding by themselves what they desired. During this entire month, every day I was threatened with being sent to a military prison or torturing if I did not give evidence on the 'conspiracy.' This further intensified the exhaustion of my nervous system, bringing me to a state of diminished capacity.

"And then on 16 February 1948, the MGB leadership finally, being dissatisfied with my testimony, carried out its threat and dispatched me to Lefortovo Prison and on the evening of the same day in the investigation building (Room 72) I was subjected to a cruel beating with rubber rods (Sokolov, Samarin). I was pulled from the room to my cell by two guards as I could not walk. On 27, 28, 29 February, 1 and 2 March, I was again subjected to a cruel beating by these same two persons in Room 31 of the investigation building. I was senseless, I could not walk, they did not allow me to lie down and I could not sit. Hitting my head on the floor, I had seemingly reached the extreme stress of the nervous system, the pain and noise in my head completely sapped my forces; my mind, heart and will power were paralyzed. For 6 months, I was unable to sit down and I began to walk a little in the 4th month. The torturers tore pieces of flesh from my body, they damaged my spine and femur and beat me on my feet. All of this brought me to the point of complete desperation, complete indifference to my fate and left just one desire: sooner the end, sooner death and the end to the torture. For how could I dream about life and freedom, it would be shameful for me to look every honest Soviet person in the face, I had been branded a 'state criminal' and on me were the marks of severe torture. It would even be shameful for me to be with my family which knew my honesty and dedication to the motherland and to the party. I could not explain to them why the new marks on my body.

"On 13 March 1948, I was moved back to the internal prison. And regardless of the fact that I could not walk or sit and that I was in a stage of the complete exhaustion of forces and my nervous system, I continued to be summoned for interrogation, repeating the threats of being sent back to Lefortovo for new torturing. I could no longer stand this and without realizing what I was doing I signed everything that they wanted if only they would not torture me.

"From September 1948 through September 1951, all interrogations were halted, I was left alone and at the end of 1949, having begun to recover a little and recalling my evidence, I was terrified by the thought that while I myself was indifferent to my own life, in my evidence other persons had figured with the investigation consciously distorting the facts about them. They (the MGB) were deceiving the party here and people were suffering. I began to urgently seek a rectification of the evidence and explanations of it, since the investigation had not categorically accepted my motives. They decisively refused me this and only in September 1950 was a single minute drawn up which changed the former evidence about the supposedly 'systematically occurring conversations between Zhukov, Serov and myself who condemned and belittled the Supreme High Command and I.V. Stalin personally and the narrating of anti-Soviet anecdotes.' All of this, of course, was complete rubbish and a conscious distortion of the facts stated by me about conversations between us.

"Having been unable to achieve a complete correction of the records, I repeatedly demanded that I be given an opportunity to write a statement to the CPSU Central Committee but was refused this under various pretexts. During all the time I spent in prison, up to September 1950, I did not see a procurator. I was also refused a meeting with him and thus the entire case came to court....

"All that I have experienced over these 5 years has not shaken my affection and loyalty to the party, to the government and to the motherland but rather has further tempered and strengthened it. But it is particularly hard, very hard for me to bear the unmerited slander of 'enemy of the people,' 'plunderer, thief.' Here in the camps certain prisoners persecute me with this, disseminating all sorts of slander about the amounts of my 'robbing the state.' I suffer profoundly from this but legally do not have the right to say anything to them.

"I turn to you, Kliment Yefremovich, knowing your sensitivity and attention to the living man and who also knows me well. I am confident that your personal intervention will help more quickly in lifting from me this very severe unmerited punishment and shame and will provide me with an opportunity to return to honest labor for the good of our motherland....

"At present, disfigured and maimed, I still refuse to write myself off and as much energy, experience and knowledge as I have, I wish to work for the glory of our party and motherland....

"(Signature) Telegin.

"P.S. In December 1952, I wrote a letter to V.M. Molotov giving these same facts."

## 6. Pardon

Mariya Lvovna also continued writing constantly to various officials. Thus, in April 1952, she sent off her next petition to the USSR General Procurator. At that time, she learned that Konstantin Fedorovich had been condemned under the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 7 August 1932 for the embezzlement of state property for 25 years. She clearly did not know about the second part of the charges (concealing of anti-Soviet propaganda by the brother).

Mariya Lvovna explained the presence of a significant amount of things at home as follows: living, in essence, in the apartment were three families (she and her husband, a married daughter and son, a demobilized officer) but all the things were registered only to Konstantin Fedorovich. Moreover, a predominant portion of the things from this general list had been purchased by the elder Telegin couple in the Soviet Union long before the Patriotic War or in the war years. The things purchased in Germany had been bought there through Voyentorg [Military Trade Organization], the administrative-economic section (AKhO) and so forth. In addition to the petition, Mariya Lvovna explained in detail what she

had purchased, where and when, she gave the names of witnesses and the owners of local stores. One could feel that she was the real housekeeper at home, she knew the price and place of each article, she was informed where to buy it and possibly was excessively fond of doing this. That the family budget was concentrated in her hands is clearly seen from the fact that the family had a general single savings booklet which was written out in the name of Mariya Lvovna.

In her petition M.L. Telegina focused attention of the General Procurator on the fact that during the period of the war, Konstantin Fedorovich, like all the leadership of the fronts where he fought, received numerous gifts from the republics, individual organizations and troop units. These were more often watches, weapons, dishes and leather articles.... "We have now kept a portion of the documents concerning the gifts received and a portion of name plaques which during the search were somehow torn off the things and discarded," wrote Mariya Lvovna. "The MGB has 40 accounts and 2 receipts for 2,000 Soviet rubles each and from which Telegin deposited at the bank of the Group's financial department money for a portion of the articles purchased through the AKhO but not backed up with receipts. According to the prices existing then in Germany, these 4,000 Soviet rubles significantly surpassed the value of the acquired articles."

We have no reason to feel that the petitions of M.L. Telegina including the one just mentioned, as well as the letter from K.F. Telegin to K.Ye. Voroshilov helped in ascertaining the truth or more accurately impelled the law enforcement bodies to review the sentence. More probably what did the trick was the death of I.V. Stalin.

From the Secretariat of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the corresponding instructions were sent for a "investigation" to the Main Military Procurator's Office and K.F. Telegin was also informed of this.

## 7. Rehabilitation...With the Drop of a Hint

The document which we would like to acquaint the readers with is worth quoting almost completely (we have left out only already familiar points).

Approved Deputy Chief Military Procurator, Maj Gen Just D. Kitayev 27 July 1973

## Opinion<sup>15</sup>

27 July 1953, Moscow

The Military Procurator of the Military Procurator's Office of the USSR MVD Troops, Capt Just Kozhura, has reviewed in a supervisory capacity the archival investigatory file...<sup>16</sup> relating to charges against Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin, and has found:

By the sentence of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court of 20 March 1952 according to Article 58-12 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and under the Law of 7 August 1932, Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin was

condemned to imprisonment in an ITL for a period of 25 years with a loss of rights for 5 years and confiscation of all property....<sup>17</sup> He was arrested on 24 January 1948.

The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court considers Telegin guilty of the following...<sup>18</sup>

The sentence under the case of Telegin cannot be left in force and should be repealed and the case halted for the following reasons.

The grounds for condemning Telegin under Article 58-12 of the RSFSR Criminal Code were his testimony that he did not report to the Soviet authorities on anti-Soviet conversations of his brother D.F. Telegin.

On this question Telegin in court stated:

"I spoke twice with my brother and both times he was drunk. I wanted to speak with him when he was sober and establish whether he made anti-Soviet statements only when raving drunk or whether he actually was an anti-Soviet person, but I was not able to do this. For this reason, I did not report him to the MGB, although later my brother was arrested under my testimony which I had given, and I myself was already arrested."

This evidence by Telegin must be viewed not as proof of his guilt under Article 58-12 of the RSFSR Criminal Code but as the evidence of a witness on certain facts known to him of anti-Soviet statements and provided under his own initiative. For this reason the charge under Article 58-12 of the RSFSR Criminal Code should be halted.

The charges against Telegin under the Law of 7 August 1932 were based on testimony by the witnesses Morozova, Vasyukov, Borisov, Semochkin and Chernoryzh. The testimony of these witnesses was not verified either in the preliminary investigation or in the court. Confrontations between Telegin and the designated witnesses were not provided, although he denied their testimony.

Telegin in court stated that he had not engaged in the theft of captured property but a majority of the valuable things confiscated from him in the search had been purchased from his own personal savings and he had the appropriate documents which were confiscated during his arrest. Telegin did not deny that in receiving a high salary (9,000 German reichsmarks) he had enriched himself excessively, however he viewed this as nonparty conduct. He also did not deny that an insignificant portion of the articles, chiefly household articles which did not correspond to a state valuable, had been acquired by him illegally.

As can be seen from the materials of the case, during the search of Telegin's apartment, they confiscated 42 accounts and receipts for property and valuables acquired by him abroad for cash, however the investigatory bodies had destroyed these documents and it was impossible for the investigation and subsequently the court to establish reliably what portion of the property

and valuables had been acquired by Telegin illegally and what he had purchased from his own personal savings.

With such a state of affairs the court did not have sufficient grounds to consider Telegin guilty according to the Law of 7 August 1932.

Telegin for many years served in the Soviet Army in leadership positions, he was a participant in the Patriotic War and for the successful execution of a number of combat assignments by the Soviet Army Command was repeatedly awarded governmental orders.

On the basis of what has been set out above and in being guided by Article 373 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedural Code, I would rule:

The sentence of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court of 20 March 1952 on the case of Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin should be lifted, the case halted and he released from prison.

Military Procurator of the Military Procurator's Office of the USSR MVD Troops, Capt Just (Kozhura)

On 7 August 1953, Maj Gen Just Kitayev informed the Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Pegov, that the Telegin case had been reviewed and halted as a criminal action. A similar statement along with the appropriate documents was dispatched to the CPSU Central Committee, possibly for restoring Telegin to the party.

The investigatory and court materials contain many interesting and instructive facts. For example, one is struck by the extended correspondence of Gen Telegin "for the return of articles belonging to him and illegally confiscated." This ended when he was ultimately reminded of the "Flying Dutchman," that is, the "general's train," which had not been completely forgotten. This was done by A.A. Cheptsov who by that time was a Lt Gen Just and Chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court.

In one of his replies to the constant requests from Telegin, Cheptsov on behalf of the General Procurator of the USSR, Rudenko, unambiguously reminded the tenacious petitioner that the things which he was demanding their return "had been acquired illegally" and for this reason were not to be returned.

## 8. It Is Difficult to Explain

What caused a sick and long-suffering man who had so recently been languishing in a prison cell and then in a camp and merely wanting to recover his freedom and good name to spend so much time and nervous energy on actual involvement in a "property scandal"? It is difficult to explain!

We were more touched by the moral position assumed by Pvt (Ret) Fedor Yakovlevich Radchenko after his misadventures and which we described at the beginning of this instructive story. Yes, to live and work honestly

may seem to some the lot of the "failures" and the "limited persons." Those fond of easy gain are convinced that an honest life and daily hard work do not provide a "paradise" of abundance nor satisfy the ever-increasing needs for luxury and gratification and for this reason they search for different ways for enrichment.

Clearly, something is awry in our home if some even during the difficult wartime years could turn their apartments into picture galleries and museums while others could scarcely make ends meet. Let us recall that it is not a question of "wage leveling" but rather an elementary social justice which is considered one of the main victories of Soviet power.

The court case described by us here could serve as a good lesson for all of us.

#### Footnotes

1. Corrective labor camp.
2. The same complaint was dispatched to the USSR General Procurator.
3. The missing date is no accident. K.F. Telegin was kept under guard for an entire week without any sanction from a procurator for arrest.
4. Criminal Procedural Code.
5. An associate of Beriya in criminal affairs in Georgia and the Caucasus in 1921-1938; later he was a chief of the UNKVD [Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] for Leningrad Oblast and representative of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] and the USSR NKGB [People's Commissariat of State Security] for the Far East.
6. In hand on the text of the list of charges was the note: "Check. Case of Telegin on 3 October 51 with list of charges was reported to USSR General Procurator, Comrade Safonov, who issued instructions to forward the case for review to the Military Collegium."
7. The reference data already known to the readers have been omitted.
8. A clear inaccuracy. Beginning with 1925, Tatarsk was part of Novosibirsk Oblast.
9. In the lower corner of the letter in the handwriting of the brigade commander, judging from the handwriting, the note was made: "Letter sent to Lt Gen, Comrade Zhizhin, 17 May 1946."
10. By this time, K.F. Telegin no longer lived in Tatarsk, the town of his childhood and youth, for over 30 years. In truth, his married sister was still there.
11. These documents were not discovered by the workers of the investigatory bodies.
12. On 3 November 1951, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court ruled at a closed court session to remand the file for additional investigation. Three months later, a new list of charges was drawn up. In the sentence of the Military Collegium, read at a closed court session on 20 March 1952, the chief guilt of Telegin was theft and appropriation of large amounts of captured valuables and property which "he transported from abroad to Moscow."
13. The letter is printed with certain cuts.
14. Previously, we already stated that for "violating the legally established procedure for awarding orders," K.F. Telegin by a decision of the VKP(b) Central Committee was reduced from a party member to a candidate member.
15. On the document in hand the note was made: "The Military Collegium has canceled the case as a criminal one."
16. The case number is missing.
17. Already known inquiry data of K.F. Telegin are given here.
18. The essence of the case is set out.

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#### End of Tsarist Army

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[Article, published under the heading "From Unpublished Manuscripts," by M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich: "The End of the Tsarist Army (On the Decade of the Red Army)"; the materials were prepared by V.A. Volkov, junior science associate from the Manuscript Department of the USSR State Library imeni V.I. Lenin]

[Text] **Mikhail Dmitrievich Bonch-Bruyevich (1870-1956)** was a Russian and Soviet military leader, a lieutenant general (1944), doctor of military and technical sciences and a lieutenant general in the Tsarist Army (1915). In August-September 1917, he was the commander-in-chief of the Northern Front and helped suppress the Kornilov Revolt. He was one of the first generals from the Russian Army who firmly came over to the side of Soviet power. After the Great October Socialist Revolution on 7 November 1917, he was appointed the chief of staff of the supreme commander-in-chief. From 4 March 1918, he was the military leader of the Higher Military Council. In June-July 1919, he was the chief of the Field Staff of the Republic Revolutionary-Military Council. Below we publish material from the notes of M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich devoted to the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.

At the end of 1915, the Russian Army began to lose gradually its ability to fight. There were more than enough reasons for this. Let me point out only the most important of these causes.

1. The enthusiasm of the first days of the war by this time had given way to reflections over the advisability of a major European War with the basis for this war being little-understood Allied obligations which were somewhat indefinite and forced the Russian Army to immediately abandon its own plan of actions and initiate very risky and clearly disadvantageous actions for itself upon the demand of the Allies: the upper command of the Russian Army probably felt that this army would not figure it out, but alas, in the lower ranks of the army they understood this precisely.

2. The experienced command personnel to a significant degree had been killed off in previous fighting; their place was taken in the army by warrant officers ["praporshchik"] from the schools and the so-called "wartime officers," that is, the staff and senior officers serving during the war; both these categories of officers left much to be desired on the question of the ability to maintain the battleworthiness of the units assigned to them, although personally many of them were very brave officers;

3. In the ranks there were few remaining old soldiers who were experienced in fighting and in campaign life; they had been replaced by youths who had been poorly trained in the reserve unit and they were nervous and extremely sensitive to military setbacks;

4. The attitudes within the government and as a consequence of these the constant shortage of heavy artillery, small-arms ammunition and generally in logistic supply, clearly persuaded many of the impossibility of achieving military superiority over the enemy;

5. Finally, the fatal setbacks in the so-called Carpathian Campaign<sup>1</sup> which ended with the complete routing of the best half of the Russian Army in the field decisively undermined its combat might.

In addition to these main factors, a prominent role in the loss of the battleworthiness of the Russian Army was played by the uncautious use of inductions of entire age groups into the reserve units. The Defense Ministry, without considering either the capacity of the reserve units or the available amount of weapons and supplies or the possibility of training inductees in the reserve units, continued stubbornly to call up for military service entire age groups. Thus, the workers were taken away from their machine tools, the farmers said farewell to their fields, the tradesmen had to abandon their trades and so forth; generally, the national economy suffered severely....

All of this was done in order, without any benefit to anyone, to have the inductees serve in reserve units which were so overfilled with personnel that it was impossible to billet, dress and train all the inductees in service.

It would be difficult to explain to a person 30-40 years of age that the state had to keep hundreds of thousands of

men in the reserve units without training them and under the most impossible conditions for anyway endurable human existence.

It would be difficult to comprehend and understand all of this in a positive sense but this lamentable reality which was extremely clear and visible persuaded many of the absurdity of what was happening: the reasoning of the inductees undoubtedly worked in the direction of realizing the complete jeopardy for them of waging war and hence was very close to the shout: "Down with the unnecessary war!"

It was precisely with such an attitude that the men arrived to make up the troop units at the end of 1915 and later, passing this on to other comrades in the units.

Hence, there was no possibility of high zeal without which successful troop operations are inconceivable and which is the basis of their "battleworthiness."

Let us repeat that such a mood began to be felt already from the end of 1915.

During the February Revolution of 1917, military operations on all fronts died out; the army at this time already had an insignificant degree of battleworthiness.

A very decisive impetus for a further decline in the battleworthiness of the army was provided by the reforms of the Defense Minister A.I. Guchkov<sup>2</sup> of which the main one in terms of its lethality was the relieving of the chiefs who did not support the shouts for a "war to a victorious end!" due to the reason of the clear awareness of the impossibility of achieving this with an army which had lost more than one-half of its battleworthiness.

The solid, intelligent, combat-experienced and influential commanders still remaining in the army were replaced by Guchkov with inexperienced and insignificant persons who shouted everywhere about a war "to a victorious end" for the sake of playing up to an artificially fanned mood. Everyone who realized that with an army which had to a significant degree lost its battleworthiness, it was impossible to count on a victorious end were proclaimed to be "defeatists," "traitors to Allied duty" and...expelled into retirement....

During the October coup, the question of the loss of battleworthiness was merely thus: was it possible to restore the lost ability to fight or must the army be recognized as completely collapsed, that is, turned into an armed mob incapable of subordination to the command and, consequently, unfit for achieving any military plans whatsoever.

From the example of Gen Kornilov<sup>3</sup> many in Russia and the army itself still continued to feel that it was merely a question of introducing extraordinary measures of strictness or eliminate one or another innovation of the revolutionary period and immediately everything would change, everything would return to its former places and everything would be focused on conducting a war "to the

"victorious end" and to concluding a peace without "annexation and reparations." Over these ideas the entire command personnel split into two camps. Those who believed blindly in the possibility of healing the army were indignant over the idea of eliminating the previous order in it, without realizing that with the former order the army had begun to collapse as a fighting force from the end of 1910; they did not realize that the superiors in the army instead of the "right to order" were left by this time with only the "habit of issuing orders" while the soldiers instead of "the duty to obey orders" were left with one or another degree of "voluntary subordination" to the orders of the superiors, that is, nothing more than the "inertia of subordination."

Could these timid notions of command and subordination last long?

Of course, not for long because the Army which had sustained its last push toward collapse from the action of Gen Kornilov<sup>4</sup> continued to break down unchecked as a fighting force.

By the time of the October Coup, I considered the Russian Army completely unable to fight and incurably ill.

To me it was clear that in a revolutionary age it was completely impossible to wage a war proceeding from the "allies" and "plans" of that power which had been overthrown by the revolution; generally, in my opinion, there was a very dubious possibility for the state of simultaneously passing through all phases of the revolution and at the same time participating in a European war, without having this war pursue the aims which had arisen in the process of the revolution and derived from the tasks of the revolution itself.

For participation in a war it was essential to have a complete revision of the grounds for this participation; the provisional government did not carry out such a revision because a military collapse was for me an obvious thing, an event of the near future.

With these convictions I assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 20 November 1917 and in order not to fall into error, I decided to thoroughly examine the question of the battleworthiness of the army. During the next 2 weeks such an inspection was carried out by me with all carefulness and in all detail. As a result, I drew up and dispatched a lengthy telegram to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.I. Lenin in which in terse expressions I set out the entire diagnosis of the state of all elements in the battleworthiness of the Russian Army. My overall conclusion was expressed with the following final words of this telegram: "The Russian Army has completely lost its ability to fight. Russia needs a new army capable of fighting."

Having lost the army as a fighting force, there merely remained concern for its possibly painless dispersion

home and saving from loss the largest possible amount of materiel needed for the future "new" army....

These concerns were overriding during the entire time from 20 November 1917 to 20 February 1918, when the elimination of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with all its facilities had been completed.

At this time the Germans began advancing from Narva to Petrograd; their cavalry sweeps began appearing in the surroundings of Gatchina.

Upon summons from the Government of People's Commissars, I, with the vestiges of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, arrived in Petrograd to organize its defense.

On 22 February 1918, I was given the task of defending Petrograd with instructions that the government did not have available sufficient armed forces for this task and that the workers summoned from the plants and factories would replace the armed force.

During the night of 22-23 February, the whistles blew to assemble at Smolnyy.

During that very same night, from the workers they began organizing "reconnaissance groups."

On 23 February 1918, that is, 10 years ago, the first "reconnaissance groups" were dispatched to the Narva—Sebezh<sup>6</sup> Front and after these our "detachments" supporting these groups.

Thus arose the "new" army of the young republic developing from the "reconnaissance groups" and "supporting detachments" for the defense of Petrograd becoming the powerful Red Army which victoriously traveled the difficult path of the first decade of its existence.

#### The Fight to Defend the Western and Southern Frontiers of the Young Soviet Republic at the Beginning of 1918

On 22 February 1918, upon summons of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, I arrived in Petrograd with several senior personnel of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief which had been broken up by 20 February 1918.

I drove directly from the station with my fellow travelers to Smolnyy; we were all received by Vladimir Ilich who informed us that the Germans were advancing on the city of Narva and that small cavalry units had already appeared near Gatchina.

I was ordered to organize the defense of Petrograd.

"We do not have any troops," Vladimir Ilich added, "the Petrograd workers should make up for the armed force."

Having received such orders I immediately set to carrying them out.

It was decided during the night of 22-23 February to move up reconnaissance groups formed from workers with 20-30 men in each group. The groups were to travel by rail to Narva and from here they would be split up in sectors designated on the map for reconnoitering (information) on the movement and actions of the Germans; all these groups were to maintain reciprocal contact between themselves and send telegraph reports to Smolnyy.

As close support for the "reconnaissance groups," a decision was taken to move up "detachments" of 50-100 men each; the detachments were to station themselves on the general front, occupying points and junctions of the roads running from the enemy side toward ours. These detachments served as close support for the reconnaissance groups and at the same time were to hold up the German advance toward our side.

Even before our arrival, when the headquarters had received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front that the Germans had gone over to the offensive and namely on 20 February at around 2400 hours, upon the orders of the Chairman of the Committee to Combat Pogroms, Counterrevolution and Sabotage, V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich<sup>7</sup> deputies from the worker and peasant soviet departed for the plants and blew the whistles. The workers arrived at the plants and the German offensive was announced to them and they immediately headed to Smolnyy.

At Smolnyy the workers were issued weapons, cartridges, food and money. By our arrival, around 50,000 men had been mobilized in this manner and a portion of them had already departed for Pskov. Here (at Smolnyy), from 22 February upon my instructions, "reconnaissance groups" and "detachments" were constituted and a "chief" and his "deputy assistants" were assigned to each of them.

The chief of each group and detachment came to Room No 76 (in Smolnyy) where my assistants and I set the task for each of them and instructed them on the method of action upon arriving at the destination; brief written instructions were issued to each chief. Work was going on at full swing....

By making a maximum effort, we were able during the night of 22-23 February and the day of 23 February to dispatch such a number of groups and detachments that was fully sufficient for reconnaissance and holding up the enemy in the space between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Chudo.

On the following day, 24 February, we continued to constitute and send out "reconnaissance groups" and "holding detachments." These were sent to the south of Narva along Lake Chudo and then to Pskov and Sebezh. By the evening of 24 February, the first "reconnaissance groups" from around Narva had sent in their first reports on the enemy and these were compiled according to all the rules of the Field Service Manual. On 9 February, the Ukrainian Rada<sup>8</sup> signed a separate truce

with the Germans and the Germans advanced on the Ukraine, threatening the western and southern frontiers of the RSFSR by this movement.

On 21 February, the Germans occupied Minsk and Rezhitsa<sup>9</sup> although they did agree to continue the peace talks with the Government of People's Commissars.

In continuing their offensive, on 25 February the Germans occupied the towns of Borisov, Revel,<sup>10</sup> Yuryev<sup>11</sup>.... It was clear that the Germans were surrounding the young Soviet Republic and were endeavoring to establish a blockade of it running from the Gulf of Finland to the Don River; but in the area of the Don River during this time, certain forces clearly hostile to us were already grouping....

Amidst these terrible events on 23 February 1918, the first cells ("groups" and "detachments") of the future armed forces of the young republic arose.

Under the pressure of these terrible events, we had to continue to send "groups" and "detachments" to the entire Western and Southern frontiers of the RSFSR beginning from the Gulf of Finland; taken altogether, the "groups" and "detachments" made up a "defensive screen" which initially was divided into two sectors (fronts): Northern and Western and then a third sector of the Defensive Screen was formed, the Southern Sector running from the Northern Caucasus and then further east to the Volga River.

On 4 March 1918, the Higher Military Council<sup>12</sup> was formed and this was made responsible for directing the defense of the frontiers of the Soviet Republic. I was appointed the military leader of the Higher Military Council [VVS].

The immediate tasks for the military leadership of the VVS were:

1. To eliminate the German thrust from Narva;
2. The development and strengthening of the "screen" for more strongly securing the frontiers of the republic;
3. Organizing and forming new armed forces according to an ordered, strictly thought out system;
4. Leadership over the further combat operations of the "screen."

Soon after sending out the "reconnaissance groups" and "detachments" it became clear that the Germans had occupied a portion of Narva located on the left (western) bank of the Narova River and that several of their mounted patrols supported by infantry had swept as far as Gatchina; the mounted patrols had reached Gatchina while the German infantry was concentrated at the railroad station of Veymarn.<sup>13</sup> During this time, our "reconnaissance groups" had come out in the rear of these German units. The appearance of the "supporting detachments" which were growing stronger and stronger and building up on the flanks of the German positions

clearly persuaded the Germans that after a few days they would be completely surrounded.

With such a state of affairs, Gen P.<sup>14</sup> who had volunteered for service was ordered to bring together in his hand command over the "reconnaissance groups" and "detachments" in the space between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Chudo and attack the Germans with all forces in their flank and rear.

During the night of 24-25 February, Gen P. traveled to the area designated for him.

In the meanwhile the Germans, having considered their difficult situation, began to retreat back to the town of Narva and were being squeezed by our detachments.

The supporting detachments soon thereafter occupied Yamburg<sup>15</sup> and all the territory up to the Narova River had been cleared of Germans.

Retreating very hurriedly, the Germans covered their retreat with rear guards which clashed with our "supporting detachments" pursuing them. Beyond the Narova River, our detachments did not go, as they did not have the strength (they had no artillery). The Germans halted on the left (western) bank of the Narova River and our detachments were on the right (eastern) bank.

Thus, an equilibrium was established here. For more completely supporting the approaches to Petrograd, the Northern Sector of the "curtain" was extended further to the south.

Approximately during these same days when the just-described...events were occurring on the Narva Front, information was received, and some considered the possibility of the appearance of the German Navy in the Gulf of Finland; in other words, the fear was created of the taking of Petrograd from the land by a German landing force which could land somewhere on the shores of Finland under the cover of a squadron entering the Gulf of Finland.

The presence of the government in Petrograd served as a circumstance which further intensified such fears.

On this question I submitted a report to Vladimir Ilich Lenin who agreed with my arguments and issued orders for an immediate move of the government to Moscow.

The move itself was organized and executed under the direct leadership of the Manager of the Council of People's Commissar, Vladimir Dmitriyevich Bonch-Bruyevich, my brother. During the evening of 11 March, the government arrived in Moscow and moved into the buildings of the Moscow Kremlin.

The VVS with its staff, simultaneously with the move of the government over the Nikolayev Railroad, traveled to Moscow on its own special train on a somewhat circuitous route via Dno, Novosokolniki, Velikiye Luki, Rzhev—Moscow.

Along the way at stations I received reports from the chiefs of the nearby "screen" detachments.

Upon arrival in Moscow, the VVS train stopped on the tracks of the passenger station of the Aleksandrovskiy Railroad.<sup>16</sup>

The session of the VVS was held in my car.

Prior to the departure from St. Petersburg to Moscow, the government had sent a commission to Dvinsk<sup>17</sup> for talks with the Germans about a peace. However, regardless of the peace talks, the Germans continued to advance into the interior of the republic. This led to the necessity of reinforcing the "screen" along the Western, Southern and Southeastern frontiers of the republic. In its final form the "screen" was created in the following manner:

- a) It consisted of three fronts: Western, Northern and Southeastern;
- b) Each front was divided into "sectors"; each "sector" occupied the tactically most important points with infantry detachments and artillery; subsequently under these detachments they organized cavalry platoons and squadrons; the detachments of the "screen" covered all the probable routes of advance of the enemy;
- c) In each sector in the rear of the detachments were the "supports" of one or several detachments which when necessary could concentrate at one or another point;
- d) The terrain ahead of each sector was constantly swept with "troop reconnaissance" sent out by the detachments with fixed tasks of reconnoitering the enemy and the terrain;
- e) Several "detachments" with their "supports" were combined together into a "group," since the groups were the immediate subunits of the given "sector." The "detachments" and "supports" were of varying strength, depending upon the importance of the sector or area covered by them. Subsequently, the groups in the sectors of the screen served as the personnel for developing each group into an infantry division according to the established TOE.

The purpose of forming and further strengthening the "screen" was not only to cover the republic's frontier but also the fact that service in the "screen" which was aimed at defending the state's frontiers was acceptable for those who served in the old army and who willingly joined the detachments of the "screen"; the participation of experienced servicemen was essential at that time as the enemy was refined and experienced in military terms.

On the other hand, adjusted to serving in the detachments of the "screen" and in the detachments themselves, the experienced servicemen remained in those Red Army units which were organized from the "screen" units, comprising in them strong personnel which was militarily trained and had undergone a school of combat.

Thus, the "screen" was a fighting school for the personnel of the future Red Army and in part a method for winning over servicemen from the old army to serve in the newly constituted Red Army.

There were not major mass military clashes with the enemy in the "screen" during its existence; there were only local (partial) military clashes predominantly with the White Guard and anarchistic elements which had recovered in various localities. These military clashes were very bloody; they began and ended under the command of the leaders of the "detachments" and sometimes on a group scale under the command of the chiefs of the "groups."

Things never reached the point of involving an entire "section" of the screen. Service in the "screen" was extremely intense and for this reason it required great vigilance.

On the part of the VVS, all sorts of measures were taken to promptly develop the most threatened sectors of the "screen" by concentrating the required forces on them.

On the way to carrying out this task, the VVS had to direct its energy at working out and carrying out the "military district system" as the basis for constituting the republic's armed forces and at systematizing the rear service in "supporting current and possible combat actions with the essential materiel." In this area, a plan was worked out for forming and strategically deploying the republic's armed forces. According to this plan, the "screen" was to be turned into a "cover army"; under its cover, the "main forces" were to be organized and deployed in the initial strategic position; even deeper inside the nation, beyond the Volga River, units (divisions) of the "strategic reserve" were to be constituted.

The plan was worked out in all details, it was approved by the VVS and reported to Vladimir Ilich Lenin; the plan was officially approved and adopted for immediate execution. The intervention on the part of the foreign states and the actions of the Czechoslovak Corps<sup>18</sup> which had wrongly been allowed into the interior areas of the republic upset the execution of the above-mentioned plan.

The entire burden of the struggle on the republic's periphery and in the "screen" detachments was carried by the Red Guards and the Red Partisans who officially entered combat during the night of 22-23 February 1918 but who had also participated in this previously at their own initiative. Precisely their valor is responsible for the irrefutable fact of success in defending the frontiers of the young republic.

The Red Guards and Red Partisans received personnel of all ages, of different social backgrounds and various classes; they fought selflessly out of a realization of the need to fight decisively for the common just cause.

History will not forget the unstinting feat of these still little-known heroes.

#### Footnotes

1. The author has in mind the offensive operation of the Russian Armies of the Southwestern Front conducted on 10 (23) January—11 (24) April 1915 in the aim of invading Hungary and putting Austro-Hungary out of the war. Here the main task rested on the 8th Army of Gen A.A. Brusilov. The preparations for the Carpathian Operation became known to the German Command. In the area of Mukachevo (Munkach), Uzhgorod a new Southern Army (commander, A. Linsingen) was deployed.

The Austro-Hungarian and German troops on 9-11 (22-24) January, went over to the offensive. The offensive of the 8th Russian Army which commenced almost simultaneously was accompanied by numerous meeting engagements under difficult mountain, winter conditions, and as a result the Russian troops did not make significant headway. In mid-March 1915, the 8th, 3d and 11th Armies of the Southwestern Front received the task of breaching the defenses in the center of the Austro-German troops and coming out in the enemy flank and rear. In the course of the new offensive, the 8th and 3d Russian Armies advanced just 20 km. On 11 (24) April, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Gen N.I. Ivanov, issued a directive for the troops to dig in on the achieved lines.

As a result of the Carpathian Operation, the Russian troops lost around 1 million men (the enemy around 800,000 men) but did not achieve the set goals.

2. Guchkov, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1862-1936), the leader of the bourgeois anarchistic Octoberist Party. One of the political leaders of the Russian counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie and the organizers of intervention against Soviet Russia. From 2 March 1917 through 30 April 1917, he was the military and naval minister in the First Provisional Government. He personally participated in organizing the Kornilov Counterrevolutionary Coup. He participated actively in establishing the White Guard "Volunteer Army" and in organizing the intervention. He died an emigree in Paris.

3. Kornilov, Lavr Georgiyevich (1870-1918), one of the leaders of the Russian counterrevolution, a rabid monarchist, an infantry general (1917). He participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In 1907-1911, he was a military attache in China. During World War I, he commanded a division and in March-April 1917, the troops of the Petrograd Military District and then the 8th Army and the Southwestern Front. From 19 July (1 August) through 27 August (9 September) he was the supreme commander-in-chief. At the end of August 1917, he raised a revolt and moved troops against Petrograd. After the elimination of the revolt, he was arrested by the Provisional Government and put in prison in the town of Bykhov. On 19 November (2 December), he escaped to Novocherkassk where, along

with Gen M.V. Alekseyev, he headed the White Guard Volunteer Army. He was killed in the unsuccessful storming of Yekaterinodar.

4. The action of Gen L.G. Kornilov—a counterrevolutionary coup in August 1917 under the leadership of the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian Armed Forces, Gen L.G. Kornilov, in the aim of defeating the revolutionary forces and establishing a reactionary military dictatorship. Eliminated by the revolutionary soldiers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet and the Red Guard.

5. Gatchina—a town of oblast subordination, the center of Gatchinskiy Rayon of Leningrad Oblast of the RSFSR, rail junction 45 km to the southwest of Leningrad.

6. Sebezh—a town, center of Sebezhskiy Rayon, Velikiye Luki Oblast, RSFSR. Rail station on the Velikiye Luki—Rezekne Line. Highway junction.

7. Bonch-Bruyevich, Vladimir Dmitriyevich (1873-1955), a party and state leader. During the October days of 1917, he commanded the area of Smolnyy—Tavrid Palace. From December 1917 through March 1918, chairman of the Committee to Combat Pogroms, in February-March 1918, the Committee of the Revolutionary Defense of Petrograd. From November 1917 through October 1920, he was the manager of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars. In March 1918, he directed the move of the Soviet government from Petrograd to Moscow.

8. The Central Rada was a counterrevolutionary unified body of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalistic parties and organizations in the Ukraine in 1917-1918. It was established on 4 (17) March 1917 in Kiev. The Central Rada held a hostile positions vis-a-vis the October Socialist Revolution, it conducted secret talks with the Austro-German bloc, and began reprisals against the White Guard detachments and revolutionary units in the Ukraine, becoming one of the centers of the All-Russian Counterrevolution. The First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met in Kharkov on 11-12 (24-25) December 1917 outlawed the Central Rada.

9. Rezhitsa. At present, Rezekne, a town, center of Rezeknenskiy Rayon in Latvia. Located on the Rezekne River. Rail junction on the line to Riga, Pskov, Velikiye Luki, Daugavpils.

10. Revel—the former name of the city of Tallinn and capital of Estonia.

11. Yuryev—the former name of the city of Tartu. A city of republic subordination, the center of Tartuskiy Rayon of Estonia. River port.

12. The Higher Military Council (VVS)—the organ of strategic leadership over the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic. It was formed under the Decree of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars of 4 March 1918. The membership was: M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, military

leader, P.P. Roshyan and K.I. Shutko, political commissars. According to the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of 19 March 1918, the VVS was to head the defense of the nation and the organizational development of the Armed Forces. It coordinated and united the activities of the people's commissariats for military and naval affairs, it established the "screens," and worked out the plan for organizing the Armed Forces. On 2 September 1918, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the VVS was abolished and its functions turned over to the Republic Revolutionary Military Council.

13. Veymarn—rail junction on the Leningrad—Tallinn line, 14 km to the east of Kingisepp.

14. Parskiy, Dmitriy Pavlovich (1866-1921)—a Russian and Soviet military leader, lieutenant general (1915). In February 1918, he voluntarily sided with Soviet power. In February-March 1918, he was the military leader of the Soviet detachments defending Narva and Yamburg against German interventionists. From May he was the military leader of the Northern Sector of the "screen" detachments and in September-November 1918, the commander of the Northern Fleet. In subsequent years, he was a member of the Special Conference Under the Commander-in-Chief.

15. Yamburg—from 1922, the city of Kingisepp. Center of Kingiseppskiy Rayon of Leningrad Oblast. A port on the Luga River 40 km from its mouth into the Gulf of Finland.

16. Aleksandrovskiy Terminus is presently the Belorussian Terminus in Moscow.

17. Dvinsk, the former name of the town of Daugavpils, the center of Daugavpils Oblast in Latvia. Major rail junction at the crossing of the Riga—Orel, Leningrad—Vilnius Rail Lines.

18. The revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps was an armed counterrevolutionary action of the Czechoslovak Corps in 1918 involving around 50,000 Czechs. The corps which had been organized in Russia from former prisoners of war of the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1917 was ready to be dispatched to Western Europe via the Far East. Instigated by the entente which had assigned the revolt a major role in its plans to overthrow Soviet power, the corps rose in revolt and in May-August captured, together with the White Guard detachments, a number of towns (Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, Ufa, Simbirsk and so forth), where bourgeois orders were restored. The revolt created an enormous danger for the Soviet Republic. It was eliminated by the Red Army.

### M.M. Dragomirov on Military Discipline

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[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Papers and Information," by Lt Col A.M. Komissarov, candidate of psychological sciences, docent: "M.M. Dragomirov on Military Discipline"]

[Text] In the history of the development of military pedagogical thought in Russia, the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries held a special place. This was brought about by a number of factors: by the defeat of Tsarism in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, by the elimination of serfdom, by the military reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, by the development of capitalism and capitalist relations in the nation, by the transition to manning the army on the basis of universal military service (as of January 1874 in Russia) and by the change in the methods of combat. The then existing methods of training and education did not meet the new demands and came under acute criticism by the progressive portion of the officer personnel. One of the military leaders who realized the importance of the changes in the army was Gen M.I. Dragomirov.<sup>1</sup> "The experience of the last war with Japan," he wrote, "has certainly shown that the time has come, finally, to take into account the modern conditions of a soldier's service (its brevity) and remove the question of his education from the hands of routine and the barracks, putting this in more capable hands, the officers. We are convinced that an officer can be not only an instructor, but above all he should be the educator and teacher of the soldier."<sup>2</sup>

M.I. Dragomirov conceived of discipline both in the "broad" sense of the word and as military discipline, *per se*. In the broad sense, discipline, in his opinion, "embraces the entire aggregate of moral, mental and physical skills of a person who has dedicated himself willingly or unwillingly to a certain specialty" (p 382). And "military discipline is the aggregate of all moral, mental and physical skills needed for the officers and soldiers of all levels to meet their purpose" (p 383). Thus, discipline is a complicated skill which includes a part that is inherited at birth and a part gained as a result of various educational actions and the personal experience of the serviceman. Discipline is a law which defines the relations of the superior and the subordinate. Both the soldier and the officer are equally obligated to be subordinate to this law; the law should stand above the personality of the chief and the subordinate. M.I. Dragomirov included the following in an understanding of military discipline: subordination to a chief; efficiency; dedication to the chief, to service, to the sovereign and to the fatherland; subordination which he understood as "the established order of execution or dispatching something...a certain, systematized graduation in relations between the levels of the military hierarchy...the observance of this graduation presupposes the corresponding inner or moral habit in a military person; and as such, he

considers discipline a part of his whole" (p 386). M.I. Dragomirov also included in the concept of military discipline respect for rank (military courtesy): "...It is imperative that the conduct of a soldier in relation to civilians be restrained and be based on the conviction that the military uniform imposes on the person wearing it a duty to be more polite and restrained in any event than those who do not have a military uniform" (p 613).

In a most concentrated manner, the ways for strengthening military discipline are set out in three works by M.I. Dragomirov: "Distsiplina, subordinatsiya, chinopochitaniye" [Discipline, Subordination, Respect for Rank] (a reply to Mr. Volnyy); "Opyt rukovodstva dlya podgotovki chastej k boyu" [Experience of Leadership in Preparing Units for Combat] and "Podgotovka voysk v mirnoye vremya" [Training of Troops in Peacetime] (education and indoctrination). He felt that the discipline of a soldier could be passed on by heredity and, in addition, "family discipline" of the simple people prepares the efficiency and discipline of a soldier. For this reason, he asserted that military discipline is not trained in a new recruit but is "rooted," since "our simple people with rare exceptions are disciplined due to family discipline; it remains, consequently, merely to develop and specialize it in the military direction" (p 385). Here one should note the correct view of the important role played by the family in training the future soldier.

In his works, M.I. Dragomirov repeatedly emphasized that he was a student of A.V. Suvorov. In continuing his traditions, he asserted that real military discipline "takes root...by means of constant insistence on once-given demands, by justice, strict legality, concern for the soldier and an honest attitude toward his supply and support" (p 385). A soldier should be accustomed to legitimate and constant exactingness, for exactingness on a haphazard basis dampens ardor, it makes it possible to divide duties into important and secondary (not obligatory) and this ultimately leads to the violating of military discipline and a decline in the general level of the combat readiness of the unit or subunit. In turn, a constancy of demands entails the necessity of educating a conscious soldier who realizes what the commander is demanding from him. "By his inherent properties a person only performs well when he knows what is desired of him: hence the Suvorov axiom 'each soldier should understand his maneuver'" (p 525). But it is not easy to achieve such a situation. This is preceded by extended work in training and educating the soldier, and here an important component part is the unity of views of the superiors concerning its tasks. "The question of education and indoctrination should not depend upon the particular views of one or another superior. It is essential that a unity of views throughout the entire army be established concerning the tasks of military training and education. This unity is achievable only in the instance when even at a school desk the future officers are taught the principles of the rational training of the soldier and the troop unit" (p 683).

The shortening of the period of service exacerbated the problem of education and particularly the discipline of the collective. That "cohesion" which was achieved previously spontaneously, that is, by years-long familiarization and incorporation of the soldier in the collective now, Dragomirov was convinced, had to be a subject of education: "...A soldier should maintain close order because he has an inner predisposition for this, he is the master of himself and is accustomed to obey the superior; and not because he is subordinate to the superior that he stands in close order" (p 170); "...A ranking [by size] that is internal or moral in a company, squadron or battery should be preferred to external: not the slightest difference between the position in formation and at home; friends drill and live together and not just people who are close in size alone" (p 171).

In paying proper due to the role of comradeship in the strengthening of discipline in a subunit (unit), M.I. Dragomirov warned against the manifestation of false comradeship and familiarity as harmful to service and pointed out that a feeling of comradeship should not deny but rather presuppose service exactingness.

#### **Discipline in a Soldier Is Instilled by Concern for Him and by a Correct (Law-Abiding) Attitude Toward Him**

This helps to educate the soldier in a spirit of the awareness and the need to show individual initiative, that is, initiative on the battlefield. In the work "Armeyskiye zametki" [Army Notes] we read: "...Self-sacrifice is not taken, it is given. This is the resultant of the entire way of life and exercises. Where a man loves his motherland, he loves his unit; where, as a consequence of this, the common becomes his personal undertaking, where the insulting or defeat of his motherland or his unit is his own personal insulting, his own personal defeat—here he would not hesitate to sacrifice himself for their good. The means to achieve this? Protect the soldier: where he is protected he does not have to protect himself, for he knows that he is valued and that he will not be assigned to any useless work and will not be involved in slaughter in vain" (p 326).

With a shortened term of active service and a sharp rise in the overall number of soldiers of younger ages and young recruits, the greatest responsibility rested on the officers as educators. The officer has moved to the forward edge of military pedagogical activity. With good reason, M.I. Dragomirov was concerned that not all the officers were prepared for such a role. It was essential to arm them with pedagogical skills and above all teach them to work with the junior officers to whom the general assigned the role of teachers and instructors. He made the officers responsible exclusively for the "indoctrinational department" as he considered this more important than the educational. The indoctrinational department was also in charge of discipline. The officer should be indefatigable in the training of the junior officers and should constantly supervise their activities. "He should constantly remember that he must not tire in explaining; that he risks being not understood not only

after 2 or 3 times, but sometimes after 20...." (p 188). And an order will be carried out precisely with the same tone it is issued and particularly so in combat. The officer should master both the word (the ability to persuade) as well as the tone of voice (the ability to command). Let us recall what importance A.S. Makarenko gave to developing in the educator a correct placement of the voice and to the skillful use of the range of speech.

But exactingness should not be similar to personal irritation or anger. These are not the same thing. "The service requirements in no way cause such irritation as an essential condition; on the contrary. The person who loses control of himself serves his own personal need to become irritated and not the interests of service for he predisposes his subordinates to be more concerned with servility to him than with service efficiency.... If your every order or comment is given briefly, precisely, without mumbling and in an impressive voice, that is, so that each person can understand what is wanted of him and you feel this is not a joke, then there will be no need for swearing or blows" (pp 396-397). Such an ability to deal with a soldier must be learned constantly and this ability must be realized unswervingly. M.I. Dragomirov warned that "it is too late to learn to talk with a soldier when you must be able by a word to send him to his death" (p 215). Only daily practice and a desire for mastery lead to the desired result.

Considering a person's abilities.

#### **An Officer Should be Able to Carry Out Disciplinary Practices**

The methods of employing reprimands and commendations in indoctrinating discipline does not come by itself. It does not come with the obtaining of an education. It is achieved fully in practice and under the condition of a profound analysis of the arising conflict situations and the actions of the indoctrinators in them. This, in essence, was the approach adhered to by M.I. Dragomirov. It was essential to ascertain what had served as the cause of the infraction: the negligence of a soldier or his ignorance or lack of training? Having ascertained this, one should give some thought to what the reprimand should be. Was it worth a punishment for lack of training? Would this not do damage to the situation? Only after asking so many such questions, having provided an answer to them and worked out a correct, reasonable solution can one begin to work. The pedagogue M.I. Dragomirov taught: "Ignorance is corrected by explanation and not by reprimands" (p 409); "if a young soldier does not execute something or executes it clumsily, this happens...out of a misunderstanding of the demands; help can be provided for the young soldier only by patient and brief explanations.... As to what he should do, and not by reprimands; reprimands in such instances may only finally frighten and shatter him" (p 645); "only in efficiency arising out of negligence should be pursued with appropriate reprimands" (p 646). Thus, the general advised a battalion commander: "At first, the

most zealous and capable company commander does not always, for example, observe reasonability in the imposed reprimands he may not punish strictly for something but weakly. The battalion commander, looking, and frequently so, in the reprimand log, can accelerate the bringing of reprimands into conformity with the infractions" (p 452).

Dragomirov gave great attention to the question of observing legality toward the soldier, emphasizing that strict legality in peacetime develops in a soldier a conviction of the rectitude of the constant demands of a commander in wartime. Very categorical is his demand on the officer not to belittle a soldier "all the more not to fight." "In training a correction should be made by word and not by hand: this is more understandable and not insulting; if the word is not understood then demonstrate yourself and so that it be more visible stand no closer than three paces away from the trainee" (p 645). In indoctrinating, "remember that the soldier is a person and for this reason for him, like for any person, there should not be a single duty without an appropriate right" (p 611).

The high principledness and exactingness of a command help achieve the goal of indoctrinating discipline. "Demands are to be made strongly and their execution is to be constantly supervised.... Hard service is performed without a murmur for an exacting commander; out of habit it does not even seem hard but for a person who is exacting only periodically or at random, even low demands cause murmuring and complaints of severity. This phenomenon occurs not out of an absolute difficulty in carrying out what is demanded but due to the rarity of moving from ordinary negligent attitudes toward the undertaking immediately to strictness and precision" (p 611). These words are also pertinent in our times. Young officers commit such oversights in service. And here aid on the part of a senior superior (company, battalion) is important as well as attention from the political workers of the subunits and units. A typical error is also excessive "unprepared" exactingness when a young officer in his work relies on orders considering them the sole means of indoctrinating efficiency. But even M.I. Dragomirov said that an officer has the wrong notion when he feels "that the duty of an officer is only to order and it is not his job to indoctrinate efficiency. There is no need to explain to what lamentable and even fatal disappointments such a view can lead in difficult circumstances with the young army personnel" (p 187). For this reason, without having instilled a feeling of efficiency in the soldier, an officer does not have the right to expect it fully from the soldier. Before demanding something, it is essential to explain to the soldier "what he should perform and how" (p 188). This is achieved by constant, unceasing work in the training and indoctrination of the new recruit. Here an important place is held

#### By the Personal Example of the Officer Indoctrinator,

This includes: a knowledge of the military sciences; the personal experience of the commander and indoctrinator of subordinates; high efficiency and loyalty to duty; relationships with other officers; the observance of the laws.

In an officer Dragomirov particularly valued such a quality as precision, that is, never to be late, to commence any undertaking on time and complete it promptly and not to fatigue the men by "mindless" waiting. In the work "Opty rukovodstva dlya podgotovki chastej k boyu" we read: "...In everything and always be precise to the minute. This is the guarantee for protecting the men who are exacerbated not by work but rather senseless waiting without anything to do until the work and the delay in dismissal under the empty pretexts upon completing work" (pp 585-586). In Dragomirov's opinion, discipline inevitably is disseminated better not from the bottom upwards but from the top downwards, that is, from the superiors. All of this presupposes "the complete and profound knowledge and honest execution of all rules of interior and garrison service; not only a knowledge of all the areas of individual and drill education but also the ability to teach them, in explaining what is required briefly and intelligibly" (p 490). By the strength of example, an officer instills in a soldier the feeling of duty and efficiency. Here the example must be set not only in large matters but also small ones, in "the most minute things." "It must never be forgotten that the example of an equal is not obligatory but the example of a superior, being obligatory in the good sense, out of necessity becomes obligatory in the bad" (p 606).

Relationships, said Dragomirov, should be based upon respect for rank and each officer should carry out unfailingly all demands prescribed by the military regulations. If it states in the regulations that an officer should return a salute to one given by an inferior rank then this must be done. The failure to perform this already tells the inferior rank that not all demands of the regulations are obligatory. Moreover, such conduct by the officers shows that they "are less well educated than the soldiers." "It is impossible either to instill or establish efficiency if you yourself do not excel in such" (p 399).

The personal example set in observing the laws instills in the soldiers respect for the law and for the officer, for they can see that he along with them performs the same requirements, does not grumble but will take a proper attitude toward his own service and the duties entrusted to him. "In order to achieve the execution of the regulations, the officer should see to it that his demands and orders do not have the nature of being capricious. What he has demanded in a certain manner once should be demanded in precisely the same manner constantly. Having developed such legality in himself, the officer will be sensitive to illegality and will not allow it to develop among his subordinates...this comprises the basis of the most diverse and terrible crimes" (p 656). Such a responsible attitude toward diverse duties is

possible only in the instance that an officer understands and is profoundly aware of his high purpose in the army and society.

In "Armeyskiye zametki" we read words which have the ring of an obligation of oath, as a motto for the activity of an officer. These are words to which one can subscribe to even now. "The role of the officer is great and honorable...and not every person is capable of its burden. One must invest a great deal of heart in one's career in order to be able to say with a clear conscience: "...Many men have passed through my hands and there are very few among them who were not made better because of this, more developed and fit for any undertaking. I have not made a single one a good-for-nothing; none have I overdone with senseless work or inattention to his needs; in none have I undermined his confidence in his own forces. All have become accustomed to subordinating their will to the achieving of one common goal out of an awareness of duty and not because of the rod..." (p 190)

The recommendations of Gen M.I. Dragomirov on the directions and methods of work for the officers in strengthening military discipline to a significant degree can be applied in our own military pedagogical activities. For us it is important that Dragomirov was in favor of creating a rational system of education, that he was able to get across to the troops all moral principles and was able to educate the army with these principles. It is also important that he carried out his educational theory in practice, taught the officers to work with subordinates and here achieved high results having covered Russian arms with glory in battle.

#### Footnotes

1. Infantry Gen Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov (1830-1905) had a long career as a military and state figure. Having completed the General Staff Academy in 1856, from 1860 he was an instructor and in 1863-1869 was a professor on the tactics chair of the academy. Then in 1873-1877, he was in command of the 14th Infantry Division which demonstrated high fighting qualities during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. In 1878, he was the chief of the General Staff Academy and from 1889, the commander of the Kiev Military District, and from 1898, also the Kiev, Podolsk and Volyn governor general. From 1903, he was a member of the State Council. He was elected an honorary member of the Moscow and Kiev Universities, the Swedish-Norwegian Military Academy and in 1900, an honorary member of the National Pedagogical Society in France.

2. M.I. Dragomirov, "Izbrannyye trudy. Voprosy vospitaniya i obucheniya voysk" [Selected Works. Questions of Troop Indoctrination and Training], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1956, 620 pages. (In the text of the article, references are given to the current book.—Editors)

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#### Soviet-American Colloquium

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[Article by Capt V.M. Gobarev, candidate of historical sciences: "A Soviet-American Colloquium"]

[Text] In the autumn of this year in the United States, there will be the next fourth colloquium of Soviet and American historians on the problem of Soviet and American collaboration during the years of World War II.

Contacts between scholars of the two powers have always been a significant event. All the more, as in the area of military history, they as yet have not been so frequent as the interests of the development of military history science might require. For this reason I would like to describe the impressions which I gained from the work of the previous colloquium held in Moscow.

The colloquiums alternate between the Soviet Union and the United States and their participants discuss in sequence the events of the next year of World War II. Thus, in October of last year, the subject of discussion was the Teheran Conference and Soviet-American collaboration in 1943.

The American delegation has constantly been headed by the professor from Rutgers University (Newark, New Jersey) Warren F. Kimball. The enthusiasm, high competence, open sincerity and democratic nature of the scholar to a large degree has contributed to the successful work of the colloquium. Naturally, the specialization and scholarly interests of the participants influence the choice of the theme of measures. Prof W. Kimball is a well-known specialist on the questions of the history of military diplomacy. The subject of his paper was stated in the title: "In a Family Circle: Roosevelt at Teheran."

As a whole, the American delegation made a strong impression. It was basically comprised of university professors and this again confirms the leading role of university science in the historical and other research in the United States.

Among them was the professor from the University of Vermont, Mark A. Stoler, the author of a number of recognized works on the history of World War II. In particular, his book "Policy of the Second Front: Military Diplomatic Aspects of the Coalition War of 1941-1943" has been recommended for translation and publication by Voenizdat. The paper of M. Stoler was entitled "Strategic Priorities and Coalition Diplomacy at the 1943 Teheran Conference: The Overlord Plan, the Mediterranean and the War Against Japan."

The professor from Florida State University, Arthur L. Funk, was a veteran of World War II. He is also a prominent specialist on the history of military diplomacy. In his report the scholar took up the question of what influence the Teheran Conference had on the

subsequent events of World War II in the Mediterranean Basin: in Southern France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

A colleague of the American delegation's leader at Rutgers University, Prof Lloyd C. Gardner, gave a paper entitled "The Riddle of the Sphinx: Russia and Reconstruction" devoted to the rebirth of the USSR economy in the last wartime and first postwar years. Aside from all else, in it he examined the question of the possibility of the involvement of American firms and companies in this process.

A professor from Ohio University, Charles C. Alexander, made an interesting attempt to examine the question of in what manner the ardent sympathy of the Americans during the war years for the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against Nazism was focused on the personality of Stalin. His paper was termed: "Uncle Joe: The Image of Stalin During the Period of the Greatest Development of the Grand Coalition."

Probably more than the others, the study of the political history of Soviet society was the concern of the professor from de Kalb University (Illinois), Albert Resis, who had a good command of Russian. Although his paper "The Policy of the Allied Parties Vis-a-vis Future Germany, 1942-1943" was devoted to the prospects of the postwar arrangement of Europe, the basic content in the activities of Prof A. Resis is research on the vagaries of recent Soviet history. For this reason, it would be more valid to call him a Sovietologist. The books by the scholar have become widely known in the West. It must be said that the views of A. Resis and our historians are at polar opposites concerning the various events occurring in the USSR.

The colloquium confirmed that American historians pay significant attention to Soviet historiography of World War II. All the research by our historians to one degree or another have become an object of their close scrutiny. They have also studied the archival documents and other sources carefully as these have become available. A characteristic example is the work of the professor from Ohio University in Athens-Stevens, S. Miner, an energetic researcher who has a good command of Russian. On the basis of a comparative analysis of Soviet and Western verbatim minutes of the Allied conference, he has prepared the report "On the Other Side of the Hill." The Soviet sources on the Teheran Conference are a study that is not devoid of passion and very curious showing different interpretations in the American and Soviet verbatim record of the Big Three sessions.

Studied with equal attention in the United States is the reverse process of American publications concerning the Soviet Union during the years of World War II as was evident from a joint paper by the Profs Clayton R. Koppes (Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio) and Gregory D. Black (University of Missouri, Kansas City, Missouri) "Interpretation of Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union in the American Press in 1943."

The paper by Prof Theodore Wilson, a well-known specialist on the history of World War II, from Kansas State University (Lawrence) was devoted to an analysis of American-English relations from Teheran to the beginning of Operation Overlord, that is, the Allied landing in Normandy.

Finally, Prof Alexander S. Cochran (the Military History Center of the Department of the U.S. Army, Washington) represented the military historians of his country. His report "From the ABC-1 Plan to the Teheran Conference. The Anglo-American Staff Services and the Strategy of Coalition Warfare" contained a significant amount of diverse information concerning the actual military efforts of the Western Allies.

Having become acquainted with the subjects of the papers presented by American historians participating in the colloquium, the reader may conclude on the nature of the priority in the focus of their research. We would merely like to emphasize that probably the strongest aspects in the work of American historians include: saturation with skillfully selected factual material, the use of recent archival and other documents, a free orientation in the research of their own and foreign colleagues as well as a pluralism in views and approaches.

Undoubtedly, all of this to a large degree is aided by the planned access to archival materials by the appropriate foreign bodies for availability to researchers, including scientists, coming from abroad. This work is also being done in our country. But the pace of it cannot satisfy the archival hunger. Let us take the USSR Foreign Policy Archives since the colloquium above all discussed the diplomatic history aspects of various problems. Over the last 3 years, the security classification has been lifted only from 10,000 files (from an interview with the Chief of the Diplomatic History Directorate of the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], F. Kovalev with the IZVESTIYA correspondent on 6 January 1989), while around 400,000 remain still classified. With such a pace, a portion of the materials extremely essential for researchers will be accessible for them only at the end of the 21st Century.

One can only be amazed by the fact that, regardless of the limited access to the archives, our historians have been able to prepare strong papers and worthily represent the Soviet side. Such papers as "The Teheran Conference" by the Deputy Academic Secretary of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician G.N. Sevostyanov, "From Teheran to Normandy" by Doctor of Historical Sciences O.A. Rzhevskiy (Institute of Universal History of the USSR Academy of Sciences), "The Soviet Military Economy and the Problems of Rebuilding the National Economy (August 1943—Mid-1944)" by Doctor of Historical Sciences G.A. Kumanev (USSR History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences), "Nazi Germany: Strategy of a War on Two Fronts" by Doctor of Historical Sciences D.M. Proektor (Institute of World Economy

and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences) and "Lend-Lease: Routes of Collaboration" by Candidate of Historical Sciences A.S. Orlov (Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense) set the tone for the discussions.

Profundity of elaboration and clarity of exposition of the author's opinion also marked the papers by Doctor of Historical Sciences L.V. Pozdeyeva "American-English Relations (From Teheran to the Beginning of Overlord)," Prof B.A. Gilenson "Cultural Ties Between the USSR and the United States: 1942-1943," Candidate of Historical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank V.P. Zimonin "Cairo—Teheran—Cairo and the Fate of the War on the Pacific," Candidate of Historical Sciences N.S. Ivanov "Soviet and American Historiography of the Teheran Conference," and the Co-worker from the Institute of Universal History of the USSR Academy of Sciences V.V. Pozdnyakov "Problems of Collaboration With the USSR, War and Peace in the American Mass Information Media and U.S. Public Opinion on the Eve of the Teheran Conference."

The debates which ended each session were lively and direct. This was possible to achieve due to the open statement of views and the skillful grouping by subject of the papers of the American and Soviet participants. Thus, one session was completely devoted directly to the Teheran Conference, another to the coalition aspects of the war, a third to the questions of the economy and so forth.

The main thing which distinguished the discussions—and this is a reliable indicator of today's changes—was a flexibility in the thinking of the participants and their ability not only to listen but also to hear the opponent, to seek out not differences but rather similarity in views; an attempt to rely in their arguments on the most authoritative, recent and often foreign sources; the search for a reasonable compromise and a desire to achieve the truth and not results that were merely convenient (out of ideological or mercantile considerations) for one or another side. The comments by the veterans of World War II, Prof Arthur L. Funk (United States), Maj Gen (Ret) B.V. Panov and Col (Ret) G.A. Koltunov, were warmly met by the colloquium participants.

The discussions of the most diverse questions in the corridors were equally as interesting and informative as the official debates. Here the participants voiced their views more frankly and exchanged impressions. The American historians were vitally interested in the process of perestroyka and the level of glasnost in the Soviet Union. Not all of them were well acquainted with our reality and a portion was making their first trip to the USSR.

Of course, the conversations were primarily over specific problems of Soviet-American collaboration in the history area. Regret was expressed on the inaccessibility of numerous archival holdings. And undoubtedly no one

could be satisfied with the current state of contacts between Soviet and American historians. On this both sides were united.

Actually, if during a year a score (even if they are leading ones, still just a score!) scientists from both countries assembled together for 3 days and carry out one (even significant) measure, is this sufficient? Moreover, a majority of historians for reasons not dependent upon them are forced to use only domestic archives.

In this context one cannot help but say that the level of contacts between the Soviet and American military historians remains even smaller in volume and content. For this reason the next point of the colloquium program was received with hope: a visit by the American historians to the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This fact alone evoked a storm of emotions and impressions among the Americans but the main thing was still to come, a meeting and talk with the institute chief, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof D.A. Volkogonov. The American researchers literally peppered D.A. Volkogonov with questions, a majority of which touched upon the period of Stalin's cult of personality but all were given an apt, profound and well-reasoned reply.

If one speaks about the American perception (and not by ordinary readers but by specialists) of the post-Leninist period in Soviet history, one is struck by its inadequacy to our comprehension. This is natural. However, certain facts provide food for thought. A number of the American historians visiting us were virtually unfamiliar with the name of M.V. Frunze, or in any event his activities were unknown, while the biographies of N.I. Bukharin, L.D. Trotsky and M.N. Tukhachevskiy were rather well known and, most importantly, there was a great desire to more profoundly study their activities. K.Ye. Voroshilov and S.M. Budenny in the interpretation of the American side are uniformly depicted as butchers of their own people. Such discoveries can and should be known, if we wish, defending the socialist ideals and giving priority to common human values and for this there must be more frequent, regular and extended contacts between our peoples in the humanities sphere, including in the history area.

One can scarcely consider as satisfactory the fact that the colloquium was attended by a very small number of young Soviet historians. This would have been understandable if the forum had been held in the United States, but here, in Moscow, each academy historical institute without any difficulty could have assigned to the colloquium five or six young candidates of sciences, junior science associates and graduate students with a knowledge of English. I do not doubt that for greater professional skill of each of them participation in such a forum would have been very beneficial.

In conclusion I would point out that there certainly is a need to conduct similar measures on other problems of

Russian, Soviet, American and world history, in particular on the questions of military history. In the latter instance, it is essential to establish systematic contact between Soviet and American military historians in those forms which would be acceptable for both sides and, most importantly, would help to improve the quality of the military history research. It would be desirable to more widely involve the youth in preparing and conducting the joint measures. To look at things more widely, all that has been said above about Soviet-American collaboration in the history area applies fully to international ties in this sphere as a whole.

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